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Food sovereignty is Africa’s only solution to climate chaos

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6 years ago

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Processing of local rice by a women’s cooperative in Dioro, Mali. Photo: FAO/Michela Paganini
The convergence of the climate crisis and rising food imports in Africa is a recipe for catastrophe. Unless actions are taken to build up local food systems and reverse the growing reliance on imports of cereals and other staple foods, there will be multiple and more severe repeats of the 2007-8 food crisis that caused food riots across the continent. African governments and donors have wasted the past decade on failed programmes and policies to support corporate agribusiness while doing little to effectively challenge the corporations that are dumping surplus food commodities, driving up global greenhouse gas emissions and destroying biodiversity. Now, movements for climate justice and African food producers must urgently join forces to eliminate the dependence on food imports and realise food sovereignty across the continent to respond to the climate crisis.
For Africa, the climate crisis is a food crisis
Africa’s food forecast over the next decades is troubling. The continent will need more food to cope with a growing population that the United Nations projects will rise from 1.2 billion to 1.7 billion over the next decade.[1] But, as this demand for food surges ahead, the increasing effects of climate change will make food production on the continent more difficult. Estimates are that global warming could cause a 10% – 20% reduction in Africa’s overall food production.[2]
If nothing is done to reverse course, Africa’s food imports will soar. The African Development Bank expects that Africa’s net food imports will triple between now and 2025, reaching over $110 billion.[3] The United Nations predicts that Africa may only produce just 13% of its food needs by 2050.[4]
African countries are already well aware of how vulnerable this dependence on food imports leaves them. In 2007, a set of weather shocks in Asia set off a cascade of actions that spiked the price of rice on the international market, with ripple effects on other cereals. Africa, which accounts for about a third of global imports of rice and wheat, was hit hard. The rise in prices was too much for millions of Africans to absorb and food riots broke out across the continent, from Ouagadougou to Cairo, Maputo to Abidjan, and Dakar to Nouakchott. In Nairobi, a protest over rising food prices for basic foods, called the “Unga Revolution” (Maize Flour Revolution), began in 2008 and lasted until 2011.[5]
Climate change will make such global food price spikes more frequent, and will push international prices for basic food commodities upwards. Consider maize, one of the world’s most heavily-traded agricultural commodities and an important staple food for much of Africa. Until recently, yields of maize were relatively stable in the main maize-producing areas of the world, and serious climate-induced yield reductions were rare. But with the warming of the planet, the chances of major crop losses are increasing, as are the chances of simultaneous crops losses in the large maize-exporting areas, such as North America and the Southern Cone of Latin America. Researchers with the US Department of Atmospheric Sciences estimate that the probability for simultaneous major production losses in the large maize-exporting countries in any given year is virtually zero under present-day climate conditions but rises to seven per cent with 2 °C of warming and 86 per cent with 4 °C of warming.[6]
If one set of far away, isolated weather shocks was enough to cause food riots across Africa in 2007-8, imagine what this would look like in the coming decades, if the climate crisis deepens and hundreds of millions more Africans are dependent on imports of basic foods. This is an unfolding crisis of epic proportions that needs immediate action.
The future does not have to look like this. There are complementary actions that can be taken inside and outside of Africa to ensure that Africa has the capacity to feed itself in the years to come. Yes, the climate crisis will and is already making food production on the continent more challenging and will increase the frequency and severity of weather shocks such as floods and droughts. But the extent of these impacts can be greatly lessened if fast and deep reductions are made to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the main polluting countries. Such reductions will require a profound transformation of the global food system- from a model that favours the industrialised production of cheap commodities that are processed and shipped to Africa and other parts of the world, to a model based on agroecological production and local food systems. In this sense, Africa’s farmers, fisher people and pastoralists are a leading example for the rest of the world to follow. They are already using agroecological methods to mitigate and build resilience in the face of climate extremes. And they are more than capable of feeding the entire continent, even in the face of the growing climate crises. What they require is access to sufficient and appropriate lands, water, fish stocks and seeds, paired with policies and programmes that support them and can ensure that food gets to where it is needed. It sounds simple but these basic measures towards food sovereignty are precisely what is not being done.
How will climate change impact African agriculture?
Climate models are still not able to provide a detailed picture of the impacts that climate change will have on African agriculture. The latest science does, however, concur that rising temperatures, erratic weather, changes to rainfall patterns and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events will negatively impact food production across most of the continent. Scientists also agree that African food production is particularly at risk because of the dominance of rain-fed farming and pastoral livestock systems, which are highly vulnerable to the rainfall variability and heat waves generated by climate change. They predict that climate change will cause shorter growing seasons, reduced soil fertility, new pest and disease pressures, lower crop yields and animal productivity and a reduction in farming and grazing lands over large parts of Africa. They also agree that food production will be more frequently and adversely affected by extreme weather events.
Such impacts are already in evidence with this year’s floods and cyclones in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe or the drought that began in Somalia and Somaliland in June this year.[1] As noted by La Via Campesina Southern and Eastern Africa: “While the discussion on climate change at the global level often revolves around predictions on future consequences and the perceived threat of increasing migration, the effects are already very much a present lived experience of Africa’s peasants, rural women, landless peoples and indigenous communities, who feel the impacts of climate change everyday.”[2]
[2] This quote is slightly modified from the original in LVC-SEAf and Afrika Kontakt, “Peasant agroecology achieves climate justice: a primer,” May 2018: https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/05/primer_english_print.pdf
Food self-sufficiency moves back on the agenda
Africa’s dependence on food imports is a recent phenomenon. In the 1980s, under pressure from the former colonial powers and the multilateral lending agencies, African governments abandoned local agriculture and food systems, opened the door to massive imports and aid shipments of cereals and other basic foods and channelled the remaining state support into exports of a few cash crops (cotton, coffee, cacao, palm oil, rubber, etc.). The result was that, between 1980 and 2007, Africa’s food production did not keep up with its population growth and its food deficit grew at an average of 3.4 percent per year. Over that period, Africa went from having a balance of agricultural exports and imports to a US$22 billion food deficit.[7]
It is important to recognise that the majority of these food imports are for staple foods, particularly cereals like rice, maize, and wheat, and dairy and meat products, meaning that much of Africa is now heavily reliant on food imports (and/or food aid) for its food security.[8] Moreover, by the turn of the century, over a quarter of Africa’s population was considered chronically hungry.[9]
African heads of state came together in 2003 in a first effort to try and come to terms with this intolerable situation. They launched a Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and committed to investing 10 per cent of their national budgets in agriculture and rural development.[10] But these commitments on paper did not translate (and have still not translated) into much concrete action.[11] Then came the 2007-8 global food crisis. With their populations rioting in the streets over food prices, African governments once again promised urgent measures to ramp up food supplies and domestic production, with some even promising to bring back the long-lost days of food self-sufficiency.[12]
In the aftermath of this food crisis, several major initiatives to boost national food production were launched in Africa, most of them closely coordinated with foreign donors and multilateral agencies. Some of these initiatives are continental, like the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa or the African Development Bank’s Feed Africa Strategy. Others are regional, like the “Rice Offensive” of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or national, like the Grande Offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l’abondance (GOANA) launched by Senegal’s former President Abdoulaye Wade. Certain African governments have also enacted policy measures to curb food imports and support domestic production that were not on the table prior to the crisis, such as food reserves, targeted import duties, quotas, foreign exchange controls and even bans on specific food items.
Table 1. Some measures to restrict food trade enacted by African governments
Country/Agency
Measure
Year
Nigeria
Foreign exchange prohibition on imports of rice
2015
ECOWAS
Regional Food Security Reserve
2013
Zambia
Ban on imports of certain fruits and vegetables
2017
Egypt
Export ban on rice
2008, 2017
Burkina Faso
Decree requiring public programmes to procure local foods
2017
Tanzania
Suspension of rice imports
2018
But, despite the impressive names of these various initiatives, most have fallen far short of their ambitions. There have been some gains in production, but imports of cereals and other basic foods continue to grow in many African countries. Part of the problem is that these initiatives have not done enough to protect local production from the dumping of cheap imports. Most measures were either temporary, open to abuse from large traders and smugglers, or simply too weak and backed up with too few resources to make a difference. Moreover, many African governments have signed onto and/or are negotiating trade agreements that make it much harder to implement food import restrictions and protections for local food producers, including the recently-launched African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA).[13]
Climate, food and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA)
The central and guiding priority of the AfCFTA is to create a single, completely liberalised market for goods and services across Africa.[1] The text of the agreement, which was formally adopted in March 2018, commits all member countries to a rapid, deep and comprehensive liberalisation process, with only a small window available for countries to exclude sensitive items or to delay their tariff liberalisation.[2]
No special treatment is provided for agricultural products and foods, despite the critical importance of the food and agricultural sector to Africa. No mention is made of climate change either, despite the enormous impacts this will have on Africa over the coming decades. Rather, AfCFTA severely constrains the trade measures and domestic programmes that governments can implement to protect their local food systems and to take action against climate change. On the other hand, the AfCFTA contains a specific article that sanctifies “Special Economic Arrangements/Zones”, in which corporations are freed from tax obligations and other national laws and regulations (land laws, labour laws, etc.).
Further advantages for agribusiness will be on the table in Phase II of the negotiations, when a chapter on intellectual property rights will be negotiated that will cover seeds. The tendency in neoliberal trade agreements is to harmonise “upwards” toward international standards on patents and plant breeders’ rights that criminalise farmers for saving seeds and that do not allow for diversity and alternatives (which, like small farmer support programmes, require aggressive domestic agendas). In the planned second phase of negotiations, therefore, AfCFTA will likely bring forward some form of obligation on governments to implement strict patent and plant breeders’ rights legislation on seeds, along the lines of UPOV.
AfCFTA’s emphasis on liberalisation and corporate privileges undermines and pre-empts domestic policies and programmes that could strengthen the small-scale food producers and informal traders and street food sellers who are currently the main actors in African food systems. It will inevitably concentrate more power within the formal agribusiness and food sector– which is dominated by foreign corporations and a handful of national and multinational African companies. This is already happening under the existing trade frameworks and it will get worse through increased liberalisation under AfCFTA, not better. As is simply stated by Dr Ndongo Samba Sylla of the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation in Senegal: “Agriculture is generally not a sector that should be liberalised.”[3]
[1] The text of the AfCFTA is available here: https://www.bilaterals.org/?afcfta-consolidated-text-march
[2] For more information see Jonathan Cannard, “The African Continental Free Trade Agreement: Loss of sovereignty, lack of transparency,” AIDC, 27 May, 2019: http://aidc.org.za/the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement-loss-of-sovereignty-lack-of-transparency/ ; Peter Lunenborg, “‘Phase 1B’ of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) negotiations,” South Centre, June 2019: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/PB63_Phase-1B-of-the-AfCFTA-negotiations_EN-1.pdf
[3] Bilaterals.org, “Interview de Ndongo Samba Sylla,” March 2018: https://www.bilaterals.org/?interview-de-ndongo-samba-sylla&lang=en
The corporate model falls apart
The other major defect with these post-food crisis initiatives is their focus on big business. Over the past decade, African governments, at the behest of outside donors, have changed laws and regulations, granted tax breaks, handed out lands and money and set up special economic zones with the hope of attracting investment from agribusiness corporations. But, ten years on, it is clear that this strategy has not worked. The private investment that was promised in return for these policies and handouts, whether in contract farming schemes or plant breeding, has either not materialised or failed badly.[14]
Consider the case of rice. Rice is not a traditional staple crop for most of the continent, but urbanisation and cheap imports from Asia and the US have contributed to a galloping rise in consumption across the continent over the past 50 years. Production has failed to keep up with consumption and today Africa imports about half of what it consumes, spending roughly US$3.5 billion a year on rice imports.
With the spike in rice prices in 2007-8, Africa’s political class had little choice but to take action to reduce the import bill. But any efforts that might favour local production over imports had to run up against the interests of the powerful cartel of transnational trading companies and local business elites that control the lucrative rice trade into Africa. So, rather than take on these forces, many African governments chose instead to enlist them in their strategies to reinvigorate national rice production.
Rice cartels undermine local production efforts in Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire
The Nigerian government imposed an 110% tariff on rice imports in 2013 to encourage domestic production. But it offered trading companies quotas with much lower tariffs if they could show that they were investing in local rice production. The result: investigations by the Nigerian Senate revealed that the largest trading companies either lied about their investments or exceeded allocated quotas, adding up to a loss of over US$160 million to the Nigerian government in 2014, the year the scheme was implemented.[1] When the government then abolished the trade differentials and implemented foreign exchange controls to further block imports, traders rerouted their shipments to the port of Cotonou, in Benin, and the rice was smuggled into Nigeria over land.[2]
Those traders who are investing into Nigerian rice production have directed much of their investment to their own massive rice plantations. This is the case of the Singapore-based multinational food company Olam, which is building Africa’s largest rice plantation on a 10,000 ha land concession in Nasarawa State.[3] Olam is one of the companies that violated the Nigerian government’s tariff reduction scheme by greatly exceeding its allocated quota, depriving the state of around US$25 million.
Olam had also pledged to make multi-million dollar investments in Côte d’Ivoire’s rice sector in the wake of the rice price crisis of 2007-8, alongside several other big rice traders.[4] Olam’s promised investment never materialised, nor did the deals to establish mills, large-scale rice farms and contract growing operations signed between the government and five other multinational cereal trading companies as part of the country’s Cooperation Framework with the G8’s New Alliance.[5] All of these projects failed, including a high-profile 100,000 ha project with one of the world’s largest grain traders, Louis Dreyfus of France.[6] Meanwhile, rice imports into Côte d’Ivoire have continued to grow, hitting a record high in 2018 and accounting for over half of the country’s rice supply– and Louis Dreyfus continues to dominate the import market.[7]
[3] Olam’s contract rice farming schemes with Nigerian farmers have performed poorly, despite significant backing from USAID and the UN’S IFAD. See https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/245894/files/Revised_OLAM_Report_June_jms3.pdf
[4]https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/afdc84804b5f0477bc28fd08bc54e20b/GAFSP_CountryDiagnostic_COTE+D%E2%80%99IVOIRE_Full.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[5] GRAIN, “The G8 and land grabs in Africa,” 11 March 2013: https://grain.org/e/4663
[6] See Inades Formation, “Étude sur le partenariat public-privé dans le secteur agricole en Côte d’Ivoire: le cas de la filière riz, dans le cadre de la.Nouvelle Alliance pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Nutrition en Côte d’Ivoire”, 2016: http://publications.inadesformation.net/download.php?f=.%2Fupload%2Fdoc%2Finades_doc_306_zzQzWLzx.pdf; and GRAIN, “Failed farmland deals: A growing legacy of disaster and pain,” 6 June 2018: https://grain.org/e/5958
These strategies to lower tariffs for companies investing in local rice production has done little to curb imports and has resulted in a shockingly long list of corporate rice farming projects that have gone bust across Africa in recent years. The projects wasted millions of dollars in public funds and deprived African farmers of lands and water to produce food. They undermined, rather than supported, African government pledges to reduce rice deficits.[15]
Mali is the one country in West Africa that has achieved its rice self-sufficiency targets, but this was done despite the actions of big business. All of the corporate rice farm projects announced in Mali after the 2007-8 food crisis failed.[16] Mali’s path to self-sufficiency was only achieved through the political struggle and hard work of its small-scale rice farmers. They seized on the rice crisis of 2007-8 to put in place a national rice platform led by rice farmers, which then pushed the government into taking measures to restrict imports and support farmers in increasing domestic rice production, mainly by ensuring access for small farmers to lands and water and by getting the government to purchase local rice for its national rice reserves. The rice farmers also teamed up with the small-scale millers, merchants, transporters and other actors involved in local rice markets to educate consumers on the benefits of local rice, and they have fought a constant battle to keep the big trading companies from re-opening the doors to imports.[17]
A peasant and street vendor in Kumasi, Ghana. Photo: GRAINEgypt is another rice self-sufficient country in Africa, but with a much longer record. At the time of the rice price crisis in 2007-8, Egypt was actually exporting significant volumes. Much of the country’s rice crop is purchased for the national food subsidy program, which provides discounted staple foods to nearly two-thirds of the country’s households. When international food prices spiked in 2007-8, the price of bread shot up because Egypt is one of the world’s top importers of wheat, but the government was able to partially offset this hike in the price of bread by blocking rice exports and keeping its population supplied with affordable local rice, despite efforts by the grain traders to keep their export channels open.[18]
What stands out in Egypt and Mali’s rice self-sufficiency stories is the marginal role of big agribusiness and food companies. The main actors here are smallholder farmers and, in the case of Mali, a vast web of small traders and retailers, or, in the case of Egypt, a state purchase and distribution system. Both governments also regulated trade, and big business was not able to set the agenda on rice policy.[19] This shows that food self-sufficiency is achieved through government support of local production, not through corporate agribusiness and international trade.
These are simple and low-cost ways that African governments can get behind their food producers and support them in providing high-quality, locally-grown food for their populations, without having to depend on foreign donors. Yet most African governments remain entirely focused on supporting agribusiness corporations. Not only do they provide these companies with tax incentives and corporate-friendly regulations and policies, but they are even giving corporations their country’s most fertile lands and important water sources.
It is incredulous that, in the face of a climate crisis and population boom, African governments have, over the past ten years, given away over 10 million hectares of fertile lands to foreign companies to produce foods for export. These large-scale land grabs were mostly undertaken without consulting the rural communities that live on the lands and have deprived them of the access they need, now and in the future, to land, forests and water sources to feed their communities and supply local markets.[20]
Corporate seeds are no cure for climate change
When it comes to seeds, African governments have similarly spent the past two decades complying with demands from the big seed companies to make their laws and regulations corporate-friendly, under heavy pressure from the World Bank, foreign governments and major donors like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The justification was always that such changes would drive private investment into plant breeding on the continent and provide farmers with improved varieties. But this investment is not happening. Instead, the number of formal plant breeders is in decline, even in some of Africa’s biggest seed markets, and the vast majority of Africa’s plant breeders are still working in the public sector. Moreover, the private sector is almost exclusively focused on plant breeding for big money-making hybrid crops like maize, and is hardly present when it comes to important traditional food crops that are more resilient to climate change like millet.[21] Meanwhile, the legal and regulatory changes that governments have implemented for the seed companies have damaged and even criminalised Africa’s dynamic and innovative farmer seed systems, which continue to account for 80% of Africa’s seed supply.[22]
Malawi provides a painful lesson of why programmes to boost local food production with corporate seeds do not work. A little over a decade ago, Malawi launched a national programme to distribute subsidised maize seeds and fertilisers to its farmers. Initially the programme focused on varieties bred by national scientists. But soon, after much pressure from the US government and the World Bank, the program became focused on hybrid maize sold by Monsanto and the Seed Co., a company from Zimbabwe. The first thing that Monsanto did when entering the country was to buy up the national seed company that had developed open-pollinated and hybrid maize varieties adapted to the local agroecosystems. Monsanto dropped the local varieties from circulation and pushed its own, patented varieties instead, even though some of the local varieties were much more productive than their own. Over the years, Monsanto, together with the companies that import and distribute chemical fertilisers, became the main beneficiaries of the government’s seed and fertiliser subsidy programme. With Monsanto in control, the yields of hybrid maize went down, the soils were depleted, and, during the 2015-2016 drought and flooding seasons, the maize crops were almost entirely destroyed. In many places across Malawi, farmers are now moving back to local seed varieties, composting and reintroducing traditional crops that were left behind by the subsidy programmes, such as legumes that build soil fertility and hardy crops like cassava and millet.[23]
A vision for Africa’s food systems in an era of climate crisis
Fodder grass that was scorched by the persistent drought in Nakasongola district, Central Uganda. Photo: Robert Guloba/PELUM UgandaAny policy or programme that is going to effectively deal with the twin food and climate crises bearing down on Africa has to focus on the main actors in Africa’s food system. Africa’s food producers (small farmers, fisher people and pastoralists) and local markets still supply 80% of the food that is produced and consumed on the continent.[24] Africa’s food supply relies primarily on the knowledge, seeds, animals, soils and local biodiversity that is maintained by Africa’s small food producers. And Africa’s growing number of urban consumers depend on the small traders and street food vendors to ensure their access to these foods. It is critical to note that the vast majority of these actors in Africa’s food systems are women.[25]
Africa’s food systems, based largely on agroecological practices and short circuits, are the ultimate in green, low emissions and resilient systems, and they supply diets that are among the healthiest on the planet.[26] Despite a policy environment that is designed to crush them, Africa’s food systems are also the continent’s economic engine, providing more livelihoods, jobs and revenue than any other sector.[27] Food imports on the other hand are a huge revenue drain on Africa’s scarce foreign reserves (which, it needs to be said, are generated in large part from the sale of fossil fuels).
Africa’s local food systems are what sustains the continent today, and what can sustain it into the future. The climate crisis will increasingly challenge these systems, especially if global greenhouse gas emissions in other parts of the world are not seriously reduced. African food producers will have to continue to adapt their practices and knowledge to cope with a changing and unpredictable climate. Local markets will have to integrate emergency reserves and other measures to ensure people’s access to food and livelihoods during extreme weather events like floods and droughts. These are difficult but not insurmountable issues, and already there are many inspiring initiatives being implemented across the continent to prepare for climate change.[28]
It is important to recognise that the climate crisis requires approaches to adaptation that support Africa’s food systems and are led by Africa’s small-scale food producers, not approaches that rely heavily on chemical inputs and seeds sold by multinational companies, such as those often described as “climate smart” and promoted by programmes like A Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA). (see box: The hoax of climate smart agriculture).
The hoax of climate smart agriculture
Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) has become one of the new slogans of governments, institutions and corporations when they talk about where farming should be heading in the era of climate crisis. The World Bank, FAO, CGIAR and other institutions all have set up special departments to deal with the issue, and websites to inform the public. These agencies, together with governments, NGOs and the private sector, formed the Global Alliance for CSA in 2015. Centrally involved in the launch of the Alliance was the fertiliser industry, which was trying to hijack the growing enthusiasm for agroecology. Of the Alliance’s 29 non-governmental founding members, there were three fertiliser industry lobby groups, two of the world’s largest fertiliser companies (Yara of Norway and Mosaic of the US), and a handful of organisations working directly with fertiliser companies on climate change programmes.[1] Initially a full 60% of the private sector members of the Alliance were from the fertiliser industry, and today they are still centrally involved in its management and priority setting.[2]
But everybody seems to have their own understanding of what CSA entails. The UN and the World Bank present CSA as achieving a “triple-win” of outcomes: increased productivity, enhanced resilience, and reduced emissions from farming. Underlying all this is the notion of ‘sustainable intensification’ that is promoted by fertiliser companies like Yara or pesticide and seed companies like Syngenta and Bayer/Monsanto.

The conceptual and practical vagueness of the concept allows everybody to make their own interpretations and avoid thorny issues such as power imbalances, socio-economic impacts and gender inequities.

Indeed, if one looks at the dominant literature on CSA, most of it is extremely oriented to on-farm production processes only, ignoring the tremendous emissions produced by the wider farm to fork industrial food system. Very revealing in that context are the CSA country profiles that have been developed by the CGIAR and the World Bank giving climate smart scorecards for different countries.[3] They rank Argentina’s huge soybean plantations as super climate smart, applaud farmers in Africa who use improved seeds and controlled chemical fertiliser and give them a high “smartness level”, but fail to analyse indigenous farming practices and the threats they face. The World Bank’s 2016-2020 Climate Action Plan commits to climate smart agriculture investment plans in at least 40 countries “with a focus on hybrid seeds and carbon capture practices, high-efficiency/low-energy-use irrigation programs, livestock productivity, energy solutions for agribusiness, and mainstreaming of risk management.”[4]

Stuck in such discourses and business plans, Climate Smart Agriculture is not going to take us in the direction we need. We need an approach based on agroecology that builds soil carbon and fertility, combined with policies that support small scale farmers and their harvests, local markets and the end of food dumping into Africa.
[1] For more on the origins of “climate smart agriculture” see GRAIN, “The Exxons of agriculture“, 30 September 2015.
[3] See CGIAR/Worldbank/USAID: CSA Country Profiles: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/publications/csa-country-profiles
[4] World Bank Group, Climate change action plan 2016-2020. Washington 2016.
It is also crucial to recognise that adaptation is a secondary issue. It should not get the outsized attention it receives in governmental circles when climate change and Africa’s food systems are on the agenda. The single most important and effective way to protect African food systems from global warming is to cut global greenhouse gas emissions. Given that Africa, as a whole, contributes less than 4% of global emissions this is obviously something that has to happen outside of the continent.[29] And, because the industrial food system is associated with up to half of all global emissions, and is the leading cause of species collapse, deforestation and habitat destruction worldwide, this reduction has to involve a wholesale transformation of the global food system.[30]
Meaningful climate action in the industrialised countries means an end to the surplus production of the food commodities that are dumped in Africa. Meaningful climate action in Africa means putting an end to the import of these surplus food commodities. The two actions go hand-in-hand; the solution in the North and the South is food sovereignty.
This is the uncomfortable truth that is always left out of high-level governmental discussions and policy processes. In this year’s report by the European Commission’s Task Force Rural Africa, for instance, there is plenty of discussion about how to help African farmers to adapt to climate change but no mention of how the exports and greenhouse gas emissions from Europe’s food system undermine Africa’s food production and its capacity to weather the climate crisis (see box: The case of dairy).[31] It is politically more expedient to tell small farmers in Africa what to do (“no slash and burn agriculture”, “use ‘climate smart’ GMO seeds”) than it is to deal with the massive emissions produced by the big food and agribusiness corporations back home.
The case of dairy
Twenty dairy companies based in Europe, North America, Asia and New Zealand process 25% of all the milk produced in the world and dominate the global trade in dairy products.[1] Together these companies are responsible for more annual GHG emissions than Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy.[2]
Many of these companies are based in Europe, which produces more dairy than any country in the world (about 30% of the global total). Over the past decade, instead of reducing dairy production in line with Europe’s commitments to reduce its bloated GHG emissions, European dairy companies have been ramping up production. Since consumption in Europe is stagnating, an increasing share of this production is being sent overseas, in the form of milk powder.
Africa has become a key dumping ground for Europe’s heavily subsidised, surplus milk powder, especially in the form of fat-filled milk powder, which is skim milk powder that is reconstituted with cheap vegetable oils like palm oil. Africa now accounts for over a third of Europe’s exports of fat-filled milk powder, and this low-quality product has inundated Africa’s dairy markets, wreaking havoc on local dairies and dairy farmers.[3]

In line with its climate commitments, Europe has to reduce its consumption and production of dairy products (and find a way to do so that protects its small-scale dairy farmers and processors). It can’t merely export its problem. And, in this way, Africa’s growing consumption of dairy, which is still well below the global per capita average, can be supplied by African dairy farmers and small-scale processors.

[2] GRAIN and IATP calculate that the top 12 dairy companies produced 274 MT of CO2e emissions in 2017. Wehen the next eight companies are included the total would easily surpass the GHG emissions of Nigeria, which were 304 Mt CO2e in 2017. See GRAIN and IATP, “Emissions impossible: How big meat and dairy are heating up the planet,” 18 July 2018: https://grain.org/e/5976 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_greenhouse_gas_emissions
[3] Fanny Pigeuad, “L’Afrique de l’Ouest consomme de plus en plus de «faux lait» européen”, Mediapart, 3 June 2019: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030619/l-afrique-de-l-ouest-consomme-de-plus-en-plus-de-faux-lait-europeen
African governments are unfortunately mostly singing along with this chorus. Instead of resisting, they are facilitating Africa’s integration into the supply chains of the global food and agribusiness corporations: keeping their borders open to the dumping of surplus food commodities and ultra-processed foods, handing out fertile lands for industrial plantations of oil palms, sugar cane and animal feed crops and criminalising the practices of small vendors and farmers.[32] There are some hopeful exceptions, such as in Burkina Faso where the government recently put in place a decree requiring public institutions, such as school canteens, to procure only locally-produced foods.[33] But a much deeper and complete reorientation of public policy by African governments is needed to facilitate and support the necessary transition towards food sovereignty. In the annexed table ‘Good climate – bad climate’ we give some examples of what that could entail.
As it now stands, the actors in Africa’s food systems– the pastoralists and the butchers, the farmers and open-air market vendors, the small-scale fishers and street food hawkers, the farm labourers and women preparing food at home– are going to have to take matters into their own hands. They need to urgently come together, with the support of movements for climate justice, to build and implement a vision for how to respond to the climate crisis and to the interconnected food crisis that Africa faces.
This process is already well underway. Africa’s rural social movements have articulated and come together around a number of demands and principles over recent years that can serve as a basis for a vision for Africa’s food systems in an era of climate crisis. The Nyéléni Peasant Agroecology Manifesto, for instance, which was adopted by numerous national and regional African peasant and fisherfolk organisations in 2017, provides a clear path towards food sovereignty and climate resilience.[34] The vision is already being put into action by social movements in different parts of Africa, from campaigns to eat-local to struggles against corporate land grabs to fights against the entry of transnational supermarket chains. Such interconnected actions are immediately required to break Africa’s dependence on food imports, advance food sovereignty and, in so doing, effectively deal with the climate crisis.
GRAIN wishes to thank Andrew Adem, Nyoni Ndabezinhle, Mariann Bassey, Mamadou Goïta and David Calleb Otieno for their inputs into this report.
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Original Source: Grain.org

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MEDIA FOR CHANGE NETWORK

Young activists fight to be heard as officials push forward on devastating project: ‘It is corporate greed’

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3 months ago

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August 27, 2025

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“We refuse to inherit a damaged planet and devastated communities.”

Youth climate activists in Uganda protesting the East African Crude Oil Pipeline, or EACOP, are frustrated with the government’s response to their demonstration as the years-long project moves forward.

According to the country’s Daily Monitor, youth activists organized with End Fossil Occupy Uganda took to the streets of Kampala in early August to protest EACOP. The pipeline, under construction since about 2017 and now 62 percent complete, is set to transport crude oil from Uganda’s Tilenga and Kingfisher fields through Tanzania to the Indian Ocean port of Tanga by 2026.

Activists noted the devastating toll, with group spokesperson Felix Musinguzi saying that already around 13,000 people “have lost their land with unfair compensation” and estimating that around 90,000 more in Uganda and Tanzania could be affected. End Fossil Occupy Uganda has also warned of risks to vital water sources, including Lake Victoria, which it says 40 million people rely on.

The group has been calling on financial institutions to withdraw funding for the project. Following a demonstration at Stanbic Bank earlier in the month, 12 activists were arrested, according to the Daily Monitor.

Some protesters were seen holding signs reading “Every loan to big oil is a debt to our children” and “It’s not economic development; it is corporate greed.”

Meanwhile, the regional newspaper says the government has described the activist efforts as driven by foreign actors who mean to subvert economic progress.

EACOP’s site notes that its shareholders include French multinational TotalEnergies — owning 62 percent of the company’s shares — Uganda National Oil Company, Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation.

The wave of young people taking action against EACOP could be seen as a sign of growing public frustration over infrastructural projects that promise economic gain while bringing harm to local communities and ecosystems. Activists say residents face costly threats from pipeline development, such as forced displacement and the loss of livelihoods.

Environmental hazards to Lake Victoria could also disrupt water supplies and food systems, bringing the potential for both financial and health impacts. Just 10 years ago, an oil spill in Kenya caused a humanitarian crisis. The Kenya Pipeline Company reportedly attributed the spill to pipeline corrosion, which led to contamination of the Thange River and severe illness.

The EACOP project has already locked the region into close to a decade of development, and concerns about the pipeline and continued investments in carbon-intensive systems go back just as long. Youth activists, as well as concerned citizens of all ages, say efforts to move toward climate resilience can’t wait. “As young people, we refuse to inherit a damaged planet and devastated communities,” Musinguzi said, per the Monitor.

Source: The Cool Down

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WITNESS RADIO MILESTONES

Why matooke farming is losing ground in Bukedi

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3 months ago

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August 27, 2025

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On a humid morning in Namusango Village, Kamonkoli South Ward, Kamonkoli Town Council in Budaka District, 58-year-old farmer James Kainja walks at the edge of what used to be his flourishing matooke garden.  For generations, the green banana plant—matooke—stood tall in Uganda’s farmlands, its broad leaves swaying in the wind and its heavy bunches promising a warm, hearty meal. But in Bukedi Sub-region today, that story is fading. Between the tired banana stools, spear grass has taken over. A few bunches hang small and low quality. “We used to harvest every week,” Mr Kainja says, dusting his palms.

“Now, it is once in a while and the money is not worth the struggle,” he adds. Across Bukedi, particularly in Pallisa, Budaka, Butebo, and Kibuku, the banana plants are shrinking back, replaced by maize, cassava, rice, and other faster-growing crops.  The sub-region that once sent truckloads of matooke to nearby districts now measures its banana harvest in small piles under tarpaulin. Where the green canopy of banana leaves once dominated, the landscape has changed. For many farmers, the decision is not about abandoning tradition but about survival.

Matooke as culture

In many Bukedi households, matooke still holds cultural value, especially during weddings, funerals, and community gatherings.  But with fewer plantations, sourcing enough bunches has become harder and more expensive. Matooke is now imported into Bukedi from Mbale and Mbarara. Mr Abubakar Nanghejje, an elder in Kibuku, warns: “If this trend continues, our children may only know matooke from stories. We are losing more than a crop—we are losing a piece of who we are.”

He adds that matooke, once abundant, is now a luxury: “People only access matooke during ceremonies because the cost of a bunch has turned expensive,” he explains. Within Kibuku Town Council, women sell matooke in pieces: three or four fingers for Shs1,000, while a complete bunch costs between Shs30,000 and Shs35,000. This contrasts sharply with central and western Uganda, where matooke is more than a crop—it is an identity, a culture, and a livelihood.  Yet across the country, banana plantations are thinning out, replaced by maize, beans, or simply abandoned.

Farmers’ voices

Mr Peter Mwigala, a 73-year-old farmer from Bubulanga Village, recalls with nostalgia: “I grew matooke for 30 years. But now my plantation is less than half what it used to be. The pests are too many, the prices are too low, and the rains are no longer reliable.” His story echoes across villages, evidence of a slow, steady decline in matooke production.  This decline has unfolded over two to three decades, rather than as a sudden collapse. Agricultural researchers point to several reasons. Among them, banana bacterial wilt (BBW), banana weevils, and nematodes that have devastated plantations in major banana-growing areas. These pests cause premature ripening, rotting, and eventual uprooting of infected plants.

 “When wilt enters your plantation, you can lose everything in one season,” says Mr Abner Botiri, an agriculture officer in Budaka. He further explains that erratic rainfall and prolonged dry spells also take a toll.  Matooke thrives in consistent moisture, but under drought stress it yields smaller bunches.  Repeated losses have led some farmers to abandon the crop entirely. Continuous cultivation without soil management has also depleted many banana-growing soils. Beyond agronomic challenges, the economics of matooke farming have shifted dramatically.  Local market prices fluctuate widely depending on supply, while transport costs have risen sharply.

Mr John Gwanyi, a 71-year-old farmer, recalls: “In the 1980s and 1990s, matooke farmers could educate children through primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, and still cover basic needs. Today, a whole plantation might not pay for one term’s school fees.” Urbanisation has worsened the trend. Younger generations moving to towns now eat rice, spaghetti, and bread more frequently.

The once sacred matooke meal is no longer the undisputed centrepiece of Ugandan dining tables. Meanwhile, land fragmentation leaves families with smaller plots, unable to sustain large banana plantations.  In some areas, higher-value or quicker-return crops like coffee, passion fruit, or maize dominate.  As one agricultural economist notes: “A bunch of matooke takes nine months to mature, but maize can be ready in three months. For cash-strapped farmers, that difference matters.

Government interventions

Government and research institutions have made several attempts to address the situation.  The National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) has introduced resistant banana varieties and promoted good agronomic practices. NGOs are training farmers in mulching, proper spacing, and integrated pest management. Still, the decline carries a cultural weight. In Buganda, for instance, matooke is central to marriage ceremonies, community gatherings, and daily life.

“When you serve matooke at a function, it shows respect,” explains Mr Badiru Kirya, a cultural leader in Obwa Ikumbania bwa Bugwere. Yet, Mr Kirya attributes part of the decline to newer banana varieties introduced by research agencies. “The old varieties planted by our grandparents could withstand weather changes better. These new varieties are weaker against climate volatility,” he says. He also notes that soil infertility and population pressure have accelerated the decline, as families squeeze more onto smaller pieces of land.

National standing

Uganda remains one of the world’s largest banana consumers, with per capita consumption estimated at 250–300 kg annually in some regions. Yet, national banana production has generally declined. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2024 census, only 27.1 percent of households participate in banana cultivation.  Dr Sadik Kassim, the NARO deputy director general in-charge of agricultural promotion, highlights several factors. “Soil fertility has gone low, while pests and disease build-up have grossly affected matooke gardens. Erratic rainfall and climate change further reduce yields.

Poor agricultural practices have made the decline worse,” he says. However, Dr Kassim dismisses the claim that new technologies are to blame. Similarly, Dr Rabooni Tumuhimbise, the director of research at Rwebitaba Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institute, said: “As of now, I am not aware that Bukedi has registered a decline in banana production. This needs verification before conclusions.” But farmers and local leaders insist the reality is clear: matooke is disappearing from Bukedi. Mr Arthur Wako Mboizi, a seasoned politician and opinion leader, argues: “Bukedi has drastically registered a total decline in banana production due to various factors, including soil infertility, diseases, and erratic rainfall.”

Efforts are underway to add value. Under the Presidential Initiative on Banana, NARO and Kilimo Trust have developed matooke-based products such as flour, bread, and cakes. More than 13 million Ugandans consume bananas as their staple, and 75 percent of farmers grow them, contributing nearly $440 million annually to the economy. Yet, for Bukedi, the reality is sobering. The once proud producer of matooke is a shadow of its former self. As Mr Nanghejje, the Kibuku elder, put it: “We are losing more than a crop. We are losing a piece of who we are.”

Background 

In 2024, national banana production was estimated at 6 million tonnes annually, 70 percent of which was consumed at household level and 30 percent sold.

The Banana Merchandise Trade Statistics Bulletin (2024) shows export earnings rose from $2.1 million in June 2023 to $2.4 million in June 2024. Still, yields remain below potential—currently 5–30 tonnes per hectare compared to an attainable 60–70 tonnes.  Uganda’s banana losses to wilt disease are massive, with officials estimating a 71.4 percent loss of potential harvest annually, worth nearly $300 million.

Source: Monitor

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MEDIA FOR CHANGE NETWORK

Cases against anti-EACOP activism are skyrocketing in Uganda. Witness Radio has documented close to 60 cases in the last eight months.

Published

4 months ago

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August 7, 2025

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By the dedicated efforts of the Witness Radio team.

The Witness Radio team has documented nearly 60 cases of arrest, detention, and prosecution targeting activists protesting the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) since January 2025.

The $5 billion EACOP project, led by TotalEnergies and its partners, involves the construction of a 1,444km heated pipeline from Hoima in Uganda to Tanga in Tanzania. This pipeline, which will transport crude oil from the Tilenga and Kingfisher fields, has been a subject of controversy due to its potential environmental and social impacts.

As activism against the EACOP Project grows in Uganda, youth activists leading the cause face strong resistance from the government and its agents, who are pushing for the development of oil activities, including EACOP. Their bravery in the face of such adversity is truly inspiring.

The activists have continuously been suppressed and weakened with torture, unlawful arrests, and prolonged detentions accompanied by unscrupulous charges. The injustice they face is a call for empathy from all who hear their story.

The latest incident happened on Friday, August 1, 2025, when the police brutally arrested 12 environmental activists at Stanbic Bank Headquarters in Kampala. The urgency of the situation is apparent, as the activists were protesting against the bank’s financing of the EACOP project.

On March 26, 2025, EACOP Ltd., the company in charge of the construction and future operation of the EACOP project, announced new project financing from regional banks such as Stanbic Bank Uganda Limited, KCB Bank Uganda, African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD). The announcement sparked widespread alarm and outcry, with activists urging the banks to immediately withdraw their support and halt the financing of the project.

These activists, individuals from Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and environmental enthusiasts, strongly oppose the implementation of the EACOP project. They cite its harmful effects, including the displacement of thousands of people, damage to sensitive ecosystems, a threat to water resources, and exacerbating climate change mainly through carbon emissions. They argue that the short-term economic benefits do not justify these long-term consequences.

In doing their work, they have ended up in the hands of the authorities with numerous charges slapped against them. The latest remandees include Teopista Nakyambade, Shammy Nalwadda, Dorothy Asio, Shafik Kalyango, Habibu Nalungu, Noah Kafiiti, Ismael Zziwa, Ivan Wamboga, Akram Katende, Baker Tamale, Keisha Ali, and Mark Makobe.

On the same day of their arrest, the victims were arraigned before the Buganda Road Chief Magistrate Winnie Nankya, who charged them with common nuisance. She later remanded them to Luzira prison until August 18, 2025.

Section 160 of the Penal Code Act, Cap 120 states that a person convicted of common nuisance faces a one-year imprisonment.

In response, the Stanbic Bank manager for corporate communications, Mr. Kenneth Agutamba, confirmed that the bank is financing the EACOP project, justifying that it aligns with and balances environmental sustainability and economic development in the country.

Ever since this year started, Witness Radio has documented 56 cases of arrests and illegal detentions of EACOP activists, with most of them being charged with common nuisance. Below is a chronology of these incidents as they happened.

 

Date Incident Charge
26th Feb. 2025 11 activists were arrested while marching to the European Union offices deliver a petition concerning TotalEnergies’ involvement in harmful fossil fuels in Uganda. Common nuisance
19th Mar. 2025 4 activists were arrested while marching to the Parliament of Uganda to deliver a petition to the speaker, Anita Annet Among, in protest of the ongoing construction of the EACOP Project. Common nuisance
2nd April, 2025 9 activists were arrested while marching to Stanbic bank offices. Common nuisance
23rd of April, 2025 A group of 11 activists were arrested as peacefully went to deliver a petition to KCB Uganda offices challenging its will to fund the EACOP project. Criminal trespass.
21 May 2025 9 activists arrested while protesting KCB financing of the EACOP Common nuisance.
1 Aug. 2025. 12 activists arrested for protesting the Stanbic bank funding. common nuisance

 

According to Witness Radio’s special report, “Activism on Trial: Despite the increasing repressive measures, Uganda’s EACOP Protesters are achieving unexpected victories in the country’s justice systems,” released last month, a case review revealed that while Uganda’s justice system is being used to suppress the activities of youth activists opposing the EACOP project, many of these cases have lacked merit and were ultimately dismissed.

The report found that none of the activists had been convicted, though they continue to face prolonged court processes marked by repeated adjournments. “Of a sample of 20 documented cases since 2022 involving the arrest of over 180 activists, 9 case files have either been dismissed by the courts or closed by the police due to lack of prosecution, another signal indicating the relevance and legitimacy of their work, while 11 cases remain ongoing,” the report noted.

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Some anti-EACOP activists arrested while protesting against Stanbic Bank's financing of the EACOP project.
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