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Big Tech’s digital trade agenda is a danger for farmers and food systems

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Criticism against Big Tech’s digital crusade is growing, along with demands for greater regulation. Yet, through underhand tactics such as trade deals, tech companies are blocking reform. Their recent focus on agriculture threatens our food systems. In order to rein in their growing power over them, it is crucial to expose what is happening behind the scenes and build movements to stop it.

It is not easy to evade the power and influence of Big Tech companies in everyday life, even for those living in rural communities in the global South where internet access is often limited.

Anyone searching for information on the internet, whether in Brazil, India or Kenya, will most likely use Google’s search engine.1 If they are in China, they will probably use Baidu’s. If they need to connect with their family or friends, they will probably use one of Meta’s social media or messaging platforms, like Facebook, which controls 75% of the global social media market, and 83% in Africa.2 When ordering food delivery in Brazil, they will most likely turn to the iFood platform (which holds 80% of the market), and if in Southeast Asia, they will almost certainly use Grab.3

Such digital monopolies enable tech companies to gather huge amounts of data from billions of people. This power is in turn being used to expand their control over developments in artificial intelligence (AI). Today, eight of the ten largest corporations in the world are tech companies. Each of them has a market value greater than the GDP of 93% of all countries.4

People around the world are waking up to the dangers of this corporate power. The Big Tech companies and their billionaire owners are taking over the media, backing far-right political parties, providing support to militaries committing war crimes, and collaborating with governments to curtail human rights.5 And they have an agenda for the food system too. Big Tech companies are converging with the largest agribusiness corporations, vacuuming up the data of small-scale food producers, workers and consumers with barely any oversight or limitations and then using that data against their interests.

Mass data grabbing across the food system

The world’s largest seed, pesticide and fertiliser companies have access to a constant stream of data from farms stretching across tens of millions of hectares– from Brazil to China– by way of digital apps installed on the smart phones and tractors of farmers. The information is stored on the clouds of Big Tech companies, like Microsoft’s Azure and Amazon’s AWS.

The clouds also store data from a growing number of government programmes collected to develop national digital databases and services for farmers. The Indian government’s new digital database, Agri Stack, for example, was developed with Microsoft and gives the company detailed information on 80 million Indian farmers, from land records to health histories.6 Agri Stack is the blueprint for other national digital farm registries that the Gates Foundation and the World Bank are pushing forward in several countries, beginning with Ethiopia and Kenya.7 Farmers increasingly have little choice but to hand over their data to corporations in order to access extension services, get loans and subsidies, or purchase inputs and machinery.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and others have been raising concerns about how this corporate control over data can harm farmers.8 Agribusiness companies, for example, can use their chatbots and digital apps to push farmers into buying their seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. When the chatbot advice fails, there is little farmers can do to get compensation, and even just switching to another platform can be difficult. The clear overall trend is that corporations are using their digital platforms to entrench a top-down flow of information that gives farmers less and less autonomy over how they farm.

Companies can also sell data they collect on farmers to third-parties who may use that information in ways that harms the interests of farmers. This is what happened with the Bayer-Microsoft collaboration in India, where farmer data was sold to food companies who then used the data to squeeze farmers on prices.9

And it is not just on the farm. Mass data harvesting is happening at all points of the food system, with ever more integration. China’s largest online retailer, Alibaba, for instance, connects its newly created digital agriculture division with its e-commerce and food delivery platforms that generate data on the preferences and behaviour of over 800 million consumers.10 Retailers can use online and in-store sales data to build profiles of their consumers and then encourage them to buy certain products or adjust prices to what they determine each customer will be willing to pay– a practice called surveillance pricing.11 Online food delivery platforms are also notorious for using their access and control over data on their drivers to coerce them into working long hours for low pay.12

There is growing criticism and resistance to these and other tactics used by tech companies. So, to fight back against any measures that might restrain their ambitions, tech companies are investing big time in influencing politicians. In 2025 alone, they spent US$170 million on lobbying in the European Union and US$109 million in the US.13 They also rely on another less visible but equally important tool to entrench their agendas and shield themselves from public accountability: digital trade deals.

Unpacking Big Tech’s digital trade agenda

Digital trade gets addressed in the e-commerce or digital chapters included in free trade agreements (FTA), or directly in bilateral or regional digital trade agreements. These texts are heavily influenced by tech corporations, especially where it comes to ensuring their control over data, restricting the access of others to their source codes and algorithms, and limiting the ability of governments to tax digital services.

The corporate agenda is heavily backed by the US government, which is home to the majority of Big Tech companies. The industry’s demands are included in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and all other agreements negotiated by the US. But they are also included in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the negotiations for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), in which the US is not a party. With some nuances, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the European Union follow a similar path (see Box).

The tech company agenda embedded in these trade deals has important consequences for food systems. For instance, in order for governments to ensure farmers, consumers and food workers have rights and control over their data, it is necessary for that data to be stored in locations under their jurisdiction. This is key not only in terms of personal privacy, but also to prevent it from falling into the hands of those who could harm them. There have been some limited movements in this direction, such as laws to protect people’s privacy in the European Union, Argentina, Brazil, and Kenya.14 Unfortunately, data generated on farms (on land, seeds, plant and animal genetics, weather) is considered non-personal and not covered by the laws, even though personal information can be gathered when data on yields is combined with location, for example.

Such government initiatives, no matter how limited, are all being fiercely opposed by the industry, which wants to be able to exploit and sell data to third parties without restriction. Not having a local, physical presence in the countries where data is extracted is also a way for tech companies to evade liabilities for their workers, especially when it comes to delivery workers, where risks of work place injuries are high. These are some of the main reasons why tech companies are pushing for data to be able to move freely across borders. In digital trade jargon, this is known as “freedom for cross-border data flows” and aims to prevent “forced data localisation”.

Access to source codes (the lines of code written by programmers to instruct machines to perform a specific task) and algorithms (pieces of code that include the steps needed to solve a problem) is also an issue for food systems. Farmers around the world have always repaired their own tools. It is a traditional part of farming. But this has become much more difficult with the adoption of digital tools, such as agricultural drones and connected tractors. Repairing these requires access to the manufacturers’ source codes, which is strictly protected by intellectual property rights. In the US, farmers lose US$3 billion a year to tractor downtime and pay US$1.2 billion more in excess repair costs because of these restrictions.15 Food delivery workers also suffer because they are unable to access the opaque algorithms that decide how much they are paid or even if they’ve been terminated.16 Consumers also find algorithms that manipulate consumption to be a black box.

There are many important reasons why companies should have to make public their source codes and algorithms but digital trade agreements can pre-empt measures aimed at doing so. Most digital trade agreements restrict public or government access to company source codes and algorithms, and the few that include exceptions, tend to be weak and vague.17

Food systems are also impacted by Big Tech’s use of digital trade deals to avoid paying taxes.18 These corporations have long benefitted from a temporary moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions established in 1998 by the WTO. Under the moratorium, states are allowed to collect domestic taxes, but cannot use tariffs to tax products entering their territory. A study found that between 2017 and 2020 Global South countries, most of which are net importers of digital services, lost US$56 billion in tax they could not apply to those imports.19 It means governments have fewer resources with which to implement food and agriculture policies for the benefit of their populations and other essential services.

To reinforce tax avoidance, all digital trade deals signed to date have systematically prohibited taxes on electronic transmissions. Those pushed by the US with El Salvador and Guatemala have, more recently, included a commitment from both Central American countries to support the US’s push to make the WTO moratorium permanent. However, at the WTO, Brazil led an effort that succeeded in getting the moratorium dropped in March 2026.20 The big question now is whether governments will seize on this development to implement border taxes or bind themselves to similar restrictions under bilateral digital trade deals.

The need for a convergence of struggles

Fortunately, movements challenging the power of tech corporations are mushrooming around the world and starting to work together towards common objectives.

Some efforts are focused on digital justice and digital rights, such as the Just Net Coalition, the European network defending rights and freedoms online and the Global Digital Justice Forum, which includes digital rights networks, feminist groups, corporate watchdogs, communication rights campaigners, trade unions, and cooperatives.21 Groups such as Citizen Lab and AlgoRace are tackling digital surveillance and the impacts of AI on migrant and racialised communities. The People vs Big Tech movement aims to challenge the power of tech corporations on issues like digital policy, consumers’ rights, climate change, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminism.22

They are also many worker-led efforts to stop corporations from using digital platforms to exploit workers and violate their rights. These include actions by workers at Amazon warehouses in the US and India and food delivery drivers working for Ele.me (Ali Baba) in China.23 In both the European Union and the UK, 12 food delivery workers organisations have been speaking out against serious abuses on platforms such as Deliveroo, Just Eat and Uber Eats, and have called for a public register of the algorithms used.24 Facebook (Meta) content moderators in Colombia and Ghana have also been mobilising.25 And there is a growing movement fighting against the expansion of data centres because of their impacts on local communities and voracity for energy, water and critical minerals, which is causing an increasing number of social and environmental conflicts worldwide.26

People in the food sovereignty movement are also active on digital issues. For example, African farmers are speaking out against the privatisation and corporate capture of their data, arguing that data cannot be separated from its relationship to territories and communities.27 The European Coordination Via Campesina recently published a critique of corporate led digitalisation that calls for inclusive research and innovation to support the transition to agroecology.28 A growing farmers’ movement is also claiming the right to repair machinery and the right to build their own tools and share the information freely.29 During the pandemic, small farmers and vendors from Indonesia to Brazil showed their capacity to coordinate efforts with driver’s cooperatives and used their own digital tools to ensure people had access to food.

In order for the movements fighting Big Tech to challenge digital trade agreements, alliances are needed with those that have long been fighting against free trade agreements.

From their side, peasant movements such as La Via Campesina have been fighting free trade agreements across different regions.30 They have increasingly joined forces with other groups, including trade unions, environmentalists, women’s groups and indigenous peoples. A recent example of this is the broad coalition of sectors that fought intensely against the EU-Mercosur agreement. During the 3rd Nyeleni Forum, which brought together movements from a wide range of sectors (farmers, migrants, trade unions, healthcare workers, environmentalists and women), the digitalisation of food systems was identified as a new colonial frontier. Building on this, there could be greater convergence with groups to denounce the impacts of corporate digitalisation and to stop digital trade agreements that advance the interests of corporations.

The global advance of digital trade agreements

Academic and activist Jane Kelsey says the standard corporate demands in most digital trade negotiations can be traced back to the “Digital 2 Dozen” principles published by the US Trade Representative in 2014.31 These shaped the e-commerce chapters of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (later the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership -CPTPP), and became a model for later agreements.32 Even after leaving the CPTPP in 2017, the US pursued even stronger Big Tech protections in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020.

The US Chamber of Commerce, whose members include large agribusiness and tech corporations, systematically promotes ‘high-standard’ digital trade agreements, particularly among the “Digital Dozen” countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Taiwan, the UK and ASEAN members).33 Several major deals have followed, including agreements involving the US, Japan, Singapore, Australia, Chile, the UK- and the EU.34 China, the UAE and India, are also advancing digital trade negotiations, but with different priorities.

The USMCA guarantees cross-border data flows, including personal information, and bans data localisation. Its provisions have influenced other agreements, even those without US participation such as the CPTPP and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) negotiations, sometimes conflicting with national laws, including those in Kenya and Nigeria.35

The European Union also supports free data flows and bans data localisation but insists on protections for personal data. Its legislation is actually regarded as one of the strongest data privacy laws in the world, which has put it in the crosshairs of Big Tech and the Trump administration.36 But implementation has been tortuous, and safeguards in international deals are often unclear.37 The EU’s data privacy body has acknowledged this in reference to the EU-Singapore deal, where there are no regulations on what corporations can do with people’s data.38

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes ten ASEAN member states, as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, includes similar provisions to CPTPP’s. 39 Its rules are not legally binding though, and allow more restrictions for national security interests. This is particularly relevant for China, who supports the freedom of cross-border trade in goods enabled by the internet rather than the freedom of all data flows. Some say this is a reflection of the interests of Chinese e-commerce platforms, like Alibaba.40

The USMCA, CPTPP and digital trade deals pushed by the European Union ban forced transfer of source codes and algorithms, while RCEP doesn’t include specific protection. Public-interest exceptions in these deals tend to be weak.41

In regards to taxes on electronic transmissions: the US continues pushing to make the WTO moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions permanent, while the EU, AfCFTA and RCEP allow room for internal taxation.42 Yet RCEP’s signatories are committed to adjusting their practices in line with any future changes at the WTO level.

See as well: Bilaterals.org, “Resisting Big Tech empires (and their trade rules)”, 30 April 2026
1 See: ITU, “Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025”, https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/D-IND-ICT_MDD-2025-3/; Statista, “Most popular reasons for using the internet worldwide as of 2nd quarter 2025”, 27 November 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1387375/internet-using-global-reasons
2 Statcounter, “Social media stats worldwide”, March 2026, https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats
3 See: José Soeiro, Kenzo Soares Seto and Víctor Riesgo Gómez, “Varieties and similarities of platform capitalisms: a comparative approach of labor regulation in Brazil, Portugal and Spain”, Frontiers in Sociology, Vol. 10, 28 March 2025, https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1454324; and Dylan Loh, “Grab’s ASEAN food delivery share rises to 55% in 2025: survey”, 28 January 2026, https://asia.nikkei.com/business/food-beverage/grab-s-asean-food-delivery-share-rises-to-55-in-2025-survey
4 See: Forbes India, “Top 10 biggest companies in the world by market cap in 2025”, 27 November 2025, https://www.forbesindia.com/article/explainers/top-10-largest-companies-world-market-cap/86341/1; and Worldometer, “GDP by country (2026) – IMF”, https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/
5 Adrienne Fichter et. al. “How tenaciously Palantir courted Switzerland”, 18 February 2026, https://www.republik.ch/2026/02/18/how-tenaciously-palantir-courted-switzerland
6 Harikishan Sharma, “What is AgriStack, which FM Nirmala Sitharaman has termed as the ‘next UPI’?”, 13 February 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/agristack-sitharaman-next-upi-10528472/
7 See: World Bank, GF, and BCG, “Digital agriculture roadmap playbook”, 2025, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099053025063021993/pdf/P508004-f943a09b-c45f-4c93-b554-9dd1decd1e7c.pdf; Ethiopian Ministry of agriculture and ATI, “Digital agriculture roadmap 2032”, April 2025, https://www.moa.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Digital-Agriculture-Roadmap-Ethiopia.pdf; and Data Driven Digital Agriculture, “Launch of the Digital Agriculture Roadmaps DARs Playbook and Lessons Learned”, 16 December 2025, https://youtu.be/E4h_3fsT8So?si=d-S7fc6wYsMq1G9C
8 See: UN, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri. Corporate power and human rights in food systems”, 21 July 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/213; ETC Group, “Commons to code: how platforms rewire agriculture and reshape power”, 9 November 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/commons_to_code_how_platforms_rewire_agriculture_and_reshape_power_0.pdf; IPES-Food, “Head in the cloud.”, February 2026, https://ipes-food.org/report/head-in-the-cloud/; GRAIN, “When big tech came for the farm: A blueprint of resistance from Asia’s small farmers”, 16 January 2023,https://grain.org/e/6940
9 GRAIN, “Techno feudalism takes root on the farm in India and China”, 24 October 2024, https://grain.org/e/7196
10 See: Mary Ma, “Agriculture: A new battlefield for China’s internet giants”, 27 February 2023, https://technode.com/2023/02/27/agriculture-a-new-battlefield-for-chinas-internet-giants/; and DBS, “Alibaba Group. Quick view”, 20 March 2026, https://www.dbs.com.hk/treasures/aics/stock-coverage/templatedata/article/equity/data/en/DBSV/012014/9988_HK.xml
11 Mayu Tobin-Miyaji, “Kroger’s surveillance pricing harms consumers and raises prices, with or without facial recognition”, 14 February 2025, https://epic.org/krogers-surveillance-pricing-harms-consumers-and-raises-prices-with-or-without-facial-recognition/
12 Arif Novianto, “Resistance is Possible: Lives of Grab Workers in Indonesia”, Asian Labour Review, January 2023, https://labourreview.org/grab-in-indonesia/
13 See: Corporate Europe Observatory, “Revealed: Tech industry now spending record €151 million on lobbying the EU”, 27 October 2025, https://corporateeurope.org/en/2025/10/revealed-tech-industry-now-spending-record-eu151-million-lobbying-eu; and Emily Birnbaum and Maggie Eastlan, “Silicon Valley pours out lobbying cash and flattery to win over deal-minded Trump”, 22 January 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-22/big-tech-leaders-spend-record-109-million-to-win-over-deal-minded-trump
14 See: Friends of the Earth, “Big brother is feeding you”, December 2025, https://friendsoftheearth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Digital-factsheet-2.pdf; ETC Group, “Commons to code: how platforms rewire agriculture and reshape power”, 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/commons_to_code_how_platforms_rewire_agriculture_and_reshape_power_0.pdf; and Biba Kenya, “Connecting communities or corporations?”, May 2025, https://bibakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Connecting-Communities-or-Corporations-Digital-AgricultureData-Harvests-and-Food-sovereignty-in-Keny.pdf
15 Kevin O’Reilly, “Report: tractor ‘right to repair’ would save U.S. farmers $4.2 Billion”, 11 April 2023, https://pirg.org/media-center/report-tractor-right-to-repair-would-save-u-s-farmers-4-2-billion/
16 See: Privacy International, “Time to deliver answers: An open letter to Just Eat Takeaway, Uber and Deliveroo”, 13 January 2025, https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/5509/time-deliver-answers-open-letter-just-eat-takeaway-uber-and-deliveroo; and “New research exposes deepening exploitation of Uber drivers by algorithmic pay”, 19 June 2025, https://www.ier.org.uk/news/new-research-exposes-deepening-exploitation-of-uber-drivers-by-algorithmic-pay/
17 EDRi, “Digital trade: the new frontline in the fight for our rights”, 7 May 2025, https://edri.org/our-work/digital-trade-the-new-frontline-in-the-fight-for-our-rights/
18 Jane Kelsey, “Digital trade rules and big tech: surrendering public good to private power”, PSI, February 2022, https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/f2bddc3d-c353-4846-a23b-82dec9a9e6d7_2020_-_ASIA_DIG_REPORT_3__1_.pdf
19 Rashmi Banga, “WTO Moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions: how much tariff revenue have developing countries lost?”, South Centre, 3 June 2022, https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/RP157_WTO-Moratorium-on-Customs-Duties-on-Electronic-Transmissions_EN.pdf
20 Sofia Scasserra, “The night Brazil said no to Trump (and changed the internet forever)”, 2 April 2026, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-night-brazil-said-no-to-trump-and-changed-the-internet-forever
23 See: UNI Global Union, “Thousands of Amazon workers and allies strike and protest in dozens of countries on Black Friday”, 26 November 2025, https://uniglobalunion.org/news/make-amazon-pay-day-2025/; “Everyone loses in the rage of China’s delivery wars”, 31 July 2025, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/07/31/everyone-loses-in-the-rage-of-chinas-delivery-wars
24 Privacy International, “Time to deliver answers: An open letter to Just Eat Takeaway, Uber and Deliveroo”, 13 January 2025, https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/5509/time-deliver-answers-open-letter-just-eat-takeaway-uber-and-deliveroo
25 See: Eiffel Abedin, “Content moderation is a new factory floor of exploitation – labour protections must catch up”, 26 June 2025, https://www.ihrb.org/latest/content-moderation-is-a-new-factory-floor-of-exploitation-labour-protections-must-catch-up; and Stephanie Höppner, “Africa’s content moderators want compensation for job trauma”, 1 May 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/africas-content-moderators-want-compensation-for-job-trauma/a-72401025
26 See: Mariam Mayet, “Critical minerals, fertilisers, agrochemicals, digital power, and the erosion of food sovereignty”, 23 April 2026, https://acbio.org.za/corporate-expansion/critical-minerals-fertilisers-agrochemicals-digital-power-and-the-erosion-of-food-sovereignty/; UNCTAD, “Digital economy report 2024”, 2024, https://unctad.org/publication/digital-economy-report-2024; and Blake Montgomery, “Datacenters meet resistance over environmental concerns as AI boom spreads in Latin America”, 11 November 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/nov/10/data-centers-latin-america
27 ETC Group, “What does data justice mean for African small-holder farmers?”, 8 December 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/content/what-does-data-justice-mean-african-small-holder-farmers
28 ECVC, “The challenges digitalisation brings to peasant agroecology: An ECVC perspective”, 28 April 2025, https://www.eurovia.org/publications/ecvc-position-on-digitalisation
29 See: https://farmhack.org/; and Kat de Naoum, “Right to repair farm equipment: legislation, challenges, and advantages”, 16 February 2026, https://www.thomasnet.com/insights/right-to-repair-farm-equipment/
31 Jane Kelsey, “Digital trade rules and big tech: surrendering public good to private power”, PSI, February 2022, https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/f2bddc3d-c353-4846-a23b-82dec9a9e6d7_2020_-_ASIA_DIG_REPORT_3__1_.pdf
32 The current signatories of CPTPP are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. Other applicants are: Costa Rica, Taiwan, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ukraine, Indonesia, Philippines, UAE, and Cambodia. China’s application has been opposed by Japan and Australia. See: https://www.bilaterals.org/?-tpp
34 Marília Maciel, “The WTO joint initiative stabilised ‘agreement on electronic commerce’: looking at the broader picture”, 30 July 2024, https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/the-wto-joint-initiative-stabilised-agreement-on-electronic-commerce-looking-at-the-broader-picture/
35 See: CPTPP, “Chapter 14. Electronic commerce”, https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/14._electronic_commerce.pdf; AfCFTA, “Protocol on the agreement establishing the African continental free trade area on digital trade”, https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/en_-_afcfta_protocol_on_digital_trade.pdf; and World Bank, “Digital trade regulatory readiness (DTRR) database”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2025/09/10/digital-trade-regulatory-readiness-dtrr-database
36 Raphael Satter and Alexandra Alper, “Exclusive: US orders diplomats to fight data sovereignty initiatives”, 25 February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/us-orders-diplomats-fight-data-sovereignty-initiatives-2026-02-25/?trk=public_post_comment-text
37 Naomi Grossman, “The Meta ruling that could change Europe’s data playbook”, 21 December 2025, https://vinciworks.com/blog/the-meta-ruling-that-could-change-europes-data-playbook/
38 Javier Ruiz Diaz, “The EU-Singapore digital trade agreement: gambling away our digital sovereignty”, The Left, November 2025, https://www.martin-schirdewan.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/4031639-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT-Booklet-Signapore_03.pdf
41 EDRi, “Digital trade: the new frontline in the fight for our rights”, 7 May 2025, https://edri.org/our-work/digital-trade-the-new-frontline-in-the-fight-for-our-rights/
Source: grain.org

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Accountability in Crisis: Development banks, while funding Asia’s energy transition, are accused of silencing Asian local and Indigenous communities, highlighting the central tension between a clean-energy push and the repression of those most affected.

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By the Witness Radio Team.

As the world races to abandon fossil fuels and embrace renewable energy to avert climate catastrophe, development banks, governments, and corporations promote this transition as a global priority. In Asia, this transition, presented as a path to a clean-energy future, is shadowed by serious concerns about who bears its costs.

However, for many Indigenous peoples, farmers, fisherfolk, and urban poor living on lands targeted by these projects, the energy transition has led to displacement, repression, and the loss of livelihoods.

This alternative reality is documented in a new regional report, Financing the Transition, Silencing Defenders. The report details how communities raising concerns about renewable energy projects across seven Asian countries have faced reprisals ranging from harassment and arrests to military occupation and killings.

The report challenges the region’s energy transition. It argues that renewable energy projects use vast resources, burdening Indigenous and local communities who have contributed little to the climate crisis. The report documents how these projects cause displacement, loss of cultural identity, ecological disruption, health risks, and increased debt.

Security forces were often reported to have carried out reprisals. Police and the military were frequently deployed to sites. Communities described beatings, arrests, and intimidation during consultations, compensation, and construction.

Rather than providing security, the report concludes that “in most contexts, their presence does not make communities feel secure, but rather threatened and silenced.”

The report goes on to describe how, in several documented cases, security personnel forcibly entered villages, dismantled community barricades, demolished homes, and stopped peaceful protests. According to the report, these confrontations often escalated tensions and contributed to the criminalization of local resistance.

The report underscores a central argument: when communities raise concerns, their voices are systematically silenced through SLAPPs, attacks, criminalization, intimidation, and discrimination—primarily by local authorities and security forces. These practices form a system of control involving governments, security forces, corporations, and development banks to repress dissent and maintain project momentum.

The 44-page report examined 12 renewable energy and energy-transition projects across seven Asian countries—India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand, and the Maldives. It was produced by the Coalition for Rights in Development, a global network representing over 100 social movements, civil society organizations, grassroots groups, and partners.

Despite variations in scale and technology among these projects, affected communities across these countries consistently reported being excluded from decision-making processes.

Many projects moved forward without real consultation or Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples. Communities said they were told about decisions after the fact, kept from key project details, or pressured to accept compensation.

As the report notes, when projects exclude rights holders from decision-making, it often leads to protests, legal challenges, and revoked permits. These outcomes raise costs and cause delays. More importantly, leaving out affected communities creates mistrust toward specific projects and the broader energy transition narrative that justifies them.

In Assam, India, Indigenous Karbi, Naga, and Adivasi communities oppose a solar project projected to affect more than 20,000 people. Community representatives report that consultations were held in only 9 of the 23 impacted villages, leaving thousands excluded from the process. They claim the project threatens livelihoods, land rights, biodiversity, bamboo forests, and elephant habitats.

“The project was approved without ensuring the communities’ Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). Consultations were held in only 9 out of 23 impacted villages, thus excluding thousands from the process,” the report states.

Researchers found that when communities attempt to challenge the harmful impacts of these projects, they are often labeled anti-development, extremists, or threats to national interests. In response, authorities, corporations, and local officials have reportedly targeted outspoken community leaders and sought to isolate them.

According to the report, “government authorities, private companies, and other actors who have a vested interest in the projects identify the most vocal community members and human rights defenders who are raising concerns and stigmatize them.”

In another case, in Pakistan, activists opposing hydropower projects reported receiving threats from authorities. They have also been accused of working against national development goals. The Madyan Hydropower Project is funded by the World Bank. The Torwali Indigenous community worries about their land, culture, and future.

Similarly, in the Philippines, environmental defenders and Indigenous leaders who oppose dam projects have faced “red-tagging.” This is a tactic that labels activists as communist sympathizers or security threats. The report says these tactics have created fear and deterred people from participating in public consultations.

Poorly planned projects imposed without meaningful consent harm communities, and those voicing concerns face intimidation and reprisals.

Many projects are led by major public development finance institutions. These include the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These institutions are directly implicated in reported abuses and the silencing of communities.

The findings directly challenge development banks: they must choose either to fund actors implicated in human rights violations or to actively leverage their influence to uphold community rights and genuine participation in Asia’s energy transition.

“Banks can either look the other way and continue funding government and corporate entities that have historically disregarded human rights and environmental sustainability, or they can use their influence to ensure that the highest standards and safeguards are upheld. The report states that development banks have responsibilities regarding both the prevention of and response to reprisals,” the report states.

The report calls on development banks to improve environmental and social safeguards. Banks should conduct thorough risk assessments and implement measures to ensure safe, meaningful engagement with affected communities. This should happen throughout the energy transition.

Development banks invoke the push to abandon fossil fuels to underscore urgency, but the report warns that this urgency is sometimes misused to accelerate approvals, rush assessments, and limit community consultation—thereby undermining both human rights and the legitimacy of the transition.

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Agroecological Entrepreneurship: African farmers are redefining agriculture by building agroecological businesses that challenge industrial models.

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By the Witness Radio team.

In rural Senegal, women’s groups use roasting, grinding, and mixing equipment to turn local beans, spices, and traditional ingredients into a natural product called Sumpak. This product is offered as an alternative to the industrial bouillon cubes common in West African kitchens. Sumpak is marketed as a locally sourced option rooted in agroecological farming and traditional food knowledge.

For its creators, Sumpak symbolizes a continent-wide movement where small-scale farmers and grassroots groups create businesses that embody self-reliance, sustainability, and a shift away from dependence on industrial agribusiness.

In Uganda, Senegal, Cameroon, and other African countries, farmer groups are trying local food processing, seed systems, ecological farming, and direct markets. They want to change how healthy food is produced, processed, and sold. Their efforts are not just for the environment. They are also driven by economic survival, food sovereignty, and frustration with systems that depend on imported inputs, foreign-controlled supply chains, and industrial food products.

Highlighting these grassroots efforts, the initiatives were recently discussed during a webinar organized by the Agroecology Fund to launch a report documenting grassroots agroecological enterprises across the continent.

“We asked ourselves what would happen if we combined the creativity and power of social movements. This was an effort to provide support to networks and organizations within the Agroecology movements that are also working to support the agroecology enterprises,” Daniel Moss, co-director of the fund, said during the online report launch.

The report, Agroecological Entrepreneurship Starts Here, draws from business planning grants awarded to 15 organizations across Africa. The projects supported by the grants ranged from cassava flour processing in Uganda to local bread-making flour initiatives in Cameroon and women-led food processing enterprises in Senegal, among others.

The report contends that agroecology represents both an environmental practice and a strategic pathway for building locally controlled, sustainable economies.

For decades, the agricultural industry in Africa and globally has favored industrial systems. These rely on hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, and export crops. Big agribusinesses and commercial farms often get grants, subsidies, financing, and policy support. Meanwhile, small-scale agroecological enterprises struggle to access even modest capital.

The report launch noted that many grassroots agricultural businesses need $10,000 to $250,000. They require funds to expand production, improve packaging, or buy processing equipment. However, the findings show that most lenders and investors focus on much larger commercial projects.

“There’s a huge finance gap,” Jennifer Astone, a co-author of the report, revealed, adding that “Smallholder farmers, cooperatives and agroecological entrepreneurs are systematically excluded from finance and policy support that fuels conventional industrial agribusiness.”

In Uganda, the Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers Forum (ESAFF) worked with farmer groups producing okra powder, cassava flour, pineapple products, and biomass briquettes.

According to ESAFF, some groups received grinding machines and value-addition equipment, while others were trained in packaging, branding, and marketing. Several enterprises, with the support of the grant, later registered formally as businesses after seeing growth opportunities emerge.

Nancy Mugimba, coordinator of ESAFF, said the grants helped transform loosely organized farmer activities into more structured enterprises.

“One of the things we discovered is that these businesses can actually work. The farmers became more organized and innovative.” Nancy said.

According to Nancy, one women’s group producing cassava flour improved its drying and processing methods to target health-conscious consumers, including people managing diabetes, while another youth group shifted from chemically grown pineapples to organic production after discovering growing demand for sweeter agroecological fruit.

“Farmers were trained on how to handle their products for their target markets. As a result, they are now producing higher-quality products than before and have successfully introduced them to the market,” she added.

In Senegal, the women-led movement, Nous Sommes la Solution, focused on replacing industrial bouillon cubes with natural products made from local ingredients.

The movement joins more than 500 rural women’s associations and 175,000 members across West Africa. It claims that more processed food additives have raised health concerns such as hypertension and kidney disease.

This bouillon uses low-cost beans and several prep steps: pre-cook, peel, wash, then ferment the beans. The beans are then processed into a powder. We rely on local skills and local produce. We also aim to promote high-nutritive value products, said Mariama Sonko during the report launch. She added that women can make something local, providing income to support a healthy lifestyle.

Their product, Sumpak, uses fermented local beans, spices, and traditional knowledge. With support from the grants, the women obtained food safety certification, trademark registration, and improved packaging.

This grant lets us focus on administrative tasks for production and sales. We received Food Safety Certification in Senegal. We can now produce and sell Sumpak, Sonko said. She noted that demand has grown faster than expected, making producers consider expanding storage and processing.

In Cameroon, another agroecological initiative focused on the problem of dependence on imported wheat, which has affected many African countries. The West African country imports significant amounts of wheat for bread production, exposing local food systems to global market disruptions and price shocks.

Global disruptions, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and COVID-19, worsened these vulnerabilities. This led to soaring prices. Data from the National Shippers’ Council of Cameroon shows that the country imported 278,408 tons of wheat in Q2 2025, at a cost of over CFA45 billion.

According to the report, the Cameroonian organization Service d’Appui aux Initiatives Locales de Développement (SAILD) responded by promoting bread and pastries made partly from locally produced cassava and sweet potato flour.

The project brought together flour processors, bakers, regulators, and financial institutions to explore how local alternatives could replace imported wheat.

“We realized that dependence on imports weakens local economies. We need local production and local consumption systems.” Mr.  Rodrigue Kouang, Coordinator of SAILD’s agroecology program, mentioned.

The report urges policies and networks that empower agroecological entrepreneurship and recommends practical support for farmer organizations.

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The 2nd edition of East Africa Business and Human Rights opens in Nairobi, highlighting the critical issue of African States’ limited participation in global treaty-making, which risks leaving the continent’s specific needs unaddressed.

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By the Witness Radio Team

Nairobi, Kenya: Prof. Damilola Olawuyi, Chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, has urged African countries to take an active and leading role in international treaty negotiations to ensure that global treaties address the continent’s unique challenges, warning that passive participation could result in agreements that overlook Africa’s needs.

He said that in international law, you don’t get what you deserve; you get what you negotiate.

Delivering the Keynote at the Dialogue, Prof. Olawuyi stressed that African governments are not sufficiently engaged in negotiations to create a legally binding international treaty on business and human rights—a lack of involvement that could undermine African interests.

The two-day dialogue, convened by DCA and partners, has the theme: “Beyond Compliance: Strengthening Accountable and Rights-Centered Supply Chains in East and Horn of Africa.” It brings together governments, businesses, civil society organizations, development partners, and human rights defenders. Participants discuss how growing investments can better align with human rights standards and responsible business conduct.

Building on the momentum of the 2023 inaugural conference in Kampala, the event aims to shift discussions from commitments to implementation. It focuses on rapidly expanding investments in land-based sectors and their impact on communities.

He reiterated that the persistent absence of African states from these talks may result in global rules that ignore African priorities.

He warned the end result might be an instrument that does not reflect African priorities and interests. It could contain pre-packed solutions that impose higher environmental, sanitary, climate, and ESG standards on African products, limiting their competitiveness and market access.

He urged the EAC, AU, and member states to unite around a common position in negotiations, underscoring the importance of African leadership in ensuring investments support both economic growth and human rights.

Prof. Olawuyi argued that the absence of binding international standards continues to undermine efforts to hold corporations accountable for human rights abuses, particularly in sectors such as agribusiness, mining, and large-scale land-based investments.

He cited an upcoming report on agribusiness, food security, and human rights. He said investment-driven agricultural projects in several countries continue to be linked to child labor, sexual exploitation, modern slavery, gender injustice, forced displacement, land grabbing, and other rights violations.

He recommended that National Action Plans must be rigorously implemented across all sectors, including agribusiness, to effectively address human rights abuses.

The concerns voiced by the UN expert were also reflected in discussions throughout the forum. Karen Poore, Country Director for DanChurchAid Kenya (DCA), spoke on behalf of the event host. She called on governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and local communities to work together proactively, urging them to take concrete steps that ensure investments respect human rights and deliver equitable benefits for all involved.

Poore described DCA’s role as both a convener and bridge-builder, creating spaces where different actors can engage honestly on difficult issues surrounding business conduct and human rights.

She said spaces like this, where honesty and constructive challenge are possible, are important. More transparency and openness about root causes, and a willingness to move beyond appearances, are needed, as business and human rights are evolving quickly and new standards are shaping expectations.

She stressed that responsible business conduct is not only about accountability but also about creating fairer and more sustainable economic opportunities.

“Access alone is not enough if it does not come with dignity and rights,” Poore noted, adding that transparency and long-term thinking are increasingly linked to resilient and sustainable business models.

She called for immediate action to address structural barriers affecting women, youth, and marginalized communities, ensure equal access to grievance mechanisms, and actively promote participation in decision-making processes.

Matthew Brooke, Head of Governance, Digital and Macroeconomics at the European Union Delegation to Kenya, represented the European Union Delegation. He acknowledged that past investment projects have been linked to human rights violations, exploitation, and abuse.

“Human rights violations in investment projects, exploitation and abuse have all been seen and witnessed, and they need to continue to be documented,” Brooke said.

He argued that such practices are unsustainable investments. He also explained that the European Union is shifting away from purely voluntary approaches toward stronger due diligence requirements. These requirements aim to prevent human rights and environmental harm in global supply chains.

According to Brooke, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) requires large companies operating in the EU market to identify and address human rights and environmental risks throughout their operations and supply chains, engage affected stakeholders, and take measures to prevent or mitigate harm.

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