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Big Tech’s digital trade agenda is a danger for farmers and food systems

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Criticism against Big Tech’s digital crusade is growing, along with demands for greater regulation. Yet, through underhand tactics such as trade deals, tech companies are blocking reform. Their recent focus on agriculture threatens our food systems. In order to rein in their growing power over them, it is crucial to expose what is happening behind the scenes and build movements to stop it.

It is not easy to evade the power and influence of Big Tech companies in everyday life, even for those living in rural communities in the global South where internet access is often limited.

Anyone searching for information on the internet, whether in Brazil, India or Kenya, will most likely use Google’s search engine.1 If they are in China, they will probably use Baidu’s. If they need to connect with their family or friends, they will probably use one of Meta’s social media or messaging platforms, like Facebook, which controls 75% of the global social media market, and 83% in Africa.2 When ordering food delivery in Brazil, they will most likely turn to the iFood platform (which holds 80% of the market), and if in Southeast Asia, they will almost certainly use Grab.3

Such digital monopolies enable tech companies to gather huge amounts of data from billions of people. This power is in turn being used to expand their control over developments in artificial intelligence (AI). Today, eight of the ten largest corporations in the world are tech companies. Each of them has a market value greater than the GDP of 93% of all countries.4

People around the world are waking up to the dangers of this corporate power. The Big Tech companies and their billionaire owners are taking over the media, backing far-right political parties, providing support to militaries committing war crimes, and collaborating with governments to curtail human rights.5 And they have an agenda for the food system too. Big Tech companies are converging with the largest agribusiness corporations, vacuuming up the data of small-scale food producers, workers and consumers with barely any oversight or limitations and then using that data against their interests.

Mass data grabbing across the food system

The world’s largest seed, pesticide and fertiliser companies have access to a constant stream of data from farms stretching across tens of millions of hectares– from Brazil to China– by way of digital apps installed on the smart phones and tractors of farmers. The information is stored on the clouds of Big Tech companies, like Microsoft’s Azure and Amazon’s AWS.

The clouds also store data from a growing number of government programmes collected to develop national digital databases and services for farmers. The Indian government’s new digital database, Agri Stack, for example, was developed with Microsoft and gives the company detailed information on 80 million Indian farmers, from land records to health histories.6 Agri Stack is the blueprint for other national digital farm registries that the Gates Foundation and the World Bank are pushing forward in several countries, beginning with Ethiopia and Kenya.7 Farmers increasingly have little choice but to hand over their data to corporations in order to access extension services, get loans and subsidies, or purchase inputs and machinery.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and others have been raising concerns about how this corporate control over data can harm farmers.8 Agribusiness companies, for example, can use their chatbots and digital apps to push farmers into buying their seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. When the chatbot advice fails, there is little farmers can do to get compensation, and even just switching to another platform can be difficult. The clear overall trend is that corporations are using their digital platforms to entrench a top-down flow of information that gives farmers less and less autonomy over how they farm.

Companies can also sell data they collect on farmers to third-parties who may use that information in ways that harms the interests of farmers. This is what happened with the Bayer-Microsoft collaboration in India, where farmer data was sold to food companies who then used the data to squeeze farmers on prices.9

And it is not just on the farm. Mass data harvesting is happening at all points of the food system, with ever more integration. China’s largest online retailer, Alibaba, for instance, connects its newly created digital agriculture division with its e-commerce and food delivery platforms that generate data on the preferences and behaviour of over 800 million consumers.10 Retailers can use online and in-store sales data to build profiles of their consumers and then encourage them to buy certain products or adjust prices to what they determine each customer will be willing to pay– a practice called surveillance pricing.11 Online food delivery platforms are also notorious for using their access and control over data on their drivers to coerce them into working long hours for low pay.12

There is growing criticism and resistance to these and other tactics used by tech companies. So, to fight back against any measures that might restrain their ambitions, tech companies are investing big time in influencing politicians. In 2025 alone, they spent US$170 million on lobbying in the European Union and US$109 million in the US.13 They also rely on another less visible but equally important tool to entrench their agendas and shield themselves from public accountability: digital trade deals.

Unpacking Big Tech’s digital trade agenda

Digital trade gets addressed in the e-commerce or digital chapters included in free trade agreements (FTA), or directly in bilateral or regional digital trade agreements. These texts are heavily influenced by tech corporations, especially where it comes to ensuring their control over data, restricting the access of others to their source codes and algorithms, and limiting the ability of governments to tax digital services.

The corporate agenda is heavily backed by the US government, which is home to the majority of Big Tech companies. The industry’s demands are included in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and all other agreements negotiated by the US. But they are also included in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the negotiations for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), in which the US is not a party. With some nuances, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the European Union follow a similar path (see Box).

The tech company agenda embedded in these trade deals has important consequences for food systems. For instance, in order for governments to ensure farmers, consumers and food workers have rights and control over their data, it is necessary for that data to be stored in locations under their jurisdiction. This is key not only in terms of personal privacy, but also to prevent it from falling into the hands of those who could harm them. There have been some limited movements in this direction, such as laws to protect people’s privacy in the European Union, Argentina, Brazil, and Kenya.14 Unfortunately, data generated on farms (on land, seeds, plant and animal genetics, weather) is considered non-personal and not covered by the laws, even though personal information can be gathered when data on yields is combined with location, for example.

Such government initiatives, no matter how limited, are all being fiercely opposed by the industry, which wants to be able to exploit and sell data to third parties without restriction. Not having a local, physical presence in the countries where data is extracted is also a way for tech companies to evade liabilities for their workers, especially when it comes to delivery workers, where risks of work place injuries are high. These are some of the main reasons why tech companies are pushing for data to be able to move freely across borders. In digital trade jargon, this is known as “freedom for cross-border data flows” and aims to prevent “forced data localisation”.

Access to source codes (the lines of code written by programmers to instruct machines to perform a specific task) and algorithms (pieces of code that include the steps needed to solve a problem) is also an issue for food systems. Farmers around the world have always repaired their own tools. It is a traditional part of farming. But this has become much more difficult with the adoption of digital tools, such as agricultural drones and connected tractors. Repairing these requires access to the manufacturers’ source codes, which is strictly protected by intellectual property rights. In the US, farmers lose US$3 billion a year to tractor downtime and pay US$1.2 billion more in excess repair costs because of these restrictions.15 Food delivery workers also suffer because they are unable to access the opaque algorithms that decide how much they are paid or even if they’ve been terminated.16 Consumers also find algorithms that manipulate consumption to be a black box.

There are many important reasons why companies should have to make public their source codes and algorithms but digital trade agreements can pre-empt measures aimed at doing so. Most digital trade agreements restrict public or government access to company source codes and algorithms, and the few that include exceptions, tend to be weak and vague.17

Food systems are also impacted by Big Tech’s use of digital trade deals to avoid paying taxes.18 These corporations have long benefitted from a temporary moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions established in 1998 by the WTO. Under the moratorium, states are allowed to collect domestic taxes, but cannot use tariffs to tax products entering their territory. A study found that between 2017 and 2020 Global South countries, most of which are net importers of digital services, lost US$56 billion in tax they could not apply to those imports.19 It means governments have fewer resources with which to implement food and agriculture policies for the benefit of their populations and other essential services.

To reinforce tax avoidance, all digital trade deals signed to date have systematically prohibited taxes on electronic transmissions. Those pushed by the US with El Salvador and Guatemala have, more recently, included a commitment from both Central American countries to support the US’s push to make the WTO moratorium permanent. However, at the WTO, Brazil led an effort that succeeded in getting the moratorium dropped in March 2026.20 The big question now is whether governments will seize on this development to implement border taxes or bind themselves to similar restrictions under bilateral digital trade deals.

The need for a convergence of struggles

Fortunately, movements challenging the power of tech corporations are mushrooming around the world and starting to work together towards common objectives.

Some efforts are focused on digital justice and digital rights, such as the Just Net Coalition, the European network defending rights and freedoms online and the Global Digital Justice Forum, which includes digital rights networks, feminist groups, corporate watchdogs, communication rights campaigners, trade unions, and cooperatives.21 Groups such as Citizen Lab and AlgoRace are tackling digital surveillance and the impacts of AI on migrant and racialised communities. The People vs Big Tech movement aims to challenge the power of tech corporations on issues like digital policy, consumers’ rights, climate change, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminism.22

They are also many worker-led efforts to stop corporations from using digital platforms to exploit workers and violate their rights. These include actions by workers at Amazon warehouses in the US and India and food delivery drivers working for Ele.me (Ali Baba) in China.23 In both the European Union and the UK, 12 food delivery workers organisations have been speaking out against serious abuses on platforms such as Deliveroo, Just Eat and Uber Eats, and have called for a public register of the algorithms used.24 Facebook (Meta) content moderators in Colombia and Ghana have also been mobilising.25 And there is a growing movement fighting against the expansion of data centres because of their impacts on local communities and voracity for energy, water and critical minerals, which is causing an increasing number of social and environmental conflicts worldwide.26

People in the food sovereignty movement are also active on digital issues. For example, African farmers are speaking out against the privatisation and corporate capture of their data, arguing that data cannot be separated from its relationship to territories and communities.27 The European Coordination Via Campesina recently published a critique of corporate led digitalisation that calls for inclusive research and innovation to support the transition to agroecology.28 A growing farmers’ movement is also claiming the right to repair machinery and the right to build their own tools and share the information freely.29 During the pandemic, small farmers and vendors from Indonesia to Brazil showed their capacity to coordinate efforts with driver’s cooperatives and used their own digital tools to ensure people had access to food.

In order for the movements fighting Big Tech to challenge digital trade agreements, alliances are needed with those that have long been fighting against free trade agreements.

From their side, peasant movements such as La Via Campesina have been fighting free trade agreements across different regions.30 They have increasingly joined forces with other groups, including trade unions, environmentalists, women’s groups and indigenous peoples. A recent example of this is the broad coalition of sectors that fought intensely against the EU-Mercosur agreement. During the 3rd Nyeleni Forum, which brought together movements from a wide range of sectors (farmers, migrants, trade unions, healthcare workers, environmentalists and women), the digitalisation of food systems was identified as a new colonial frontier. Building on this, there could be greater convergence with groups to denounce the impacts of corporate digitalisation and to stop digital trade agreements that advance the interests of corporations.

The global advance of digital trade agreements

Academic and activist Jane Kelsey says the standard corporate demands in most digital trade negotiations can be traced back to the “Digital 2 Dozen” principles published by the US Trade Representative in 2014.31 These shaped the e-commerce chapters of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (later the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership -CPTPP), and became a model for later agreements.32 Even after leaving the CPTPP in 2017, the US pursued even stronger Big Tech protections in the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020.

The US Chamber of Commerce, whose members include large agribusiness and tech corporations, systematically promotes ‘high-standard’ digital trade agreements, particularly among the “Digital Dozen” countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Taiwan, the UK and ASEAN members).33 Several major deals have followed, including agreements involving the US, Japan, Singapore, Australia, Chile, the UK- and the EU.34 China, the UAE and India, are also advancing digital trade negotiations, but with different priorities.

The USMCA guarantees cross-border data flows, including personal information, and bans data localisation. Its provisions have influenced other agreements, even those without US participation such as the CPTPP and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) negotiations, sometimes conflicting with national laws, including those in Kenya and Nigeria.35

The European Union also supports free data flows and bans data localisation but insists on protections for personal data. Its legislation is actually regarded as one of the strongest data privacy laws in the world, which has put it in the crosshairs of Big Tech and the Trump administration.36 But implementation has been tortuous, and safeguards in international deals are often unclear.37 The EU’s data privacy body has acknowledged this in reference to the EU-Singapore deal, where there are no regulations on what corporations can do with people’s data.38

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes ten ASEAN member states, as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, includes similar provisions to CPTPP’s. 39 Its rules are not legally binding though, and allow more restrictions for national security interests. This is particularly relevant for China, who supports the freedom of cross-border trade in goods enabled by the internet rather than the freedom of all data flows. Some say this is a reflection of the interests of Chinese e-commerce platforms, like Alibaba.40

The USMCA, CPTPP and digital trade deals pushed by the European Union ban forced transfer of source codes and algorithms, while RCEP doesn’t include specific protection. Public-interest exceptions in these deals tend to be weak.41

In regards to taxes on electronic transmissions: the US continues pushing to make the WTO moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions permanent, while the EU, AfCFTA and RCEP allow room for internal taxation.42 Yet RCEP’s signatories are committed to adjusting their practices in line with any future changes at the WTO level.

See as well: Bilaterals.org, “Resisting Big Tech empires (and their trade rules)”, 30 April 2026
1 See: ITU, “Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025”, https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/D-IND-ICT_MDD-2025-3/; Statista, “Most popular reasons for using the internet worldwide as of 2nd quarter 2025”, 27 November 2025, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1387375/internet-using-global-reasons
2 Statcounter, “Social media stats worldwide”, March 2026, https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats
3 See: José Soeiro, Kenzo Soares Seto and Víctor Riesgo Gómez, “Varieties and similarities of platform capitalisms: a comparative approach of labor regulation in Brazil, Portugal and Spain”, Frontiers in Sociology, Vol. 10, 28 March 2025, https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1454324; and Dylan Loh, “Grab’s ASEAN food delivery share rises to 55% in 2025: survey”, 28 January 2026, https://asia.nikkei.com/business/food-beverage/grab-s-asean-food-delivery-share-rises-to-55-in-2025-survey
4 See: Forbes India, “Top 10 biggest companies in the world by market cap in 2025”, 27 November 2025, https://www.forbesindia.com/article/explainers/top-10-largest-companies-world-market-cap/86341/1; and Worldometer, “GDP by country (2026) – IMF”, https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/
5 Adrienne Fichter et. al. “How tenaciously Palantir courted Switzerland”, 18 February 2026, https://www.republik.ch/2026/02/18/how-tenaciously-palantir-courted-switzerland
6 Harikishan Sharma, “What is AgriStack, which FM Nirmala Sitharaman has termed as the ‘next UPI’?”, 13 February 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/agristack-sitharaman-next-upi-10528472/
7 See: World Bank, GF, and BCG, “Digital agriculture roadmap playbook”, 2025, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099053025063021993/pdf/P508004-f943a09b-c45f-4c93-b554-9dd1decd1e7c.pdf; Ethiopian Ministry of agriculture and ATI, “Digital agriculture roadmap 2032”, April 2025, https://www.moa.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Digital-Agriculture-Roadmap-Ethiopia.pdf; and Data Driven Digital Agriculture, “Launch of the Digital Agriculture Roadmaps DARs Playbook and Lessons Learned”, 16 December 2025, https://youtu.be/E4h_3fsT8So?si=d-S7fc6wYsMq1G9C
8 See: UN, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri. Corporate power and human rights in food systems”, 21 July 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/213; ETC Group, “Commons to code: how platforms rewire agriculture and reshape power”, 9 November 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/commons_to_code_how_platforms_rewire_agriculture_and_reshape_power_0.pdf; IPES-Food, “Head in the cloud.”, February 2026, https://ipes-food.org/report/head-in-the-cloud/; GRAIN, “When big tech came for the farm: A blueprint of resistance from Asia’s small farmers”, 16 January 2023,https://grain.org/e/6940
9 GRAIN, “Techno feudalism takes root on the farm in India and China”, 24 October 2024, https://grain.org/e/7196
10 See: Mary Ma, “Agriculture: A new battlefield for China’s internet giants”, 27 February 2023, https://technode.com/2023/02/27/agriculture-a-new-battlefield-for-chinas-internet-giants/; and DBS, “Alibaba Group. Quick view”, 20 March 2026, https://www.dbs.com.hk/treasures/aics/stock-coverage/templatedata/article/equity/data/en/DBSV/012014/9988_HK.xml
11 Mayu Tobin-Miyaji, “Kroger’s surveillance pricing harms consumers and raises prices, with or without facial recognition”, 14 February 2025, https://epic.org/krogers-surveillance-pricing-harms-consumers-and-raises-prices-with-or-without-facial-recognition/
12 Arif Novianto, “Resistance is Possible: Lives of Grab Workers in Indonesia”, Asian Labour Review, January 2023, https://labourreview.org/grab-in-indonesia/
13 See: Corporate Europe Observatory, “Revealed: Tech industry now spending record €151 million on lobbying the EU”, 27 October 2025, https://corporateeurope.org/en/2025/10/revealed-tech-industry-now-spending-record-eu151-million-lobbying-eu; and Emily Birnbaum and Maggie Eastlan, “Silicon Valley pours out lobbying cash and flattery to win over deal-minded Trump”, 22 January 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-22/big-tech-leaders-spend-record-109-million-to-win-over-deal-minded-trump
14 See: Friends of the Earth, “Big brother is feeding you”, December 2025, https://friendsoftheearth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Digital-factsheet-2.pdf; ETC Group, “Commons to code: how platforms rewire agriculture and reshape power”, 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/commons_to_code_how_platforms_rewire_agriculture_and_reshape_power_0.pdf; and Biba Kenya, “Connecting communities or corporations?”, May 2025, https://bibakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Connecting-Communities-or-Corporations-Digital-AgricultureData-Harvests-and-Food-sovereignty-in-Keny.pdf
15 Kevin O’Reilly, “Report: tractor ‘right to repair’ would save U.S. farmers $4.2 Billion”, 11 April 2023, https://pirg.org/media-center/report-tractor-right-to-repair-would-save-u-s-farmers-4-2-billion/
16 See: Privacy International, “Time to deliver answers: An open letter to Just Eat Takeaway, Uber and Deliveroo”, 13 January 2025, https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/5509/time-deliver-answers-open-letter-just-eat-takeaway-uber-and-deliveroo; and “New research exposes deepening exploitation of Uber drivers by algorithmic pay”, 19 June 2025, https://www.ier.org.uk/news/new-research-exposes-deepening-exploitation-of-uber-drivers-by-algorithmic-pay/
17 EDRi, “Digital trade: the new frontline in the fight for our rights”, 7 May 2025, https://edri.org/our-work/digital-trade-the-new-frontline-in-the-fight-for-our-rights/
18 Jane Kelsey, “Digital trade rules and big tech: surrendering public good to private power”, PSI, February 2022, https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/f2bddc3d-c353-4846-a23b-82dec9a9e6d7_2020_-_ASIA_DIG_REPORT_3__1_.pdf
19 Rashmi Banga, “WTO Moratorium on custom duties on electronic transmissions: how much tariff revenue have developing countries lost?”, South Centre, 3 June 2022, https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/RP157_WTO-Moratorium-on-Customs-Duties-on-Electronic-Transmissions_EN.pdf
20 Sofia Scasserra, “The night Brazil said no to Trump (and changed the internet forever)”, 2 April 2026, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-night-brazil-said-no-to-trump-and-changed-the-internet-forever
23 See: UNI Global Union, “Thousands of Amazon workers and allies strike and protest in dozens of countries on Black Friday”, 26 November 2025, https://uniglobalunion.org/news/make-amazon-pay-day-2025/; “Everyone loses in the rage of China’s delivery wars”, 31 July 2025, https://www.economist.com/china/2025/07/31/everyone-loses-in-the-rage-of-chinas-delivery-wars
24 Privacy International, “Time to deliver answers: An open letter to Just Eat Takeaway, Uber and Deliveroo”, 13 January 2025, https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/5509/time-deliver-answers-open-letter-just-eat-takeaway-uber-and-deliveroo
25 See: Eiffel Abedin, “Content moderation is a new factory floor of exploitation – labour protections must catch up”, 26 June 2025, https://www.ihrb.org/latest/content-moderation-is-a-new-factory-floor-of-exploitation-labour-protections-must-catch-up; and Stephanie Höppner, “Africa’s content moderators want compensation for job trauma”, 1 May 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/africas-content-moderators-want-compensation-for-job-trauma/a-72401025
26 See: Mariam Mayet, “Critical minerals, fertilisers, agrochemicals, digital power, and the erosion of food sovereignty”, 23 April 2026, https://acbio.org.za/corporate-expansion/critical-minerals-fertilisers-agrochemicals-digital-power-and-the-erosion-of-food-sovereignty/; UNCTAD, “Digital economy report 2024”, 2024, https://unctad.org/publication/digital-economy-report-2024; and Blake Montgomery, “Datacenters meet resistance over environmental concerns as AI boom spreads in Latin America”, 11 November 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/nov/10/data-centers-latin-america
27 ETC Group, “What does data justice mean for African small-holder farmers?”, 8 December 2025, https://www.etcgroup.org/content/what-does-data-justice-mean-african-small-holder-farmers
28 ECVC, “The challenges digitalisation brings to peasant agroecology: An ECVC perspective”, 28 April 2025, https://www.eurovia.org/publications/ecvc-position-on-digitalisation
29 See: https://farmhack.org/; and Kat de Naoum, “Right to repair farm equipment: legislation, challenges, and advantages”, 16 February 2026, https://www.thomasnet.com/insights/right-to-repair-farm-equipment/
31 Jane Kelsey, “Digital trade rules and big tech: surrendering public good to private power”, PSI, February 2022, https://pop-umbrella.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/f2bddc3d-c353-4846-a23b-82dec9a9e6d7_2020_-_ASIA_DIG_REPORT_3__1_.pdf
32 The current signatories of CPTPP are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. Other applicants are: Costa Rica, Taiwan, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ukraine, Indonesia, Philippines, UAE, and Cambodia. China’s application has been opposed by Japan and Australia. See: https://www.bilaterals.org/?-tpp
34 Marília Maciel, “The WTO joint initiative stabilised ‘agreement on electronic commerce’: looking at the broader picture”, 30 July 2024, https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/the-wto-joint-initiative-stabilised-agreement-on-electronic-commerce-looking-at-the-broader-picture/
35 See: CPTPP, “Chapter 14. Electronic commerce”, https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/14._electronic_commerce.pdf; AfCFTA, “Protocol on the agreement establishing the African continental free trade area on digital trade”, https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/en_-_afcfta_protocol_on_digital_trade.pdf; and World Bank, “Digital trade regulatory readiness (DTRR) database”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2025/09/10/digital-trade-regulatory-readiness-dtrr-database
36 Raphael Satter and Alexandra Alper, “Exclusive: US orders diplomats to fight data sovereignty initiatives”, 25 February 2026, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/us-orders-diplomats-fight-data-sovereignty-initiatives-2026-02-25/?trk=public_post_comment-text
37 Naomi Grossman, “The Meta ruling that could change Europe’s data playbook”, 21 December 2025, https://vinciworks.com/blog/the-meta-ruling-that-could-change-europes-data-playbook/
38 Javier Ruiz Diaz, “The EU-Singapore digital trade agreement: gambling away our digital sovereignty”, The Left, November 2025, https://www.martin-schirdewan.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/4031639-EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT-Booklet-Signapore_03.pdf
41 EDRi, “Digital trade: the new frontline in the fight for our rights”, 7 May 2025, https://edri.org/our-work/digital-trade-the-new-frontline-in-the-fight-for-our-rights/
Source: grain.org

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Researchers sound the alarm: Uganda’s oil development threatens the nation’s vital wetlands.

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July 29, 2026

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By the Witness Radio team.

Uganda is set to launch commercial oil production in late September, but researchers caution that this rapid petroleum push could endanger the country’s precious wetlands, wildlife, and rich biodiversity.

This warning arrives as Uganda nears its long-awaited first oil, almost twenty years after crude was first discovered in the Albertine Graben.

In a recent post on the X platform, formerly Twitter, by the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU), Uganda’s statutory body mandated to monitor and regulate the exploration, development, and production, together with the refining, gas conversion, transportation, and storage of petroleum in Uganda, it indicated that the country’s major oil projects are progressing towards production. As of June 30, 2026, the Tilenga project was 74 percent complete, with 234 wells drilled, exceeding the minimum 170 wells required for production.

The Kingfisher project had reached 79 percent completion. In comparison, the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) stood at about 90 percent overall progress, with more than 1,443 kilometers of pipeline welded across Uganda and Tanzania.

In July, Irene Bateebe, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, said Uganda was on course to begin commercial oil production in September.

Speaking during a retreat for Ugandan diplomats organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kampala, Bateebe said the country’s upstream oil projects and export infrastructure were in their final stages, with first oil expected soon.

Yet as Uganda edges toward commercial oil production, a fresh study from the Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) raises red flags about the environmental fallout, especially for wetlands, biodiversity, and the communities whose lives are intertwined with them.

The 31-page AFIEGO report, titled “Siltation, Noisy Generators & Air Pollution: Documenting Oil Sector Damage to Murchison Falls National Park & Uganda’s Wetlands,” documents the impacts of oil pipeline construction and related activities under the Tilenga and Kingfisher upstream projects, as well as EACOP.

The research, conducted between March and June 2026, is based on interviews and focus group discussions with oil-host communities and tourism-sector stakeholders in Buliisa, Hoima, Kikuube, Kakumiro and Kyotera districts.

The report identifies several oil infrastructure projects that are affecting wetlands, including the Victoria Nile Pipeline Crossing under the Tilenga project, the Kingfisher feeder pipeline and EACOP.

The affected ecosystems include the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Ramsar wetland system, Kibale/Bukoora wetland, Sango Bay-Musambwa Island-Kagera (SAMUKA) Ramsar wetland system and Kafu wetland, as well as other wetlands within the Lake Albert basin.

The AFIEGO report documents increased cases of siltation and blockage of tributaries connected to wetlands, including Wambabya, Kafu and Kibaale/Bukoora in Hoima, Kakumiro and Kyotera districts.

The report also spotlights a surge in population, along with rising air and water pollution, as troubling side effects of the oil boom.

Researchers warn these impacts could ripple through wildlife populations and disrupt the delicate ecological systems that local communities rely on.

“Anthropogenic [human-generated] noise and vibrations can cause stress in wildlife, while affecting communication, movement, and foraging,” the report states.

It adds that fossil-fuel-powered generators release carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide, which can cause respiratory distress, weakened immunity, and reproductive disruptions in wildlife.

Diana Nabiruma, Senior Communications Officer at AFIEGO, told Witness Radio that the research was conducted to understand the effects of oil infrastructure on wetlands and identify measures to address the damage.

“AFIEGO decided to conduct research to ensure that first we understand what impacts the construction of the EACOP-related pipelines had on selected wetlands in the country and what measures can be put in place to remediate these impacts and to ensure that the wetlands are conserved for the benefit of Ugandans,” Nabiruma said.

She said several pipelines associated with the oil projects are crossing or affecting wetlands of significant ecological importance.

“The wetlands are being crossed or affected by several pipelines belonging to the aforementioned projects. Some of these pipelines include the Victoria Nile Pipeline Crossing under the Tilenga project, the Kingfisher feeder pipeline and the EACOP,” she said.

Nabiruma said the pipelines are also crossing the Murchison Falls-Albert Delta Ramsar wetland system, which is partly located within Murchison Falls National Park and forms part of the Victoria Nile basin.

The Kibale/Bukoora wetland, which forms part of the Sango Bay-Musambwa Island-Kagera (SAMUKA) Ramsar wetland system, is also among the affected ecosystems. The report further identifies Kafu wetland and other wetlands within the Lake Albert basin as being affected by the oil infrastructure.

The concerns documented by AFIEGO are also being raised by communities living near the oil infrastructure.

Kyakulumbye Gonzaga, a resident of Kakuuto village in Kakuuto Sub-county, Kyotera District, said residents are worried about the safety of their water sources following construction of the EACOP pipeline through the Kibaale/Bukoora wetland.

“The EACOP camp is based in our sub-county, and most of its pipelines were constructed through the Kibaale/Bukoora river and its tributaries like Kisoma tributary. They constructed the pipeline through the water, which is a big threat to the aquatic life and to us too because we use the water for cooking and drinking.” Gonzaga revealed.

The AFIEGO research also documents concerns about reduced water access for chimpanzees in Wambabya Forest in relation to the Kingfisher pipeline.

According to the report, communities said water was pumped from River Rutooha during construction activities, after which chimpanzees began entering residential areas in search of water.

Another community member from Hoima District affected by EACOP activities said blocked tributaries had reduced water flowing into Wambabya Forest, forcing chimpanzees into nearby communities.

“Water no longer flows into Wambabya forest very well because some tributaries belonging to Kanywabarogo were blocked. The forest is home to chimpanzees. These seem not to be getting water well anymore, so they come to the community to access water,” she said.

She said the chimpanzees destroy gardens when they leave the forest in search of water. “We no longer grow maize because the chimpanzees take it when they come out of the forest looking for water,” she added.

These findings emerge as civil society groups, environmental experts, and campaigners voice mounting concerns about the social and environmental toll of Uganda’s oil drive. Activists say land acquisition for the projects has already disrupted the lives of over 100,000 people.

Dickens Kamugisha, Executive Director of AFIEGO, said Uganda cannot achieve sustainable economic transformation by degrading the ecosystems that support citizens.

He emphasized that the research reveals Uganda’s oil activities are harming vital wetlands that millions of people depend on for their livelihoods.

Kamugisha called on the government to ensure that TotalEnergies EP Uganda (TEPU) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation Uganda Limited (CUL) remediate the harm caused to wetlands, while also urging the government to rethink oil production in the country.

In one of Witness Radio’s interviews with Dr. Patricia Litho, the Assistant Commissioner for Communication in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, she acknowledged that there are potential risks associated with oil exploration and production, which is why the government established robust regulations, monitoring mechanisms, and contingency plans to prevent and respond to any environmental incidents.

She added that the government of Uganda is committed to ensuring that the oil projects are executed in an environmentally sustainable and responsible manner because it also understands the importance of preserving the natural heritage and biodiversity.

Related posts:

Oil projects’ adverse effects: New report shows Oil development threatens Uganda’s tourism and local livelihoods. 61 CSOs want Ramsar Wetlands affected by EACOP and Tilenga projects in Uganda and Tanzania to be listed in the Montreux Record. New report: EACOP threatens tourism and biodiversity in Greater Masaka. NEMA says it is restoring wetlands, but poor urban families say it is using the exercise to grab their land for new infrastructure projects – now they demand compensation and resettlement. Gov’t cancels 300 titles in wetlands
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Who buys Rwanda’s smuggled coltan? The global journey of conflict coltan from DRC to the world’s electronics

Published

2 days ago

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July 29, 2026

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Conflict coltan smuggled from the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is finding its way into global markets and popular consumer products, despite due diligence systems

Where have over 2,000 tonnes of smuggled conflict coltan gone?

These looted minerals come from mines in Rubaya in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which produce 15% of the world’s tantalum, a key ingredient for electronic products found in smartphones, laptops and cars around the world.

The Rubaya mines have become a main revenue source for M23’s brutal warfare in DRC. Seizing vast areas of territory, the armed group backed by Rwanda’s military has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians, abducting and torturing with impunity.

But once the coltan is smuggled to Rwanda, little is known about who buys it or where it goes.

In a year-long investigation, Global Witness followed the DRC’s conflict coltan from the mines across the border and into global supply chains. We established the complicity of Rwandan officials, as smuggling reached “unprecedented” levels.

With Rwanda’s coltan exports more than doubling over the past three years, we identified the seven companies that exported 85% of the coltan.

Through interviews with coltan smugglers, we found that at least five of these seven companies buy conflict coltan from DRC, selling it on through middlemen to smelters in China and Kazakhstan.

In the smelters, the coltan is processed into tantalum. From there, it is used to manufacture the capacitors that are essential components in electronic devices.

We found that conflict coltan may have unwittingly found its way to global brands including Microsoft, Vodafone, Sony, Amazon, Nvidia, LG Display, Ericsson, Toyota and Apple – and into products we use every day.

Conflict coltan from eastern DRC may ultimately end up in everyday devices and global brands’ supply chains such as Microsoft. Icva2 / iStock

Around 15 years ago, a system took shape in the African Great Lakes Region that was designed to put an end to minerals financing conflict.

The recent war in DRC is a test case. Our investigation reveals that the due diligence and traceability systems have failed to break the link between conflict and natural resources.

Instead, the traceability system known as ITSCI that many international companies rely on to keep their supply chains conflict-free is being used to launder a large share of smuggled coltan. Coltan connected to the conflict has also likely been introduced into an alternative system called Better Mining.

The Responsible Minerals Initiative’s audits have failed to detect conflict coltan in smelters’ supply chains.

Meanwhile, as the war in eastern DRC continues, the international community is failing to take significant action.

Coltan financing the conflict

Since 2023, the lucrative Rubaya mines have become a war prize for various armed groups, as they have in previous phases of the wars in DRC. The UN reported incursions in the mines throughout 2023.

In late 2023, the M23 rebel group seized control of main transport routes around Rubaya. By April 2024, it had captured the Rubaya mines, monopolising coltan exports.

Since then, coltan has become a major – if not the main – source of funding for M23.

M23’s parallel administration in North Kivu has selected M23-friendly traders to smuggle minerals to Rwanda and has run a taxation system at mining and trading sites.

Traders pay “taxes” on coltan which includes US$4 per kilo to M23 and US$3 per kilo to the Rwandan government.

By collecting taxes on coltan production and trade, M23 has generated US$800,000 every month since May 2024 according to a UN estimate.

The results of a coltan sample analysed in Kanzamin’s Rubaya lab

“Taxes” requested by M23 as displayed in Mubambiro. Global Witness

Coltan smuggle to Rwanda

Rwanda is not only supporting M23’s military operations in DRC with between 7,000 and 12,000 Rwandan troops and advanced weaponry but Rwandan officials also facilitate the smuggling.

Previously, much of the coltan was smuggled through lightly monitored border areas. But since M23’s takeover of Goma, much of it now crosses there in plain sight of Rwandan border officials. Global Witness has even observed officials recording coltan coming from the DRC.

M23 fighter at “grande barrière” border post in Goma
M23 fighter at “grande barrière” border post in Goma. AFP / Getty

UN experts estimate that between May and October 2024 over 120 tonnes a month were trafficked to Rwanda, creating the “largest contamination of mineral supply chains” in the Great Lakes Region in a decade.

Smuggling has likely grown even further in 2025. Within a year of M23’s takeover, at least 1,400 tonnes of coltan – and probably much more – have been smuggled from DRC to Rwanda.

Global Witness found no evidence that Rwandan officials had confiscated any smuggled coltan in the last two years.

Rwandan official figures show that coltan exports have increased more than 2.5 times between 2021 and 2025, reflecting the smuggling boom.

Coltan is an important revenue stream for Rwanda, which levies a 5% tax on exports. Since 2023, it has become the country’s second-largest export earner, after gold.

The UN, mineral experts and NGOs have continuously pointed out that Rwanda’s mineral export figures do not correspond with its actual production, even before the latest surge in exports. The Rwandan government doesn’t publish production figures at the mine level that would allow experts to check its claims.

Rwanda has repeatedly refused to apply the analytical fingerprint (AFP), a tool developed by Germany to check the origin of minerals based on their geochemical composition, according to a natural resources expert involved in the matter. This means that the tool, which cost millions of dollars to develop, has never been applied for its purpose.

A trader showed Global Witness this sample of coltan that he smuggled from Rubaya to Rwanda
A trader showed Global Witness this sample of coltan that he smuggled from Rubaya to Rwanda. Global Witness

Failed due diligence and traceability

There is a legal requirement for Rwandan minerals to be traced before being exported.

ITSCI is the dominant due diligence and traceability system in Rwanda and until early 2025 all major coltan exporters were members.

The scheme works by assigning tags with unique numbers to bags of coltan and other 3T minerals that are supposedly free from conflict and human rights abuses. ITSCI also reports and manages incidents along supply chains. (3T minerals are coltan, cassiterite and wolframite, named after the metals tantalum, tin and tungsten which are derived from them.)

ITSCI tags used in Rwanda
ITSCI tags used in Rwanda. UN Group of Experts / UN Group of Experts

Yet our investigation has found that ITSCI is instead undermined and used to launder a large share of smuggled coltan into supposedly legitimate supply chains. Global Witness revealed in a 2022 report that, ever since the scheme was set up in 2010, it has been used by major Rwandan exporters to launder large volumes of smuggled minerals from the DRC.

Four traders who sell smuggled coltan from Rubaya to exporters who are ITSCI members told Global Witness that that coltan is tagged by the scheme, indicating it has no conflict links.

The [exporting] company in Kigali comes and puts the tags on the coltan from Masisi and thus it becomes Rwandan coltan

Coltan smuggler

A coltan smuggler explained that when he has smuggled minerals he can just call the Rwandan mining authorities and they bring as many tags as he needs.

ITSCI-tagged coltan exports increased almost precisely as much as Rwandan coltan exports between 2023 and 2024 and made up almost 100% of total Rwandan coltan exports.

Yet, coltan imports reported by other countries from Rwanda appear to have increased even more than Rwanda’s official coltan exports in 2024, suggesting that a share of the coltan may have been smuggled out of Rwanda.

Analysis of ITSCI’s data shows that the tantalite share of ITSCI-tagged 3T minerals exports increased from 21% in 2020 to 31% in 2024. The surge is difficult to explain without taking the increased coltan smuggling from Rubaya to Rwanda into account.

ITSCI’s incident reporting also indicates that its members may source smuggled material. In 2025, ITSCI reported 70 incidents related to plausibility concerns and misuse of tags.

All exporters for which Global Witness has found evidence of buying conflict coltan have been ITSCI members, although three have been suspended since by ITSCI. In early 2026, ITSCI told Global Witness that three additional exporters were under review and at risk of expulsion and suspension.

In total, ITSCI has suspended or expelled six coltan exporters since 2024.

SLR Consulting’s Better Mining increased its foothold as an alternative traceability system in Rwanda in 2025. At least two companies Better Mining works with, and a further one that is going through its onboarding process, are former ITSCI members that have been suspended by ITSCI.

Two of them, Space Mining and Philbert Trading Minerals, have sourced conflict coltan during the time they worked with Better Mining, according to traders we spoke to. We also suspect Sunrise Metal Company, which is going through Better Mining’s onboarding process, to have bought conflict minerals.

Unlike ITSCI, Better Mining doesn’t publish the names of its members nor any risks it has identified in supply chains.

Better Mining has tried to establish itself as an alternative traceability and due diligence system to ITSCI for over a decade, and Global Witness has reported about how ITSCI has used unfair means to keep its near monopoly position.

An alternative traceability provider could play a positive role, if it helped to push the bar higher. Yet, if Better Mining takes on board companies that source conflict material and have been suspended from ITSCI, it has the opposite effect.

Who sells and buys Rwandan coltan?

From January 2023 to September 2025, just seven Rwandan companies exported almost 85% of coltan from Rwanda, according to customs data seen by Global Witness.

From Rwanda, coltan is brought to the ports of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania or Mombasa in Kenya from where it is shipped. Since the start of 2023 until September 2025, seven companies have been the direct buyers of almost 80% of the coltan exported from Rwanda.

Which companies are buying conflict coltan?

Global Witness has found direct evidence that at least five of the seven largest Rwandan coltan exporters have bought conflict coltan from DRC’s Rubaya mines: African Panther Resources, Sunrise Metal Company, Boss Mining Solution, Kanzamin and Philbert Trading Minerals

We found that smaller exporters Space Mining and Rani Mining also bought conflict coltan from Rubaya.

There are indications that other companies may also have sold conflict coltan to international markets. ITSCI has reported incidents indicating fraudulent practices about several exporters. Furthermore, a few companies have in the past been involved in smuggling minerals.

Kanzamin premises in Kigali
Kanzamin premises in Kigali. Global Witness

In the chart below, we set out evidence of the connections between these Rwandan coltan exporters and the Rubaya mines in the DRC and show the relations with the companies buying the coltan.

 

Tonnes of coltan traded from Rwanda between January 2023 – September 2025

Click on any company to view details and trade volumes
East Group Minerals 1,333 tMinterra 1,252 tOther buyers 875 tSunrise Metal Company 810 tHalcyon 581 tTraxys 567 tOther exporters 468 tAfrican Panther Resources 439 tTawotin 412 tEast Rise Corporation 401 tKanzamin 362 tBoss Mining Solution 306 tNovacore 296 tOTIC 234 tJiujiang Jinxin NFM 211 tPhilbert Trading Minerals 155 tBetter Off Equipment 81.7 tRani Mining 73.2 tJiujiang Tanbre Co. 66.5 tSpace Mining 42.3 t

Nodes represent exporters and buyers of coltan registered as originating from Rwanda. Link width represents relative weight of traded coltan.

Source: Global Witness analysis of customs and trade data. Note that trade volumes are based on customs data which may be incomplete and therefore true volumes may be higher.

 

Due diligence requirements

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas is the internationally recognised standard for responsible sourcing, which has been developed in the context of the wars in DRC.

The Guidance sets out a five-step process that companies are supposed to follow when sourcing minerals from conflict and high-risk areas. Companies need to immediately disengage from suppliers that have a reasonable risk of being connected to conflict and/or serious human rights abuses.

The smelters processing the coltan

The buyers of coltan directly from Rwanda that we profiled in the previous section are mainly based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, Hong Kong and Luxembourg.

But all these locations, with the exception of China, are transit hubs, where traders sell coltan on to smelters and refiners elsewhere.

These processors extract the metal tantalum from coltan by removing impurities with high heat and acid, and refiners purify the tantalum. Smelters and refiners turn coltan into products like tantalum powder, wire or ingots, which are used for manufacturing heat-resistant capacitors, surgical implants and alloys used in jet engines.

Global Witness has identified eight smelters that processed the bulk of the coltan exported from Rwanda from 2023 to September 2025:

  • Ningxia Orient Tantalum Industry Co. (OTIC) (China)
  • Jiujiang Jinxin Nonferrous Metals Co. (China)
  • Jiujiang Tanbre Co. (China)
  • Jiujiang Zhongao Tantalum & Niobium Co. (China)
  • Ximei Resources (Guangdong) Limited (China)
  • Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New Materials Co. (China)
  • Ulba Metallurgical Plant (Ulba) (Kazakhstan)
  • Taniobis (Thailand)

China is the top destination for processing coltan from Rwanda, both in terms of volume and the number of smelters. Every major Rwandan exporter sends at least part of its coltan there.

map showing smelters in china, kazakhstan and thailand

Rwanda became China’s second-largest coltan supplier after Nigeria in 2023. China imported 1,571 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda in 2023, which jumped to 2,286 tonnes in 2024.

Customs data suggests that Ulba Metallurgical Plant (Ulba) in Kazakhstan also received coltan exported from Rwanda between 2023 and 2025.

Taniobis, a tantalum smelter based in Thailand, also imported coltan from Rwanda until the end of 2023.

Smelters are considered the pinch point in the supply chain as their number is limited and traceability is lost in the smelting process.

The OECD Due Diligence Guidance recommends that 3T smelters and refiners should collect detailed information about the upstream supply chain and use their leverage to mitigate risks. All 3T smelters and refiners are expected to regularly undertake audits of their due diligence on minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

Dar es Salaam Harbour Port with container ship entering
Cargo ships in Dar Es Salaam port. wilpunt / iStock

How smelter audits whitewash supply chains

Our investigation has found that the leading audit for smelters and refiners is failing to identify conflict links in coltan supply chains.

The Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP) run by the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) is a key part of the due diligence system for sourcing minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. It audits smelters’ and refiners’ due diligence systems and processes.

In 2024 and 2025, all eight smelters sourcing Rwandan coltan were assessed under RMAP. Each audit apart from the one on Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New Materials Co. covered at least part of the period when the M23 armed group occupied the Rubaya mines from the end of April 2024.

By the time of the assessment, the high risks of sourcing coltan from Rwanda were already well known. The UN reported in 2023 about incursions by armed groups into the Rubaya mines and minerals being smuggled to Rwanda, while ITSCI halted tagging in Rubaya from December 2023.

All eight smelters were found compliant. Yet, Global Witness and the UN have uncovered evidence linking some of them to conflict coltan. At least four smelters have likely processed coltan from Rubaya that is connected to the war in DRC, evidence suggests:

  • Jiujiang Tanbre Co. has sourced conflict coltan from African Panther Resources shipped by Traxys and likely also from Sunrise Metal Company
  • Ningxia Orient Tantalum Industry Co. has sourced conflict coltan from Sunrise Metal Company
  • Jiujiang Jinxin Nonferrous Metals Co. may have sourced conflict coltan from Boss Mining Solution through Novacore and from Sunrise Metal Company
  • Ulba has processed coltan from East Rise Corporation which, according to the US, sourced conflict coltan in DRC

If processors source from high-risk sources, RMAP requires them to assess the plausibility of the production from mines to verify the origin of minerals. Auditors review such assessments along with trading links between the mining company and processors.

Yet, processors and auditors usually don’t know which other processors source from the same mines and in what quantities. As Rwandan mining companies often supply many companies, RMI’s audits are not able to carry out effective plausibility assessments that would compare all sold minerals from a mine with the mine’s estimated production.

In its assessments, RMI can’t rely on the analytical fingerprint either, as it is not applied, nor can it rely on traceability as at least the main system has been widely used to launder minerals. Therefore, RMI’s audits can’t verify if minerals are smuggled and its audits can’t ensure that smelters are conflict-free.

Yet, despite the apparent weaknesses, companies often treat RMAP certification as evidence of a conflict-free supply chain.

In 2025, the EU has recognised RMAP under its conflict minerals regulation. This means that mineral importers into the EU can claim that they meet their due diligence obligations if they rely on the scheme.

minerals being smelted
In the smelters, coltan is processed into tantalum. Nordroden / iStock

Capacitors for electronics: From smelters to global manufacturers

Tantalum is mainly used in capacitors, which are widely used in electronics applications, including smartphones, laptops and car electronics. Tantalum is also used for aerospace and defence industries, medical implants and metallurgical additives.

The tantalum capacitor market is highly concentrated, dominated by around five major players: Kemet, Kyocera AVX, Vishay, Panasonic and Hongda Electronics Corp.

The US, followed by El Salvador, Israel and the Philippines, have been the largest importers of tantalum from China, where most of Rwanda’s coltan is processed.

PCB with ICs, chip capacitors, and chip resistors
Tantalum capacitors on a circuit board. pkphotography / iStock

Various capacitor manufacturers operate in the US, including Vishay, Kyocera AVX, Global Advanced Metals and Kemet. Kyocera AVX is likely the main receiver of China’s tantalum exports to El Salvador, where the company has a production site that it claims is the largest in the world. Vishay has an important production site in Israel.

Global Witness has found evidence of shipments from OTIC to Samsung’s subsidiaries in the Philippines, where Samsung has a capacitor manufacturing plant, as well as Panasonic’s subsidiary in the Philippines. This tantalum was likely affected by conflict.

Downstream companies

Companies using tantalum are mainly in the electronics, tech, car and aviation industries. Many international brands all over the world use products containing tantalum from smelters which, according to our research, have sourced coltan linked to the conflict in DRC.

Amazon, Microsoft, Vodafone, Toyota, Sony, Nvidia, Honda, LG Display and Ericsson all report having products from smelters in their supply chains that, according to our research, have sourced conflict coltan from Rubaya. Conflict coltan ends up in goods that consumers use every day such as mobile phones, laptops and cars.

Honda car dealership in California
Honda car dealership in California. Wirestock / iStock

Apple reports Ulba as a processor in its supply chain in 2023. In that year Ulba sourced coltan from East Rise Corporation likely connected to the conflict.

Along with other companies, Apple, once seen as a leader on responsible sourcing from conflict areas, stopped listing its suppliers in its report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2024.

Vodafone shop
Vodafone shop. TkKurikawa / iStock

Recommendations

Rwandan government:

  • Withdraw all troops from the territory of DRC.
  • Stop all support to M23 in violation of the UN arms embargo and sanctions regime.
  • Intercept smuggled minerals and repatriate them to the country of origin.
  • Support the use of the analytical fingerprint.
  • Make mine-level production data public.

Government of the DRC:

  • Strengthen control over national armed forces and ensure that violations committed by the army and affiliated armed combatants are investigated and violations are prosecuted.
  • Stop support for non-state armed groups.

International community:

  • Suspend export of military equipment to Rwanda.
  • Make any official development assistance conditional on Rwanda stopping its support to M23.
  • Sanction of commanders of M23 and senior Rwandan officials responsible for abuses as well as companies profiteering from conflict resources.

EU (additionally to the recommendations above):

  • Enforce the EU conflict minerals regulation and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) so EU companies effectively stop buying, processing or trading conflict minerals.
  • The EU should broaden the scope of the CSDDD to include all downstream activities of business partners, as well as EU companies with 1,000 or more employees and €450 million or more in global net turnover, and non-EU companies with €450 million or more in EU turnover.
  • Rescind the strategic partnership with Rwanda on strategic raw materials.

US (additionally to the recommendations above):

ITSCI:

  • Thoroughly scrutinise Rwandan members regarding smuggled minerals from DRC.
  • Set up a multistakeholder governance structure that avoids conflicts of interest between ITSCI’s members and its due diligence function.
  • Publish detailed mine-level production data for minerals tagged by ITSCI.

Better Mining:

  • Thoroughly scrutinise Rwandan members regarding smuggled minerals from DRC.
  • Publish names of member companies and incidents related to their supply chains.
  • Publish detailed mine-level production data for minerals tagged by Better Mining.

RMI:

  • Thoroughly scrutinise tantalum smelters sourcing minerals from the African Great Lakes Region.
  • Strengthen the RMAP audits by including data that allows plausibility assessments of mines and fingerprinting.
  • Clearly communicate that RMAP audits are not able to confirm the origin of minerals.

Rwandan exporters:

  • Stop buying conflict-affected minerals.
  • Carry out proper due diligence on supply chains including close monitoring of Rwandan mines from which minerals allegedly come.
  • Follow the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Traders and processors:

  • Stop buying coltan from Rwanda until M23 has withdrawn troops from the Rubaya mines unless they have scrutinised the coltan before export by directly checking its origin and grading.
  • Follow the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Downstream companies, capacitor manufacturers:

  • Directly communicate with processors and check their due diligence as well as consult with affected groups.
  • Demand high-quality reports from suppliers, engage with and follow up on the risks identified and report on these in their own annual due diligence reports.
  • Stop sourcing tantalum or products including tantalum from Rwanda until M23 has withdrawn from the Rubaya mines unless they have thoroughly scrutinised the coltan before export by directly checking its origin and grading.
  • Follow the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

Companies and industry schemes respond

Exporters and traders:

Halcyon confirmed to Global Witness that it has bought coltan from Kanzamin but denied that the coltan came from Rubaya. It referred to KYC reviews, supply chain documentation, its announced and unannounced site visits in DRC and Rwanda in 2025 and risk mitigation measures, which included disengagement from Kanzamin until receiving evidence that its due diligence mechanisms have been strengthened. Halcyon wrote that Global Witness hasn’t provided transaction-level evidence demonstrating that material purchased by Halcyon originated from Rubaya.

Halcyon denied it has had any contractual or commercial relationship with Boss Mining Solution and denied having sourced material from African Panther Resources in 2024.

It also told Global Witness that it permanently disengaged from Philbert Trading Minerals in 2025.

Furthermore, Halcyon denied having purchased any material from Rubaya in 2023, referring to geo-fingerprinting for coltan bought from North Kivu.

SOGECOM strongly denied that the Kotecha family has profited from conflict minerals for three decades. It wrote that no evidence has been presented supporting the allegations against Ramnik O. Kotecha or against SOCOMI and that there are no disciplinary or legal rulings against SOGECOM or against any Kotecha family member for buying conflict minerals from the DRC or any related offence.

It told Global Witness that Ketankumar Kotecha has been a stakeholder of SOGECOM and its predecessor SOCOMI but has not been operationally involved.

SOGECOM denied having sourced conflict minerals from the Rubaya mines, referring to its active monitoring of the area, site visits and “geo finger printing”, a technique involving chemical and mineralogical signatures of minerals.

SOGECOM denied having bought coltan coming from the two main concessions in Rubaya after late 2021 but confirmed having sold coltan to Halcyon in 2023.

Novacore replied to Global Witness’s request for comment to say that after a visit in Kigali “to familiarise … with the activities of Boss Mining Solution” it “found no anomalies” in Boss Mining Solution’s export volumes and that “shipments originated in Rwanda and comply with ITSCI program requirements.”

African Panther Resources has previously denied having sourced conflict coltan from Rwanda, referring to its due diligence procedures, but did not reply to Global Witness’s request to comment on allegations that it continues to buy conflict coltan.

Traxys confirms having bought coltan from African Panther Resources, Rani Mining and Hillside Mining, but strongly denies that the coltan was from DRC and connected to conflict.

Traxys wrote to Global Witness that the mineralogy of the bought coltan was different from that in DRC, that the minerals it bought were traced back to specific mine sites in Rwanda and that a Traxys representative regularly monitored the operations at the premises of African Panther Resources.

Traxys also wrote that it signed contracts with Hillside and Rani before the temporary suspension of African Panther Resources, that both companies have been active in the local market for some time and that Traxys has not ignored red flags but instead enhanced its due diligence by sourcing from specific mines instead of aggregators in Rwanda.

Traxys wrote that it is swift to disengage from problematic suppliers and said it had ceased sourcing tantalum from Rwanda in May 2025.

Minterra wrote to Global Witness that it found no indications of sourcing or trading of smuggled or conflict minerals by East Group Minerals, referring to its ITSCI membership and monitoring. It also mentioned that all ITSCI incidents were resolved.

Minterra wrote that “increases in exported quantities should be viewed in the context of starting from relatively low base” export volumes. Minterra did not disclose specific mines and the quantities it sourced from each of them, as requested by Global Witness.

Tawotin denied having sourced conflict material from DRC in recent years and previously denied having done so in the 2010s. It told Global Witness that its coltan exports increased in 2024 because in 2023 it was not active during half of the year.

Tawotin also wrote that it follows sanctions regimes and therefore had to find another buyer after East Rise Corporation was sanctioned by the US.

Tawotin and Chris Huber both deny being connected to each other and Huber denies that he is or has ever been a beneficial owner or member of Tawotin.

CDMC denies having traded conflict minerals from the Rubaya mines, referring to “verification and control measures” and temporary suspension after alerts. CDMC and Crawley both deny being connected to each other.

Kanzamin, Boss Mining Solution, Rani Mining, Sunrise Metal Company, Better Off Equipment & Solutions, Philbert Trading Minerals, Space Mining, East Group Minerals and East Rise Corporation have not replied to Global Witness’s request to comment.

Processors:

OTIC, Jiujiang Tanbre Co. and Jiujiang Jinxin Nonferrous Metals Co. denied having sourced material connected to conflict, referring to their due diligence which they told Global Witness is in line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.

Ulba confirmed to Global Witness that it has bought coltan from East Rise Corporation but denies that the coltan is connected to conflict, referring to its risk monitoring through RMAP and its policy to suspend suppliers if they are linked to conflict. It also wrote that it stopped buying “from the region” in May 2024 including from East Rise Corporation.

Taniobis told Global Witness it stopped sourcing coltan from DRC or Rwanda at the end of 2023.

Downstream companies and capacitor manufacturers:

Toyota told Global Witness that it does not tolerate human rights abuses and aims to procure conflict-free minerals, referring to due diligence checks on suppliers and promptly addressing identified abuses.

Sony wrote that it is committed to building a responsible supply chain and that it expects all suppliers to comply with its supply chain code of conduct and policy, which it enforces with corrective actions.

Ericsson wrote that it collaborates with the RMI, that the smelters Global Witness refers to are RMI-conformant and that it will review the specific cases.

Apple wrote to Global Witness that as the conflict in the region escalated, it notified its suppliers that their smelters and refiners must suspend 3T and gold purchases from the DRC and Rwanda, as it was concerned that industry certification mechanisms could no longer perform the required due diligence and that it has increased its support to organisations that help communities.

Apple did not reply to Global Witness’s questions about why it stopped reporting processors in its supply chains in its 2024 report to the SEC, nor how it can avoid sourcing coltan from DRC and Rwanda given the importance of DRC as a coltan-producing country and the fact that smelters and refiners usually mix minerals from different origins.

Samsung told Global Witness that, after reviewing, it had no concerns in its transactions with OTIC, referring to OTIC’s RMI audit.

Amazon did not reply to Global Witness’s request for comments but wrote to the Guardian that it is committed to providing products and services that are produced or supplied in a way that respects human rights and the environment, that it continues engaging with suppliers and upstream partners and that it requests additional due diligence from its suppliers associated with the smelters identified in this report.

Vodafone did not reply to Global Witness’s request for comments but replied to the Guardian that it does manufacture electronic products and that it relies on organisations like the RMI to verify the source of products.

Nvidia, Microsoft, Panasonic and LG Display have not replied to Global Witness’s requests for comment.

Industry schemes:

ITSCI replied to Global Witness’s request for comment that its system is active and functioning, referring to its incident reporting, suspensions, letters it wrote to ITSCI members alerting them to high risks and requesting explanations about due diligence measures, collecting additional data at mines for plausibility checks, and directly addressing exporters when it had concerns, as well as organising trainings.

Regarding the increased tantalite share in ITSCI exported minerals, ITSCI told Global Witness that such aggregated data offers limited insight and that, instead, ITSCI conducts more effective plausibility assessments at the level of a mine or of single transaction of minerals.

Global Witness has requested granular data on mine production and supplier transactions from ITSCI, but ITSCI has not shared it, citing confidentiality.

ITSCI also told Global Witness that it is no longer the dominant traceability system, seemingly referring to 2025 particularly and has previously denied having a monopoly status. ITSCI has previously denied that its scheme was used to launder massive volumes of minerals in the past and that it has used unfair means against Better Mining.

Global Witness asked ITSCI why African Panther Resources’ suspension had been lifted but has not received a response.

Better Mining denies having tagged conflict-affected coltan. Better Mining wrote that its due diligence and traceability approach is based on an onboarding processes, a supply chain evaluation, field-based monitoring, controlled tag issuance, traceability documentation and ongoing risk identification within a defined operational framework as well as audits by a third party.

It denies that Global Witness has provided evidence that conflict-affected material entered the Better Mining traceability system and requested more granular data.

Better Mining also wrote to Global Witness that no decision whether to take Sunrise Metal Company on board has yet been taken and the company has not yet received any tags from Better Mining.

RMI replied to Global Witness’s request to comment that the claim that RMAP audits can’t ensure smelters are conflict-free is unfounded. RMI wrote that Global Witness’s trade data has deficiencies such as ignoring “the often-significant interval between mining and international trade.”

RMI mentioned “at least one case” of “extended (12+ months) warehousing of a shipment prior to receipt by the smelter.” “As such, shipment dates from 2025 and 2024 may still be in the process of an active assessment or may not be reviewed until 2026.”

RMI also wrote that “many of the data points referenced in the Global Witness research to support allegations of potential conflict financing pre-date the escalation of the conflict in eastern DRC.”

RMI didn’t answer Global Witness’s question about which shipment was received after an extended warehouse period, citing confidentiality.

RMI said it had made significant efforts to clarify the scope and limitations of RMAP assessments to its members and other stakeholders.

T.I.C. wrote that its members’ “compliance with its legal obligations remains their sole individual responsibility” and that a manual for enhanced due diligence guides its members in complying with their obligations.

Government:

The Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board (RMB), the agency governing Rwanda’s mining sector, did not reply to questions from Global Witness.

Methodology

Global Witness’s investigation is based on extensive field and desk research over one year, reviewing trade data and interviews with over 70 actors from governments, the private sector, civil society and academia, cross-referencing our findings with UN and NGO investigations and other sources.

To identify exporters and buyers of coltan, Global Witness analysed and cross-checked customs and trade data from multiple sources including also data compiled by C4ADS and SOMO (The Counter).

We isolated coltan exports from Rwanda using relevant HS codes and product descriptions, identifying records where the cargo origin was recorded as Rwanda.

We standardised company names to account for alternate spellings and apparent misspellings across datasets, and deduplicated records where the same shipment appeared to have been recorded more than once, including at Rwanda’s border and again at export ports when cargo was loaded onto ships.

Source: globalwitness.org

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Breaking: El Niño looms over East Africa and Asia, bringing the specter of floods and disease outbreaks.

Published

5 days ago

on

July 27, 2026

By

By Witness Radio team.

A leading humanitarian aid group has sounded the alarm over a strengthening El Niño, poised to unleash extreme weather across East Africa and parts of Asia. Millions of vulnerable people now stand on the frontlines, facing mounting threats of floods, disease, food shortages, and shattered livelihoods.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) warns that the brewing El Niño could unleash severe floods, disease outbreaks, scorching heatwaves, and punishing droughts in the months ahead, threatening countries like Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The IRC cautions that communities battered by past floods, droughts, displacement, and dwindling aid now stand to endure yet another major climate blow unless swift action is taken.

“We are watching several emergencies converge at once, and the places least equipped to absorb another shock are the ones in the crosshairs. Acting now, before the rain falls, is far cheaper and far more humane than responding after people have lost everything,” said Bob Kitchen, IRC Vice President for Emergencies.

This warning comes as forecasts predict East Africa could be drenched by unusually heavy rains from October to December, heightening the dangers of flooding, landslides, ruined crops, and surging disease outbreaks.

In Uganda, authorities and aid agencies fear that relentless rainfall could wash away hard-won progress made by communities still recovering from earlier climate disasters, such as drought.

The IRC reports that Uganda may swing from parched conditions to a flood-prone final quarter, sparking fresh worries about displacement.

During the previous El Niño cycle, the IRC states that more than 413,000 people in Uganda were affected by climate-related impacts.

Kenya, too, stands on high alert, as forecasts point to persistent El Niño conditions that could unleash torrents of rain, floods, and landslides before the year ends.

“Kenya faces an 80–82% chance of El Niño persisting through 2026, with dry conditions this summer giving way to a high risk of flooding and landslides,” Humanitarian Aid stated in its press conference.

In Somalia, where millions already grapple with drought and humanitarian crises, aid agencies warn that relentless rains could deepen existing hardships. The IRC notes that over 4.8 million Somalis urgently need help, as floods threaten to wipe out crops, taint water supplies, and fuel the spread of diseases like cholera and acute watery diarrhea.

The organization recalls that earlier floods in Somalia wiped out nearly 13,000 tonnes of crops and battered towns and villages, leaving families with even fewer resources to weather another disaster.

Agricultural experts warn that El Niño could plunge East Africa deeper into food insecurity by upending farming, ravaging crops, and driving up production costs.

Because the region depends so heavily on climate-sensitive agriculture, extreme weather can swiftly trigger food shortages and send prices for essentials soaring.

Dr. Joseph W. Glauber, a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), previously told Witness Radio that Africa remains highly vulnerable to global shocks affecting food systems, including disruptions in fertilizer supply and rising agricultural input costs.

“Africa is quite vulnerable largely because shipment sizes to Africa tend to be smaller, so the unit costs for energy and other components and fertilizer tend to be a little higher than those from bigger countries,” Dr. Glauber said.

The IRC cautions that although rain is vital for farming, relentless downpours could drown fields, devastate crops, and deal a heavy blow to rural livelihoods.

“If rains destroy agricultural production, communities could face reduced food availability, increased food prices, and greater dependence on humanitarian assistance,” experts warn.

As East Africa braces for deluges, parts of Asia are set to feel El Niño’s impact in very different ways.

The IRC reports that El Niño may bring scant rainfall and soaring temperatures to Pakistan, while the northern mountains face the looming threat of sudden glacier-melt floods.

Bangladesh is already reeling from deadly monsoon disasters, as floods and landslides upend the lives of thousands, including Rohingya refugees in the Cox’s Bazar camps.

“Bangladesh’s monsoon season has already turned deadly this year. Landslides and flooding have killed at least 15 Rohingya refugees living in the Cox’s Bazar camps and displaced more than 10,000 people since the start of July,” the organization added.

El Niño is a natural climate phenomenon sparked by unusually warm sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific. It disrupts global weather, drenching some regions with rain while parching others with drought and heat.

The International Rescue Committee calls on governments, donors, and aid groups to boost funding for anticipatory action programs, empowering communities to brace for disasters before they strike.

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