For Immediate Release:

Breaking: There has been an alarming Rise in Forced Land Evictions in Uganda; over 360,000 Ugandans were Displaced in the First Half of 2024.

Kampala, Uganda -October 5th, 2024; Witness Radio releases its mid-year report on forced land eviction, revealing a sharp increase across Uganda between January and June 2024. The report reveals staggering statistics: 90 documented land evictions have affected at least 363,021 Ugandans, with over 121,000 hectares of land under threat of being seized.

These occurrences are happening following a presidential directive on land evictions, with the majority of cases of evictions being characterized by violence, human rights violations/abuses, and total disrespect of communities’ land and environmental rights. Government security forces and private security firms and militias have been documented acting on behalf of wealthy investors and government agents and have been implicated in the use of excessive force, resulting in a series of human rights abuses, including death.

“Witness Radio is concerned about the unabated forced land evictions and foresees a large population losing its livelihood to land-based investments as the country enters a period of general elections,” Says Jeff Wokulira Ssebaggala, Country Director, Witness Radio—Uganda.

He attributed forced evictions to the government’s industrialization of Uganda’s land. This industrialization must be carefully implemented to protect smallholder farmers’ land and promote food security and sovereignty.   

Key Findings:

• Attacks on Land and Environmental Defenders: In the period under review (between Jan and June 2024), 65 attacks on land and environmental defenders (LEDs) and climate activists challenging illegal land evictions and corporate harm on the environment in Uganda.
• Affected Population: Over 360,000 Ugandans were displaced, with a daily average of 2,160 people losing their livelihood. Land is targeted for oil and gas extraction, mining, agribusiness, and tree plantations for carbon offsets. While some investments have taken shape on the grabbed land, other pieces of grabbed land are still empty but under the guardship of military and private security firms.
• Land Under Threat: More than 121,000 hectares of land are at risk of being grabbed by influential investors and government agents.
• Complete Evictions: 22,962 individuals have been entirely evicted from their land, and land grabbers have fully grabbed 7,150.7 hectares of land.
• Pending Evictions: 340,059 Ugandans face imminent eviction threats, with over 114,292 hectares of land at risk of being seized.
• Regional Impact: The Central region remains the epicenter of evictions, recording 52 cases. This is followed by 24 cases in the Western region, 8 in the Northern region, and 6 in the Eastern region.
• Number of Cases documented: 90 land eviction incidents reported, affecting all regions of Uganda.

Eviction frequency.

Nearly four cases of land evictions are reported weekly, affecting approximately 15,126 people and threatening 5,060.12 hectares of land across the country.

An estimated 2,160 Ugandans face evictions daily to give way to land-based investments, with 723 hectares of land at risk of being grabbed daily.

Despite government interventions and promises to halt evictions, including directives from President Museveni, the report reveals that land grabbers frequently ignore these orders, deploying armed security forces, private militias, and police to carry out brutal evictions. Left without compensation or legal recourse, vulnerable communities are often displaced in favor of multinational corporations and influential local investors.

Case Highlights: The report details harrowing incidents like the murder of smallholder farmer Dan Ssebyala in Nakasongola, a district plagued by violent evictions involving absentee landlords and influential investors. Armed men ambushed Ssebyala following a confrontation over disputed land. This is just one of many incidents where land defenders are attacked, silenced, or even killed for opposing forced evictions.

In Kiryandongo District, security groups working for Major Taban Amin were documented torturing elected local leaders such as Councilor Fred Kangume after he opposed Amin’s illegal eviction of over 700 families. Such violent tactics have been reported as a commonly used approach to intimidate defenders and community leaders and silence opposition.

Impact on Communities:

• Food Insecurity: Evictions often destroy crops and livestock, exacerbating food shortages and malnutrition
• Loss of Livelihoods: Displaced families lose their homes and agricultural land, forcing many into poverty.
•   Violence and Trauma: Communities face violence, arrests, and intimidation for defending their land, leading to physical and psychological trauma.
•  Disruption of Education: Forced displacement disrupts children’s access to education as schools are often destroyed in the eviction process.

Call for Action: Witness Radio Uganda calls on the government to strengthen the enforcement of land laws, protect local communities from illegal evictions, and ensure justice for victims. Additionally, investors must adhere to international human rights standards and respect the communities they operate in. Financial institutions funding these projects must conduct thorough due diligence to prevent further human rights abuses.

For more information and to access the full report, please contact:

Mr. Tonny Katende

Research and Media Officer, Witness Radio – Uganda

Phone: +256 703085430

Email: news@witnessradio.org

Website: www.witnessradio.org

You can download a full report here: Forced Land Evictions In Uganda.

As civil society organizations that have supported communities around the world to use dispute resolution processes at Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs), we welcome the External Review Team’s recommendations for strengthening the World Bank’s Accountability Mechanism – the Inspection Panel and the Dispute Resolution Service (DRS). This statement focuses primarily on the implementation of dispute resolution since the reforms to accountability at the World Bank added the DRS.

Several of our organizations pushed for the modernization of the Inspection Panel’s toolkit and still believe that communities should be able to access both dispute resolution and compliance review to address concerns with World Bank-supported projects. Our organizations supported the first few cases to go to DRS – Uganda: Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP-2) and Nepal: Nepal-India Electricity Transmission and Trade Project and its Additional Financing – and cases where dispute resolution was offered, Bolivia: Santa Cruz Road Corridor Connector Project (San Ignacio – San Jose) and Tanzania: Resilient Natural Resource Management for Tourism and Growth Project (REGROW). Our experience with the case handling process thus far demonstrates that meaningful changes need to be made to the Accountability Mechanism, Dispute Resolution Service, and the interaction between compliance review and dispute resolution functions. This review should result in a system that is
more respectful of communities’ agency and leads to the effective resolution of grievances.

Additionally, we agree with the ERT that a comprehensive external review should be conducted within 24-months of the effectiveness of the DRS. We have identified the following challenges that need to be addressed:

Accessibility and Requester Choice

As discussed in the External Review Team’s draft report, requesters, the very people who submit a request for accountability, should have the opportunity to clearly express their desire for the Inspection Panel to conduct compliance review and to therefore reject a dispute resolution process. In this case, the AM Secretary should not then offer a borrower government the option of dispute resolution. Doing so ignores and disrespects requesters’ agency to decide what type of accountability process to pursue, and it also puts impacted requesters at risk of retaliation from a government that has an interest in engaging in dispute resolution.

In the Bolivia case, the AM secretary offered the Bolivian government dispute resolution after the requesters had clearly rejected the option, which put the requesters at risk of retaliation and caused the Bolivian government to delay the Inspection Panel’s access to the country for a site visit. The same issue arose in Tanzania, where the government publicly expressed to the media that it will be pursuing the DR process though the requestors had clearly rejected the option. This caused great concern to the requesters, who have chosen to remain anonymous throughout the process due to fear of retaliation. They were made to believe that their names would be disclosed
and they would be forced to engage with the government, resulting in personal risks to their safety. This also added an unnecessary delay in moving forward with the investigation.

We agree with the ERT’s recommendation: The AM Secretary should offer DR not concurrently to both parties, but first to the requesters. If the requesters after 5 working days decide to proceed with the compliance investigation, they should be allowed to do sowithout any further interruption. In such a case, AM Secretary should not provide
information about DR nor offer DR to the other party.

Power Imbalances Throughout the Dispute Resolution Process.

In the Nepal and Uganda cases, we also noted several instances where the DRS and its mediators’ actions exacerbated power imbalances between the communities and the government. In the Uganda case, there were several instances where the mediators and DRS seemed to defer to the timelines and directions of the government. As discussed in a previous statement, power imbalances were especially stark towards the end of the process, where the government seemed to be directing the process of reaching and signing a final agreement and pushing desperate community members to accept any sort of deal. This situation underscored the need for the DRS to adopt a more balanced approach, ensuring that the community’s voice is equally heard and respected throughout the process. In the Nepal case, the process did not appear free and fair, with mediators appearing to favor the position of the government.

To address these issues, the DRS should implement stronger measures to manage power imbalances. This includes continuous consultations with communities, ensuring their concerns and timelines are given equal weight. Additionally, mediators should be empowered to take a firmer stance when necessary to prevent one party from dominating the process. The DRS should ensure that no single party can unilaterally determine the scope or direction of a dispute resolution meeting, and mediators should be trained to recognize and mitigate power imbalances actively.

Furthermore, the DRS should establish clear protocols to ensure that any decisions made, especially those regarding the finalization of agreements, are done with the full participation and consent of all involved parties. This includes providing ample time for community members to review and understand the terms of any agreement and offering independent legal and advisory support to help them navigate the process.

Exacerbation of Community Conflict

It is not uncommon for individual community members to have differing interests in a dispute resolution process. Mediators must be attuned to these differing interests and proceed in a manner that does not exacerbate community conflict. Unfortunately, in the Nepal and Uganda cases, the DRS and mediators exacerbated tensions in the affected communities. In Uganda, when the elected representatives agreed to terminate the dispute resolution process, the DRS still proceeded with the process with other members of the community.

In Nepal, the agreement facilitated by the DRS has created division within the community and jeopardized communal harmony. It is our perception that the DRS worked with some community members to the exclusion of others, and today, original requesters who opposed elements of the DRS-facilitated agreement or did not sign the agreement face retaliation by other members of the community, as well as by the government. Additionally, we are concerned that the DRS, in an effort to get an agreement, favored the views of community members who were not the original requesters to the Inspection Panel complaint.

Community conflict can be particularly exacerbated in circumstances where the dispute resolution process is restricted to an “All or Nothing” prospect, which increases the stakes of the process. This was unfairly the case in Nepal and Uganda where the AM Secretary refused to allow the prospect of unresolved issues transferring to the Inspection Panel for investigation, despite the fact that the final DRS procedures allow for partial agreements and for unresolved issues being transferred to the Inspection Panel. Going forward, in addition to allowing for partial agreements, we agree with ERT’s recommendation that a provision should be introduced into the AM operating procedures that requesters who originally submitted the request to IPN but then subsequently left the DR process should be given the option of proceeding with a compliance investigation after the DR agreement has been signed. The DRS outcome report should state how many of the requesters who submitted the request for registration signed the DR agreement.

Timelines for Dispute Resolution.

Although concrete timelines for IAM processes are important for ensuring predictability and facilitating the timely resolution of grievances, the strict 18-month timeline for the DRS process put undue pressure on the parties in Uganda to reach an agreement. In that case, this pressure was exacerbated by the unfair limit on partial agreements. In circumstances where communities are negotiating with powerful governments, the pressure to reach any agreement, even if it doesn’t fully address grievances, is made even more stark as the deadline approaches.

We agree with the ERT report’s recommendation to allow for timeline extensions to 20 months, though there may be circumstances where even more time could be constructive.

The 24-month review of the DRS should further explore the timelines issue and what additional flexibility is needed.

Transparency.

As discussed by the ERT’s draft report, the DRS falls far behind other independent accountability mechanisms on the transparency of DR agreements. Again, given power imbalances, transparency of agreements helps keep the parties accountable to the agreement and is important for institutional accountability. In our experience, the DRS seems to confuse transparency of the overall agreement with transparency of commitments to particular individuals (such as compensation amounts), which individuals might prefer to have kept confidential. We agree with the ERT draft report’s recommendation that reporting should specify the issues to which the parties have agreed and those to which they have not.

We are also concerned that the DRS has no fair and predictable process in place for how decisions on confidentiality of agreements should be reached in the first place. In the Uganda case, the decision to keep the specific terms of the agreement confidential was made in the final few days of the negotiations, without some requesters’ involvement and without involvement of requesters’ advisors. Again, given power imbalances, it’s obvious that some communities will
feel pressured to agree to confidentiality of an agreement even when it is against their best interests. We call on the 24-month review to evaluate how these decisions have been reached in practice.

Monitoring

Reaching an agreement is just one step of ensuring the full resolution of grievances. Active monitoring of the full implementation of the agreement is crucial to ensure that each commitment in the agreement is fulfilled in a meaningful way. For cases so far, the DRS has not been transparent about what monitoring–if any–it does. As advisors to the communities in Nepal and Uganda, we have asked for status updates on the agreements’ implementation, and the DRS has not provided us with answers sufficiently. The DRS has at times ignored our requests and at others have offered vague and incomplete answers. The ERT draft report recommends a full
substantive conclusion report after the DRS concludes monitoring. We agree and also call for the DRS to issue interim monitoring reports, drafted in consultation with the parties, so that there will be more transparency into the implementation of the agreement, and course correction can happen if need be.

Role of the Accountability Mechanism Secretary

As we reflect on the shortcomings of the World Bank Accountability Mechanism’s dispute resolution processes thus far, we see the scope and mandate of the Accountability Mechanism Secretary to have contributed to the problems. The root of the problem is the 2020 board resolutions, which establish the AM Secretary position. The board resolutions list a mix of roles for the AM Secretary, which range from substantive to administrative: For example, being tasked with offering dispute resolution to parties and drafting the report transferring a case from DR to
the Inspection Panel on one hand, and overseeing the Inspection Panel’s resources on the other hand.

In practice, it has felt to us that the AM Secretary is more or less acting as the head of the dispute resolution process, with a surprisingly high level of involvement in the Uganda and Nepal cases. For example, the AM Secretary’s decision to restrict the option of unresolved issues going to the Inspection Panel and as well as the problematic offers of dispute resolution in the Bolivia and Tanzania cases.

This presents at least an appearance of a conflict of interest, and perhaps a real one, where the face of the overall Accountability Mechanism is also partial to the dispute resolution process and has an interest in seeing as many cases go to DR and reach an agreement as possible.

The ERT’s draft report should have considered whether the role of the AM Secretary should exist at all and if so, what its mandate should be. We consider the role to be largely redundant and thus would support the elimination of the role. Of the options proposed by the draft report, we prefer Option 3, which would split the Inspection Panel and the DRS into separate entities. We expect that this option would make the AM Secretary role unnecessary.

Additional issues for the 24-month Review

The issues above are non-exhaustive, and the 24-month review of the DRS should comprehensively examine other issues affecting dispute resolution at the Bank, including:

• Selection of mediators
• Development and signing of a framework agreement
• Respecting the role of representatives and advisors
• DRS support for studies and experts to support the dispute resolution process
• Communication with parties
• Perceptions of partisanship of the DRS toward government parties
• Information sharing, access to information, and fact finding
• Retaliation management
• Role of the Accountability Mechanism Secretary in dispute resolution processes
• Coercion of parties to sign dispute resolution agreements
• Introduction of new participants at the signing of agreements
• Effects of the DRS process on local judicial processes and other avenues for justice

Conclusion

We again commend the World Bank Board for initiating this review of the accountability system at the World Bank and the External Review Team for its examination of some of the challenges with the system so far. As advisors to communities who have used the mechanism, we stand ready to provide additional insights into the implementation of the ERT’s recommendations and the review of the DRS. We hope to soon see a system that better respects community agency and better facilitates justice.

Sincerely

Witness Radio

Accountability Counsel

Bank Information Center

Lawyer’s Association for the Human Rights of Nepal’s Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP)

Oakland Institute

Supporters

Bretton Woods Project

Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation

CEE Bankwatch Network

Fundeps

Green Development Advocates*

International Accountability Project

Jamaa Resource Initiatives

Lumière Synergie pour le Développement

MenaFem Movement for Economic Development and Ecological Justice

Oyu Tolgoi Watch

Peace Point Development Foundation-PPDF

Rivers without Boundaries

* Supporting communities in the Cameroon:

Supporting communities in the Cameroon: Nachtigal Hydropower Project (P157734) and Hydropower Development on the Sanaga River Technical Assistance Project (P157733) case.

Previous Statements:

Joint Statement on World Bank Accountability Mechanism’s Decision to Limit Application of Operating Procedures

Acknowledging Community’s Agreement while Raising Concerns with World Bank’s Dispute Resolution Service

One Year Later, Justice is Delayed: A joint statement on the implementation of the KIIDP-2

Kawaala Community Agreement

Breaking Alert: Barely a year after signing the remedy agreement, World Bank Project-Affected
Persons (PAPs) receive fresh land eviction threats

World Bank Under Fire: Investigation Launched into Bank Financed REGROW Project in Tanzania

Redefining Impartiality: Advocating for a Community-Centered Approach to Accountability Mechanisms

Date: June 4, 2024

Last week, 31st May 2024 marked a year since the signing of the dispute resolution agreement between the Kawaala community and the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), facilitated by the World Bank Dispute Resolution Service (DRS), concerning the Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP-2). The process that led to this signing was hurried and confusing, but also hopeful. Hopeful that the agreement would mitigate the significant impacts of the drainage channel project on the Kawaala community’s livelihoods; hopeful for a way forward.

There is a more objective way of investigating the impact of the DRS process on the KIIDP-2 on the lives of the Kawaala community. The most obvious would be to look at the dispute resolution agreement and evaluate if what was agreed has been implemented. However, this agreement was declared confidential, and the DRS, unlike many of its peer accountability mechanisms, provided no summary or insight as to the content of the agreement. The alternative is to remind ourselves of the issues raised by the community in the complaint – the harm or anticipated harm by KCCA in undertaking this project – and assessing whether those issues have since been resolved. It is the findings of this method that has led us, Witness Radio and Accountability Counsel, as advisors to the community, to express our profound disappointment in the DRS’s management of the post-agreement phase and KCCA’s obligations in compensation, resettlement, and livelihoods restoration of the community.

At the time of the Complaint, the Kawaala community worried that their land would be taken away without adequate compensation. A year later, we are disappointed that there are still affected people who have not been paid the agreed compensation. Women, identified among the vulnerable groups in this project are yet to benefit from targeted initiatives to elevate their socioeconomic status and reduce their vulnerability to risk of abuse including sexual abuse.

Furthermore, some members of the community worried that the remains of their departed family members would be lost. Some of these affected community members are yet to be compensated for this loss and have not been able to restore their loved ones’ grave sites.

The community was anxious about food shortages as they were not farming their lands due to uncertainties caused by threats of eviction and disruptions by the project. A year on, the community is not yet fully resettled and restored in a way that empowers them to sustain their families through farming. There is still sewer seepage into farms, KCCA is yet to finalize the infrastructure necessary to ensure the flow of water in the drainage, so it still floods when it rains, and crops are carried away and contaminated.

The community had concerns over the safety and welfare of their children, fearing their children would fall into the drainage and get hurt. Unfortunately, this is still a concern as the project area is yet to be fenced off. Pathways including bridges to enable children to cross the drainage safely when going to school are yet to be constructed. There are no signages indicating restricted areas where it would be dangerous for children to play.

To add salt to injury, the rushed conditions under which the agreement was signed led to mistrust and division within the community, significantly affecting the cohesion and collective action needed for follow-up advocacy.  Besides, the strict confidentiality of the agreement – in contravention of the norms of similar dispute resolution processes – limits the transparency and access to information necessary to ensure full implementation.

Through it all, we wish to recognize and applaud the Kawaala Community for their unwavering commitment and resilience in pursuing the fulfilment of the agreement. Despite facing significant challenges and setbacks, their dedication to seeing the agreement implemented and their lives improved remains unshaken. This steadfast commitment inspires our continued advocacy and support.

On this first anniversary, we call for immediate action from both the KCCA and the DRS:

​​To the KCCA:

1. Pay everyone: We demand that KCCA, without any further delay, pay the agreed compensation to all affected people whose land they took in connection with this project.
2. Address Livelihood Concerns: We demand that the KCCA work diligently on the livelihood concerns of the community living around the project area to ensure they are not left in a worse state due to the project’s impacts.

To the DRS:

1. Provide a Comprehensive Update: We demand a detailed report on the steps taken since the signing of the agreement, specifically regarding the promised livelihood restoration efforts.

1. Commit to Effective and Inclusive Monitoring: We urge the DRS to commit to an effective, inclusive, and transparent monitoring mechanism that genuinely addresses the community’s ongoing challenges and ensures the fulfilment of the agreement’s terms. We urge DRS to continue its monitoring role until the full implementation of the agreement.

1. Put pressure on KCCA: We urge the DRS to put pressure on KCCA where implementation has stagnated; to demand accountability for what remains outstanding; and to require KCCA to perform its obligations as agreed under the agreement.

To the World Bank Group (WBG):

1. Exert Influence for Implementation: We call on the World Bank Group to step in and exert influence to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The WBG has suffered reputational damage due to the harm financed under this project, which remains unaddressed. The WBG’s active involvement is crucial to mitigate(remedy?) the harm done and ensure justice for the Kawaala community.

The Kawaala Community deserves justice and a steadfast commitment to improving their lives as initially promised. We, as advisors, stand ready to assist in this process but require a renewed sense of duty from the DRS, KCCA, and WBG.

Sincerely,

Witness Radio

Accountability Counsel

Luganda Version

Oluvannyuma lw’Omwaka, Obwenkanya Bujjukirwa

Ekitegeeza Ekimu okuva ewa Witness Radio ne Accountability Counsel ku Kuteeka Mu Nkola Endagaano ya KIIDP-2 mu kyaalo kya Kawaala

Olunaku: 3 June 2024

Wiiki ewedde, nga 31 May 2024, omwaka guweera okuva ekyaalo kya Kawaala lwe kyateeka omukono ku ndagaano eye tesaganya ne Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), ekitongole kya World Bank Dispute Resolution Service (DRS), ku nsonga ya Second Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP-2). Okusaininga endagano kwayakuyizibwa ate era tekwali kulamulukufu wadde nga kwaali kuuwa essuubi. Essuubi nti endagaano eno yandiyambye okukendeeza ku bizibu ebingi ebyali bituuse ku bantu be Kawaala; essuubi ly’okufuna enkulakulana.

Waliwo engeri ey’omugaso ey’okwekebejja engeri DRS gyeyatambuzaamu endagaano ku KIIDP-2 mu bulamu bw’ekyaalo kya Kawaala. Engeri eyangu yandibadde okulaba ku ndagaano eyateekebwako omukono okulaba oba ebyakkirizibwa byatuukirizibwa. Naye, endagaano eno yategeerekebwa nga ya kyama, era DRS, okwawukaana kumikutu Emilala ejja Accountability mechanism, teyasobora kutegeza kubyakirizibwako mundagano. Engeri yooka jetusobola okutebereza ebyakanyizibwako, tuliina okugobelela ebizibu abantu byebaawa mukiwandiko kyogwemulugunya. Enkola nga ezo zezaretedde Accountability Counsel ne Witness Radio nga abaawabuzi ba bemulugunya okuvaayo netulaga obwenyamivu bwaffe eri enkola za DRS ne KCCA mukutukiriza kubyakanyizibwako nga; okusasula abantu, okusengula abantu no kubadeza obulamu bwabwe nga webwali.

Okongerezako, abantu abamu abekyaalo kya Kawaala baali betide nti ettaka lyabwe lyanditwaliddwa awatali kuliyirirwa mu ngeri eyituufu. Oluvanyuma olwomwaka gumu, turibenyamivu nti abantu abawerako batwaliddwako ettaka kyokka nga tebaanasasulwa nsimbi z’obuliyirizi ezakkirizibwa. Abakyala, abategeerekebwa nga bantu abali mu kibinja ekitali kya bulijjo mu projekiti eno, tebannafuna kyamagero ebyabateekebwa okubayamba mu by’enfuna n’okuweddemu obuzibu bw’okwonoona omubiri omuli n’okuvumbibwa.

N’ekirala, abamu ku kubemulukunya baalina okutya nti ebyo ebiva ku b’emikwano gyabwe abafa byandibula. Abamu ku memba z’ekibinja abali ku by’ekibanja kino tebannasasulwa ku nfuufu y’abalime ne banyizibwa okuzza mu nsi ebifo ebyo.

Ekyaalo kyali kyeraliikirivu ku by’okulya kubanga tebakyalima mu byalo lw’okusoberwa okwava mu kutya okw’okugobwa n’okubotobolwa kwa projekiti. Olw’omwaka gumu, ekibinja tekannakutulawo era ntegeka ey’ekitiibwa mu ngeri ey’okubayamba okufuna ebyetaago byabwe ebikozesebwa okuyamba amaka gaabwe mu bulimi. Waliwo okufuna okutuula mu byalo mu nfufu, KCCA tekannamaliriza kuzimba ebisenge ebisobola okuba n’emigga, era bwekikya.

Abazzade baali beeraliikirivu ku by’okutebenkeza n’obulungi bw’abaana baabwe, okutya nti abaana baabwe bayinza okugwa mu migga ne bakosebwa. Wabula kino tekinakolebwako. Enzirukanya omuli ebifo by’okutambulira ebisobola okuyambako abaana okweyongerayo ne basomero biri bituukirizibwa. Nti waaliwo obulabe obuli ku baana okukola ku nsi etali nsibuko.

Okwongera omunyu Munbwaa, enyanguyaa yokusininga endagano, Yyaleeta enjawukaana nobutesingangana ku kyalo ekitukosezamu kugeri yokugobeelela ebintu nga webitabula ne nsonga kii zitwetaga otekako ensira. Nga ojjeko ekola ekakali eye kyama, nga enkola ezo kwemulugumya endaala ezifananako nga eno, enkola eye kyama, tewaa beetu ya bintu kubera bilamulukufu, na bantu okufuna emiwandiko ebyamakulu okusobora ogobelela Yokosuka ebyakiriziganyako mukoola.

Mubyona, twebaaza abemulugunya okukola obutawera okulaaba nti ebyakanyizebwako betukirizibwa wadde nga bayita mubeera eyo kunyigirizibwa. Kino kituzamu amanyi nga abawabuzi bamwe akusigala nga tutambulila wamu namwe nokusigala nga tulwanirila enkyoka.

N’olwekyo, tusaaba KCCA ne DRS ekole kusonga ze kawaala mubunambilo.

Eri KCCA:

1. Sasula Buli Omu: Tusaba KCCA, awatali kulwawo, esasule ensimbi ezakkiriziddwa eri abantu bonna abaatwaliddwako ettaka ku nteekateeka eno.
2. Ggolokamu Eby’enfuna By’Obulamu: Tusaba KCCA ekole nnyo ku by’enfuna by’e kyaalo ekiri okumpi n’enteekateeka y’enteekateeka eno okulaba nti tebalekebwawo mu mbeera embi olw’enteekateeka eno.

Eri DRS:

1. Waayo Lipoota Enkomeredde: Tusaba lipoota enkomeredde ku bikolebwa okuva lwe baateeka omukono ku ndagaano, nga bulijjo ku by’enkulaakulana mu by’obulamu.
2. Kikole Ku Kulondoola Okuyisa Obulungi N’okugattibwa: Tusaba DRS ekole ku kulondoola okw’obulungi, okutunuulirwa n’okutegerekeka okukuuma okulaba nti enteekateeka eyatuukiriza amagezi.
3. Teekawo Ekirwadde KCCA: Tusaba DRS ekome KCCA ekisigaza okw’okukola; era ekkirize KCCA okukola ku buvunanyizibwa bwe nga bwakolebwa mu ndagaano.

Eri World Bank Group:

1. Teekawo Obusobozi Okulaba Ng’Ekirwadde Kiyindiddwa: Tusaba World Bank Group eyingire okulaba ng’endagaano eno eraba ekituukiriza. WBG tetekeddwa kuleka obuvunaanyizibwa kubanga omusango gwasindikibwa mu kugattika okw’enkomerero. Kibakakatako okukola ku ky’amagero kyabwe ekitali kyatuukirizibwa.

Ekibinja kya Kawaala kirina okufuna obwenkanya n’obukwatibwa obutuukirivu okulaba nga bulamu bwabwe buterede ng’ekisoka kye kyateebwa. Ffe nga abakubiriza, tuteekeddwa okukkiriza okukwatibwa okuva mu DRS, KCCA, ne WBG.

Mu bwesimbu,

Witness Radio
Accountability Counsel