NGO WORK

What future for seeds under the African Free Trade Area?

Published

3 years ago

July 24, 2023

Angelique Ipanga a teacher and also farmer in a manioc field, Lukolela, Democratic Republic of Congo.

The African Union is putting the finishing touches to the draft protocol on intellectual property rights to the agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Once ratified, this text will form an integral part of the AfCFTA and will be applied across all 54-member countries. The protocol will apply to all categories of intellectual property, including plant varieties, genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Specifically, it will aim to promote “coherent” intellectual property rights policy and a harmonised system of intellectual property protection throughout the continent (article 2.2.).

Given that intellectual property rights privatise agricultural biodiversity – our collective heritage and the cornerstone of food sovereignty – the implications of this protocol on seeds and the rights of peasants and rural communities in Africa must be carefully analysed.

Around the world, free trade agreements are forcing the privatisation of seeds, whether through patents or plant breeders’ rights. These rights enable seed companies to demand royalty payments from farmers for each generation of seeds they use, over a period of 20 to 25 years. According to seed companies such as Syngenta and Bayer, without these payments they will be unable to invest in research.

This same system is now rapidly gaining ground in Africa, potentially upsetting relationships between citizens within members states, and even between the member states themselves.

Article 8 of the draft protocol addresses this issue. It stipulates that state parties shall provide protection for new plant varieties through a legal system that includes farmers’ rights, plant breeders’ rights, and rules on access and benefit sharing “as appropriate”.

Furthermore, it adds that states shall comply with “additional obligations” set out in an annex to be developed once the protocol is adopted. Upon adoption, this annex, along with the annexes on traditional knowledge and genetic resources, will have the same legal value as the protocol (article 41 of the protocol).

Our analysis of these provisions seeks to address the following questions: What does this protocol mean for African countries? How will they implement it? What impact will it have on farmers and food sovereignty in Africa?

The meaning of the protocol

Spurred on by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and under pressure from other bodies, half of all African countries have already introduced an intellectual property rights system on seeds. The vast majority follow the model of the 1991 convention of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). (See graph.)

This system is highly criticised for promoting genetic uniformity of crops and preventing peasants from reusing seeds. The question now is whether the AfCFTA protocol will challenge this dominant system. The final draft text suggests that the answer is ‘no’.

Despite progressive-sounding references to farmers’ rights and benefit sharing, the protocol sets out the same requirements as the WTO, i.e., states must set up a plant variety protection system. Given that half the African countries already adhere to the UPOV model, it is highly likely that the AfCFTA protocol will simply reinforce, or even accelerate, this trend.

The protocol’s approach, consisting of requiring both the protection of breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights, as well as rules on access to genetic resources, is a ploy in the sense that the use of “as appropriate” strips it of all relevance. Presented in this way, the provision becomes more of a guideline, with member states left to apply this article in their own territories as they see fit.

Naturally, it will be implemented in line with their existing obligations, whether these stem from the WTO, the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) or the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO). This “fait accompli”, with half the states already bound to UPOV to varying degrees, makes it difficult, or even impossible, to deviate from the status quo.

UPOV in conflict with all other agreements

As UPOV does not recognise farmers’ rights, whether derived from the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture or the UN Declaration, it enters into direct conflict with these agreements. UPOV refuses to include rules on access to resources and benefit sharing, as set out in the Convention on Biological Diversity or, once again, the FAO Treaty. Since they are not “suitable” for UPOV, these additional elements will not materialise.

The conflict goes further still. In articles 18 and 20, the AfCFTA protocol requires states to oblige breeders to respect three conditions before they are granted a right to a new variety. These three conditions are: (i) to state the source of traditional knowledge or resources utilised in developing the new variety, (ii) to provide proof of free, prior and informed consent from the competent authorities under the relevant national regime, and (iii) to demonstrate proof of fair and equitable benefit sharing arising from the use of such resources or knowledge under the relevant national regime.[1] Yet these conditions do not correspond to UPOV rules, so what is the likely outcome?

It is highly likely that the African countries that conform with UPOV will continue to do so, even if they hardly benefit from it. It may be the case that those who wish to go further will do so, by applying additional conditions. However, we cannot see how governments will change the conditions for granting plant variety rights in UPOV member countries. In these countries, there is a risk that the protocol’s provisions will go unheeded.

It is hard to see how the draft protocol could achieve its objective of promoting coherence and harmonising intellectual property rules and principles in Africa if all AfCFTA member countries are given free rein to implement the protocol’s requirements as they see fit. Perhaps the annexes, which are still being negotiated, will shed light on this.

Conflicting farming models

The draft protocol to the AfCFTA agreement comes at a crucial time for Africa. The continent is divided in two on how it views the future of agriculture in Africa and the role of farmers. Some advocate and adhere to the idea of agribusiness taking a lead, with or without the involvement of small farmers. Others are seeking to strengthen family, peasant and autonomous farming and agroecology. These two rather opposing approaches are based on completely different seed systems and discussions about rights.

Across a number of countries, the industrial system promoted by UPOV is coming under fire. This can be seen in Benin, where farmers’ organisations are taking a stand against the government’s proposal to join UPOV. This is also evident in Kenya and Ghana, where legal proceedings are underway to amend or declare unconstitutional UPOV-based plant variety laws. Furthermore, in Southern Africa, a campaign to block alignment with UPOV, precisely because of the threats it poses to family farming in the sub-region, is slowing down progress on the ARIPO project. It can be seen in Tunisia and Mali, where civil society organisations are promoting a completely different approach to seed laws, based on the demands and criteria of the farming communities themselves. Lastly, it is apparent from the many initiatives and caravans run by local communities in alliance with others, lobbying local authorities and raising public awareness to call for an end to UPOV in favour of fundamental respect for farmers’ rights.

This conflict between production models and rights systems is reflected in the field of animal farming. The government of Burkina Faso was recently granted an exclusive right to the term “poulet bicyclette” (“bicycle chicken”, a common term for native chicken). It is a registered trademark and applies to live chickens, chicken meat and veterinary products for chickens. This exclusive right is effective in all 17-member countries of OAPI for a period of 10 years. However, the term “bicycle chicken” has been used across Western and Central Africa for a very long time to refer to local breeds, peasant breeds. It represents a collective heritage and is central to many agroecology projects. Benin has now banned the sale of frozen chickens, known as “morgue chickens”, across its territory in order to promote the farming of native chicken breeds, i.e., “their” bicycle chickens. Will the government of Burkina Faso exercise its veto or monopoly rights against this policy? Even the AfCFTA protocol supports this approach.

Original Source: Grain

NGO WORK

The Great “Green” Heist: When Artificial Intelligence and Arms Dealers Seize the Minerals of the South

Published

3 days ago

August 4, 2026

witnessradio.org

By Franck Zongwe Lukama, Congolese journalist and researcher, leads the independent media KilaloPress in DRC.

We were sold a simple equation: to save the planet, we must dig. Dig faster, deeper, extracting from the earth the cobalt, lithium, or copper needed for solar panels and electric vehicles. Yet, this climate rescue rhetoric conceals a staggering statistical deception. Today, 70% of global demand for critical minerals does absolutely nothing to support the energy transition. These resources end up in aerospace, communication technologies, and, above all, weaponry. Sectors that, ironically, exacerbate the global ecological crisis. The green revolution has become the perfect smokescreen, the moral veneer for a very different kind of war.

Far from the promises of sustainable development touted by the World Bank, the current scramble is driven by a strict logic of geopolitical power. A damning report from the California-based Oakland Institute exposes this global scheme. The report reveals an unprecedented and formidable convergence of interests between the American military-industrial complex and the giants of Silicon Valley. With the Pentagon openly pivoting toward a combat strategy focused on artificial intelligence (AI), securing supply chains is no longer a matter of ecology, but a question of survival in the face of Chinese influence. The United States is not seeking to reduce carbon emissions; it is seeking to guarantee its technological and military supremacy.

Artisanal Coltan - manganese - cobalt mining in Mudere mine under control of Nyatura militia, town of Rubaya, North Kivu region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa). Photo: Erberto Zani.

The real winners of this frantic race wear suits far removed from environmental activism. Trillions of dollars are flowing into new alliances that intertwine AI-driven mining companies, like KoBold Metals—backed by billionaires such as Bill Gates—and companies specializing in cutting-edge defense technologies, like Palantir and Anduril, not to mention the networks of influence close to the Trump family. For these players, the discourse of climate emergency acts as a powerful public relations tool. It justifies massive and accelerated extraction that would otherwise provoke international outrage.

Local communities and Indigenous populations find themselves on the frontlines, forced to resist an extraction machine that has the audacity to justify their suffering by claiming it is necessary to save the world.

And the price of this hypocrisy is being paid in full throughout the Global South. In the Rubaya hills, in the Kolwezi copper belt, as in the Indigenous territories of Latin America and Asia, the promise of “prosperity” translates into a terrifyingly familiar tragedy. Land grabbing, forced displacement, devastating groundwater pollution: the plundering of ecosystems and human lives is accelerating. Local communities and Indigenous populations find themselves on the frontlines, forced to resist an extraction machine that has the audacity to justify their suffering by claiming it is necessary to save the world. Today, opposing the destruction of one’s village by a multinational mining company risks being accused of hindering the fight against climate change. The rhetorical trap is devastatingly effective.

The long-term consequences of this diversion are alarming. The exponential surge in demand generated by future AI data centers, mass surveillance, and global rearmament will mathematically deplete available reserves. Every ton of copper, nickel, or cobalt consumed by combat drones or algorithmic data processing servers is a ton diverted from the production of renewable energy infrastructure. We are not equipping the energy transition; we are cannibalizing it to militarize our future.

We are not equipping the energy transition; we are cannibalizing it to militarize our future.

If no strict regulations are put in place to curb this rampant mining frenzy, hundreds of new mines will spring up in the coming years, causing irreversible damage on an unprecedented scale. The question facing citizens today, from Kinshasa to Washington, is no longer whether we will have enough minerals to save our atmosphere. It is why we are willing to sacrifice millions of lives and destroy our lands to fuel next-generation algorithms and weapons. In ten years, when the Global South is nothing more than a vast crater serving a militarized hyper-technology, it will be too late to realize that the planet was never the priority.

Photos: Artisanal Coltan – manganese – cobalt mining in Mudere mine under control of Nyatura militia, town of Rubaya, North Kivu region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa). Erberto Zani – stock.adobe.com

Source: oaklandinstitute.org/

NGO WORK

EU: IPI welcomes action against 14 states over Anti-SLAPP Directive delays

Published

2 weeks ago

July 27, 2026

witnessradio.org

EU states must introduce robust measures to protect journalists and media from vexatious litigation

The International Press Institute (IPI) today welcomes the infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission against 14 EU Member States over their inaction or delays in transposing the Anti-SLAPP Directive.

The countries included are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The EU infringement proceedings were initiated on 15 July, with letters of formal notice sent to these Member States for failing to notify about progress made in implementing the Directive. States now have two months to respond and update about measures taken or could eventually face legal action at the European Court of Justice.

The Anti-SLAPP Directive introduced EU-wide rules which protect journalists and civil society actors from manifestly unfounded or abusive civil proceedings with cross-border implications, including early dismissal tools and remedies for targets of SLAPPs. It was adopted in April 2024 and the transposition deadline was 7 May 2026.

Monitoring by IPI shows that while in some of the countries identified, such as Greece and Spain, steps have been taken to prepare for the transposition and bills are actively in development and reportedly close to being presented to or adopted by parliament.

In others such as Bulgaria and Portugal, initial work done to develop legislation has been delayed by institutional changes, changes in governments or political instability, though transposition work remains ongoing.

In other states, such as Italy and Hungary, little to no measurable progress has yet been made on transposition. However, with the new Tisza government in Hungary driving forward media freedom reforms, there is hope the new administration will introduce initial anti-SLAPP measures in the next legislative package identified for the autumn.

While Ireland has been actively working to tackle SLAPPs through legal reforms, and passed the Defamation Bill in 2024, further legislation is required to fully transpose the Anti-SLAPP Directive during its Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Although these 14 countries have been identified in the EU action, monitoring and analyses show that the overall picture for implementation of the Directive across the EU remains fragmented and uneven.

According to the European Anti-SLAPP Monitor, almost all EU Member States missed the May 2026 transposition deadline, with only a handful fully implementing on time.

IPI notes that even in those Member States where the Directive was implemented, such as Malta, these reforms only included minimum standards protecting against cross-border cases, and failed to include measures to safeguard against domestic SLAPPs.

In the wake of the EU’s opening of initial infringement action, IPI renews our call – made previously with Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) partners – for Member States to demonstrate their commitment to media freedom by accelerating their legislative processes in protecting against SLAPPs. This includes the 14 countries identified by the EU Commission and those in which reforms have been presented but not yet adopted.

Crucially, legislative reforms should both fully reflect both the letter and the spirit of the Anti-SLAPP Directive and introduce the substantive and procedural safeguards set out in the EU and Council of Europe Recommendation on SLAPPs.

A model here should be Poland, where last month the President approved a law which covers both domestic and cross-border SLAPPs, ensuring implementation of both EU Directive and Council of Europe Recommendation.

Member States which continue to delay or fail to transpose the directive should face legal action from the Commission, which must use all tools at its disposal to help safeguard media freedom across the bloc.

IPI, which has advocated at the EU and national level for measures to protect journalists and media from SLAPPs, will continue to monitor implementation in collaboration with European partners, including through MFRR media freedom missions.

Source: ipi.media/

NGO WORK

No Heritage Without its People: Why Ngorongoro Cannot be a World Heritage Site and an Eviction Zone

Published

3 weeks ago

July 20, 2026

witnessradio.org

The Tanzanian government, under the guise of “conservation,” restricts Maasai livelihoods and denies access to essential services forcing Indigenous residents away from their ancestral lands and turning their heritage into a playground for safari tourists.

As the 48th Session of the World Heritage Committee begins July 19, UNESCO continues to legitimize the continued forced displacement of the Maasai from Ngorongoro. If UNESCO cannot ensure that the World Heritage designation protects the rights of its Indigenous custodians, then the Committee must remove the Ngorongoro Conservation Area from the World Heritage List.

Increased international pressure is imperative to hold UNESCO accountable and protect the lives and rights of the Maasai!

Read our Open Letter to the World Heritage Committee.

Source: oaklandinstitute.org