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A new wave of land grabs strikes Tanzania

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Tanzania was one of the most heavily targeted countries of a huge scramble for farmland around the world that followed the food and financial crises of 2008 and that was supposed to help solve global food insecurity. The large farm projects, which became a strategy of choice for donors, multinational corporations and some governments, ultimately caused more harm than good by exacerbating land conflicts and destroying people’s livelihoods. In Tanzania, most of these projects soon collapsed and caused miseries for small farmers. But, despite this tragic record, Tanzania’s government is pursuing another round of foreign agribusiness investment by turning hundreds of thousands of hectares of lands into block farms where corporations will produce export crops, not local foods for the people. With China looking to Tanzania as a new supply source for soybeans, the stage could be set for another wave of land grabs, with dire consequences for Tanzania’s small farmers.

It should have been the death knell for large-scale agribusiness in Tanzania. In early 2019, Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL), the much-hyped, showcase model of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor for Tanzania (SAGCOT), went bankrupt.[1] Despite receiving tens of millions of dollars from foreign development banks and investors, the owner of this large-scale rice farm, a UK-based private equity fund, was unable to pay off its debts and the farm was seized by its creditors. Tanzania’s NMB Bank spent the next two years trying to find a buyer, before the government stepped in to acquire it, and then handed it over to the Army to manage.[2]

The 5,818-hectare rice farm was once highlighted by the G7 and the World Economic Forum as proof that large-scale agribusiness could drive Africa’s agricultural growth. But, with the firm in financial ruin, Kilombero Plantations Limited became instead a stark example of Tanzania’s misguided and failed decade-long drive to increase foreign investment in agriculture.

The collapse of Kilombero Plantations was the latest in a long list of failed agribusiness projects in Tanzania, ushered in by a series of donor-funded programmes under the Presidency of Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015).[3] These programmes– beginning with Kilimo Kwanza in 2006, then SAGCOT in 2010, and finally Big Results Now in 2013– aimed to make large areas of land available to companies, on the assumption that these would make Tanzania an export powerhouse, ensure food security, and most importantly, bring employment, technology, services (training, inputs, machinery, etc) and new markets for the small farmers living near to the farms. SAGCOT alone claimed it would bring in USD 2.1 billion in private sector investment.[4] But after 10 years, very little of this promised investment had materialised, and, of the few projects that got off the ground, most had failed, leaving a legacy of problems for the affected communities to deal with.[5]

By the time of the Kilombero Plantations bankruptcy, Tanzania’s then President, Dr John Pombe Magufuli, had grown frustrated with the approach of his predecessor, and had begun charting a new course. He scrapped the Big Results Now programme and began winding down SAGCOT. His government cancelled funding to a SAGCOT “catalytic fund” that had been created through a World Bank Loan– a clear sign of the changed approach.[6] And he also launched a process to revoke dozens of land titles from companies that had failed to bring lands under production.[7]

But in 2021, Magufuli died, and his successor, his Vice-President, Samia Suluhu Hassan, quickly reversed direction. Under the leadership of her Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, large-scale agribusiness once again became the government’s priority and the doors were swung wide open for domestic or foreign companies wanting large areas of farmland. SAGCOT resumed its central role, with an expanded mandate to establish corridors across the whole country.[8] Hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds have been budgeted for large-scale irrigation and, through a programme that claims to support the involvement of youth in agriculture, hundreds of thousands of hectares of lands across the country are being cleared and consolidated into “block farms” and offered to companies for the production of specified export crops.[9]

Betting on tomorrow

The centrepiece of President Samia’s renewed effort to allocate lands to agribusiness companies is a programme called Building a Better Tomorrow (BBT).[10] Under this programme, the government designates and clears large areas of land for conversion to large-scale, irrigated agriculture, called “block farms”, in which a selection of youth and women, mainly from urban cities and graduates from universities, are allocated small plots of between 1 – 10 acres (0.4-4 ha), while local communities are sidelined. In July 2023, President Samia announced that all 52,000 youth who had applied to join the army that year would be drafted into the BBT programme.[11]

Each BBT block farm is to produce a specific crop for a company that co-invests in the operation. In the model, the company will supply the inputs and machinery and purchase all of the production. It can also get a 99-year lease on a portion of the block farm area to farm the lands itself. The BBT farmers meanwhile get 33 to 66 year titles, and, while they can transfer the titles to someone else, they cannot change the conditions of their contract. They will thus be at the mercy of the company controlling the farm from whom they must buy all of their inputs and to whom they must sell all of their harvests.[12]

President Samia has stated that 690,000 hectares around the country have already been identified for block farms, but there is no publicly available information about the exact locations. In January 2023, the government published a first call for investment proposals for various BBT block farms on 65,000 hectares in the regions of Dodoma, Mbeya, Kagera and Kigoma. Interested companies could apply for lands of between 400 to 8,000 hectares on each block farm.

In March 2023, the first BBT farm was officially opened in the Chamwino district of Dodoma Region. The Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, explained that an initial 162 hectares were allocated for training 812 youth selected to participate in the project.[13] Despite access to land being an issue for the local communities, most of the youth selected for the project are not local and have little of any agricultural experience. The farm in Dodoma is supposed to eventually extend to 11,453 hectares and will produce grapes for a wine processing plant. But there has been no public mention of any private investor as of yet.

Promotional photoshoot of youth farmers at the BBT block farm in Dodoma, Tanzania, 25 March 2023. Source Twitter (X)

Prudence Lugengo, a policy specialist with SAGCOT, says lands for another BBT farm have also been allocated in the regions of Katavi and Tabora. In this case, the BBT farm is said to be a massive, 120,000-hectare block farm that will produce wheat for the Tanzanian agribusiness company MeTL, owned by the Tanzanian billionaire and former politician Mohammed Dewji. According to Lugengo, MeTL will acquire 50,000 hectares for itself and the remaining 70,000 hectares will be allocated under the BBT programme for youth. MeTL did not respond to our requests for confirmation of the deal, and it is not clear how Dewji will be financing this project.[14] It should be noted that just a few years ago, Magufuli’s government revoked several titles for large areas of farmland belonging to Dewji because of his failure to bring them into production.[15]

Together with the aforementioned issues, the odds and prospects of the glorified BBT programme are questionable in its very early days, with allegations surfacing within the corridors of social media, accounting on the government’s failure to live and fulfil its promises. As of late January 2024, a letter alleged to have originated from one BBT youth participant was widely circulated on social media, asserting that the government had failed to allocate to them the promised 5 hectares of land, individually, (let alone the 10 hectares originally promised) and so has the government failed to establish irrigation facilities. Instead, 260 of the youth who had passed through the training programme were sent to a 600 acres farm area in Chinangali, where they are farming without irrigation or decent housing, and are producing sunflower under an off-take arrangement with a company, without any guarantee of a land allocation for themselves.[16]

What are “block farms”?

A “block farm” is a large, contiguous area of land devoted to the production of a few or even a single crop. In Africa, a “block farm” programme can take many forms, but generally the government ensures that the lands are ready and available for large-scale farming, provides infrastructure (such as roads or irrigation) and identifies one or two companies to be the main or “anchor” investors. Normally, a portion of the lands will be farmed and acquired by the company on a 99-year lease and another portion will be farmed by medium to small-scale farmers who must produce crops for the company under contract.

Zambia has pursued a programme since 2006 to establish block farms of 100,000 hectares in each of its 10 provinces. Although the government failed to attract any “credible investors”, in 2023 it hoped to revive the programme through a USD 300 million loan from the World Bank for the construction of infrastructure at the farm sites.[17] The Government of Malawi also launched a block farm programme in 2020, consisting of a number of what it calls “mega farms” of around 5,000 hectares each. It too has struggled to attract significant private sector investment.[18]

A new soybean frontier for China?

Despite the pomp surrounding the roll-out of the BBT programme, there is little evidence of much interest from the private sector. The only significant funds that have so far been committed are from the government, which has pledged USD 1.4 billion over the next 10 years, and from a similar batch of donors to those who supported the SAGCOT era investment drive. These include the World Bank (USD 300 million), the African Development Bank (USD 100 million), AGRA (USD 40 million), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (USD 60 million) and USAID (USD 100 million).[19]

Soybeans could be an exception, and in particular, soybeans destined for China. Due to the growing tensions with the US and the war in the Ukraine, China is increasingly concerned about its dependence on these two countries for soybeans (as well as maize), and it is now looking to Africa as an alternative source of supply. Tanzania is one of three African countries that China has identified for the development of soybean exports. In 2020, it passed a phytosanitary measure to allow the import of soybeans from Tanzania and the first shipment was made the following year by China’s largest grain trader, COFCO.[20] In November 2022, President Samia signed a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership with China during her visit to Beijing in which soybean exports were specified as an initial priority and a task force was created for implementation.

At the moment, Tanzania only produces 200,000 tonnes of soybeans per year– a mere drop in the bucket compared to China’s annual import of 100 million tonnes, most of which goes to produce animal feed and vegetable oil. Production would have to increase dramatically for Tanzania to become a significant supplier.

China’s largest seed company, Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture, has been tasked with pursuing this potential. The company is part of the CITIC Group, China’s largest state-owned conglomerate, and it is already playing a key role in advancing China’s control over soybean and maize production in Brazil, China’s most important supplier. After entering Brazil in 2017, Longping quickly became one of the top seed companies in the country. Now Longping is looking to do the same in Tanzania, as China seeks to export the Brazilian model to Africa.

“We want to take Longping’s expertise in maize and soybean seeds to [Tanzania and Ghana]. There, the climate conditions, temperature and altitude are similar to those in Brazil and very favourable for the development of agriculture. We want to be facilitators of this process, teach them how to plant and produce grains so that in the future they will also be suppliers to China”, says Aldenir Sgarbossa, President of Longping’s Brazilian operations.[21]

In 2022 and early 2023, Longping sent delegations to Tanzania to secure political support and to identify areas for soybean production. Tests of its soybean varieties from Brazil are now underway, as well as for its hybrid maize and sorghum seeds, which will be grown in rotation with the soybeans, as is done in Brazil. While these initial varieties are not GMOs, Longping has several GMO varieties under testing and awaiting approval for commercial sale in China, and it has already had some of its GMO maize varieties approved for human consumption.

Longping says it will invest over USD 213 million (500 billion shillings) in a first phase for developing soybean production in the south of Tanzania and will also invest in the improvement of grain exporting facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam.

The company’s operations in Tanzania are being run through a joint venture with a Tanzanian businessman, the media mogul Joseph Kusaga, owner of Clouds Entertainment Group, along with his wife, Juhayna Kusaga. Longping also has high level support from within the Ministry of Agriculture, from SAGCOT and even from former President Kikwete, who has been using his position as a director of AGRA to encourage Tanzanian farmers to plant soybeans for export to China.[22] As evidence of Longping’s political connections, the government gave it special clearance to reduce the required time for testing of its seeds from five years to five seasons, making it possible for Longping to start large-scale production in 2024.[23]

The Tanzanian government is also making lands available for the company. An initial area of 53,000 ha is said to have been allocated as a BBT farm in the Chunya District of Mbeya Region. Longping Tanzania says it has “acquired” 10,000 ha of these lands for its own farm and claims to have already started farming, while the remaining 43,000 ha will be allocated to participating farmers who the company will supply with seeds, fertilisers, and machinery.[24] The farmers must sell their harvests exclusively to Longping Tanzania, which will then export to China, where the Chinese government has offered a guarantee to purchase all of the soybeans that are produced.[25]

Vice-President of Tanzania Dr. Philip Mpango shakes hands with the CEO of Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture, Liang Shi, outside the national State House. To the right is Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Anthony Mavunde. February 17, 2023 . Source : Twitter (X)

Longping’s ambitions extend beyond this BBT farm. The company is also setting up block farms with the recently established Soybean Association of Tanzania.[26] According to the association’s chairman, Marcus Albany, these block farms will bring together a group of farmers, with each farmer contributing an area of land (minimum is 2 hectares and maximum is 10% of the entire block farm) to establish one large farm that will be managed as a group. The farm will operate under a contract with Longping, which stipulates the amount the farmers must pay Longping for the supply of inputs and machinery and the price they receive for the sale of their harvests, with the amounts renegotiated each season. As with the BBT farms, a farmer can transfer their share of the lands to another farmer, but that farmer must then take on the same conditions agreed to with Longping.

The Soybean Association of Tanzania and Longping have already formed one block farm in Morogoro Region that is presently at 5,700 hectares and they expect it to eventually reach 10,500 hectares. They are in the process of setting up another one in Lindi Region on 10,500 hectares, one in Katavi starting at 202 hectares and one in Sumbawanga that is still in the process of negotiation with a private landowner. Albany says that, although his association is not made up of youth, the government is also trying to get them to be part of the BBT farm in Mbeya.

Other Tanzanian businessmen are also moving quickly to acquire lands for soybean production. The newly established company Jadeja Farming is developing a 2,800-hectare soybean farm on contested lands at Sumbawanga district in Rukwa Region.[27] The company has ties to Jatu PLC, a company listed on the national stock exchange that claimed to be pursuing block farms but that ended up defrauding its shareholders of over USD 2 million.[28] In the northern region of Kagera, a Tanzanian company called Global Agency is building a massive 21,000 ha maize and soybean farm. Despite its past legal and financial troubles, Global Agency has received substantial funding from the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (via a loan from the African Development Bank), as well as political support from high level members of President Samia’s party.[29]

Moreover, Longping is not the only Chinese company investing in soybean production in Tanzania. In the coastal region of Kilwa, a company called Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments is pursuing a 25,000 ha large-scale cassava and soybean farming project, on lands that were previously part of a much contested biofuels project that went bust. Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments is connected to the Chinese company, Beijing Chaoliang (translated as “Best Agro” or “Super Grain”), as well as Hunan Construction Engineering Group and the Djibouti Silk Road International Bank.[30] In July 2022, nearly 25,000 ha were converted from village lands to “Export Processing Zone” lands, opening the possibility for Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments to acquire them on a long-term lease.[31]

Land conflicts will get much worse

The combination of China’s new interest in soybean exports from Tanzania and the Tanzanian government’s revitalised interest in foreign agribusiness investment is creating the conditions for a surge in land grabbing. Land conflicts are already present across the country, not only because of agribusiness projects but also because of deals for mining, wildlife and forest reserves, parks and carbon credit projects that the government is also pursuing. One of these, a “sustainable forestry” project with a company owned by a member of the Dubai Royal Family, involves setting aside eight million hectares of lands for the generation of carbon credits.[32]

The new push for block farms and soybean production adds fuel to a fire that is already running hot. For example, in the Kilosa District of Morogoro Region, tensions over land have simmered for decades between villagers who want to maintain access to lands for food production and businessmen who either use the lands for sisal plantations, rent them out for cash or hoard them and render them unproductive. The villagers finally succeeded in getting the government to intervene during the presidency of Magufuli and many land titles held by these businessmen were revoked. But the lands were not redistributed to the villagers. Instead, they were turned over to the District Councils, which are now consolidating the lands and leasing them out as block farms to so-called “farmer groups” to produce cash crops like sisal on the instructions of the state or are handing them over to businessmen and public agencies, such as Tanzania’s Agricultural Seed Agency.

Abdul Tumbo, a small farmer from Mvumi village in Kilosa District struggling to prevent his lands from being grabbed by businessmen and block farm schemes. (Photo: GRAIN)

Abdul Tumbo is a farmer from Mvumi village in Kilosa District. He has been repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for farming on lands that his grandparents farmed but that are also claimed by a powerful businessman. The Magufuli government revoked the businessman’s land titles a few years back but the District Council is now trying to organise these lands into a block farm instead of letting Tumbo and the other villagers continue with their farming. The villagers want nothing to do with the block farm. They say the land is theirs and there is no reason why they should pay rent for it. Moreover, they want to produce food for their families and communities, not commodities for companies.[33]

Tumbo points to one neighbouring community where the District Council has pushed ahead with a 325-hectare block farm on lands the local villagers have been farming since 1984 when a sisal estate was shuttered. In December 2022 the villagers planted local maize for food, and shortly after, on the very same lands, the “farmer group” planted sunflowers. Now the District Council has seized the maize harvest and tensions are boiling over.

Across Tanzania, similar conflicts are erupting as the government and businessmen illegally use backdoor channels to transfer large areas of village lands into block farms to produce soybeans and other crops for export. Thousands of small farmers and pastoralists could be displaced from their lands in the process, and many more could lose access to water, as these projects tend to involve the use of large amounts of water for irrigation. The impacts will be felt not only in rural areas, but also in urban centres, as the lands that small farmers now use to produce food for the country will be converted into large-scale farms to produce agricultural commodities for export.

In another example, in 2023, the government, controversially, gave an eviction order to villagers of at least 23 villages in Mbarali District through a government notice (no. 28 of 2008), whose implementation was delayed because of the controversy and uncertainty on the legality and morality of the notice itself. This eviction order affects one of the most productive districts and national food baskets for rice and will affect over 25,000 smallholder farmers in the area. The order is to expand the Ruaha National Park in a World Bank funded project.[34] At present, 852 villagers have taken the matter to the High Court of Tanzania to challenge the eviction order.[35]

The current situation in Tanzania is reminiscent of the ProSavana project that Japan sought to finance in Northern Mozambique a decade ago. That project involved the take-over of 14 million hectares of land in one of the most fertile and densely populated areas of the country to set up large farms and enlist farmers into contract farming schemes to produce soybeans and other cash crops for export to Japan. ProSavana was developed between the Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican governments behind closed doors, without the knowledge of the affected communities. When these communities became aware of what was going on, they immediately began to organise resistance, with the support of civil society organisations in Mozambique, Brazil and Japan. Despite the powerful forces aligned against them, Mozambican farmers and their allies managed to stop the project, and it was officially terminated in 2020.[36]

This is a critical moment for Tanzania’s small farmers and pastoralists to defend their lands. These food producers are already struggling with a lack of access to sufficient land and water, exacerbated by the climate crisis and the country’s rapidly growing population. They can produce an abundance of nutritious, chemical-free foods to feed the country, and even produce a surplus for export, if the right policies are in place to support their seed systems, provide protection for their lands and water and ensure they have adequate access to markets. Scarce public resources should not be wasted on a failed model of corporate agriculture.

Banner photo: Tanzania’s Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, visiting a block farm project in Chinangali area, Chamwino, Dodoma District. Source : Twitter (X)

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[1] Oakland Institute, “After Defaulting on Loans, Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL) Goes up for Sale,” March 2019: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/after-defaulting-loans-kilombero-plantation-sale

[2] “State tells off Kilombero plantation lobbyists,” Daily News, March 2023: https://dailynews.co.tz/state-tells-off-kilombero-plantation-lobbyists/

[3] For a selection of examples, see: “Annexe 2. Discarded land deals 2016” in GRAIN, “The global farmland grab in 2016: how big, how bad?”, June 2016: https://grain.org/e/5492

[4] SAGCOT also promised to establish large-scale farms on 350,000 ha, transition 100,000 small farmers into commercial farming, create 420,000 new employment opportunities, lift two million people out of poverty, and generate $1.2bn in annual farming revenue by 2030. See: Emmanuel Sulle, “Bureaucrats, investors and smallholders: contesting land rights and agro-commercialisation in the Southern agricultural growth corridor of Tanzania”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1743093

[5] Gideon Tups and Peter Dannenberg, “Emptying the Future, Claiming Space: The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania as a Spatial Imaginary for Strategic Coupling Processes”, Geoforum 123, 2021: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.04.015

[6] “Tanzania government cancels Sh100bn Sagcot scheme,” The Citizen, May 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-government-cancels-sh100bn-sagcot-scheme-2681476

[7] “Magufuli Revokes Title Deeds for 14 Undeveloped Farms,” Tanzania Daily News, August 2017: https://allafrica.com/stories/201708150094.html

[8] Personal communication with Prudence Lugengo, Policy Specialist with SAGCOT, 24 March 2023.

[9] The government increased the budget allocation for irrigation from 57bn/- 2021-22 to 416bn/- in 2022-23 and has a stated objective to expand the irrigation area from 727,280 hectares to 822,285 hectares in 2022/2023, with a national irrigation target of 1.2 million hectares for 2025 and 8.5 million hectares by 2030.

[10] The idea for the project is said to have come from Geoffrey Kirenga, the CEO of SAGCOT.

[11] “Tanzanian government to draft 52,000 JKT members into BBT scheme,” The Citizen, July 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzanian-government-to-draft-52-000-jkt-members-into-bbt-scheme-4299870

[12] Details about the block farms were gathered from various news reports, government documents and interviews with various people involved in the programme in March and April 2023.

[13] “BBT bring hope for youth employability,” The Guardian, March 2023: https://www.ippmedia.com/en/features/bbt-brings-hope-youth-employability

[14] In July 2022, Dewji told Reuters that he plans to list an agriculture company worth up to $4 billion on the New York or London stock exchanges in 2023, with money raised mainly from development banks. Rachel Savage, “Tanzanian entrepreneur Dewji plans $2-4 billion grains production investment via SPAC,” Reuters, July 2022: https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/tanzanian-entrepreneur-dewji-plans-2-4-bln-grains-production-investment-via-spac-2022-07-08/

[15] “Tanzania revokes titles to six farms owned by Dewji,” East African, January 2019: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-revokes-titles-to-six-farms-owned-by-dewji–1410744

[16] See the post by Maria Sarungi Tsehai (@MariaSTsehai), 27 January 2024 on Twitter (X): https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1751133786195087548?t=Rbeb-qm73R83MVzH6UFt-g&s=19

[17] See 2023 Budget address by Honourable Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of Finance: https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/articles/2023%20Budget%20Speech.pdf; and Ministerial Statement by the Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Mtolo Phiri, MP, on the Farm Block Development Programme presented to the House, 16 March, 2023: https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/images/publication_docs/Ministerial%20Statement%20-%20On%20the%20Farm%20Block%20Development%20Programme.pdf

[18] Owen Khamula, “Agriculture ministry moves in to establish mega farms,” Nyasa Times, 30 June 2022: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/31400

[19] “Tanzania Country Presentation for HIH Investment Forum,” October 2023: https://www.fao.org/docs/handinhandlibraries/countries/tanzania/bbt_ps_m-m_presentation-raf-slide-wg-25-sept.pdf?sfvrsn=1dad93cf_1 and “USAID to invest $100M in supporting agribusiness youth in Tanzania,” Further Africa, November 2023: https://furtherafrica.com/2023/11/17/usaid-to-invest-100m-in-supporting-agribusiness-youth-in-tanzania/

[20] “First Shipment of Tanzanian Soybeans Enter China” June 2021: http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2021/06/25/c_7280.htm

[22] “Good news for soybeans farmers to effectively utilise Chinese market,” The Citizen, February 2022: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/business/good-news-for-soybeans-farmers-to-effectively-utilise-chinese-market-3721346

[23] Personal communication with Juhayna Kasuga, Director of Longping Tanzania, 21 March 2023.

[24] Personal communication with Juhayna Kasuga, Director of Longping Tanzania, 21 March 2023 and 27 November 2023.

[25] “Wakulima wa kusini wavutiwa na uwekezaji wa kampuni ya Longping High Tech”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation (Tanzania), May 2022: https://www.foreign.go.tz/resources/view/wakulima-wa-kusini-wavutiwa-na-uwekezaji-wa-kampuni-ya-longping-high-tech

[26] Personal communication with Marcus Albany, 24 March 2023.

[27] See the company website: http://jadeja.co.tz/about/. And the video about the farm: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZJf5eA0X64&ab_channel=JadejaFarming. The farm is known as the Efatha Farm, which was embroiled in a land conflict, see: ‘We were wrong on farm dispute’, The Citizen, October 2017: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/-we-were-wrong-on-farm-dispute–2609534

[28] A director of Jadeja, Hussein Msemwa, was the Assistant Manager of Jatu PLC (https://www.linkedin.com/in/hussein-msemwa-07246211b/?originalSubdomain=tz). For more on Jatu PLC, see: “Struggling Jatu Plc turns to Dutch consultant”, The Citizen, January 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/business/struggling-jatu-plc-turns-to-dutch-consultant–4075174

[29] On the legal and financial troubles, see the court cases against Global Agency for failure to pay Rabobank (https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/judgment/tzhccomd/2021/3517/eng@2021-12-13) and Balton Tanzania (https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/judgment/tzhccomd/2022/378/eng@2022-11-11). On the political support from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Vice Chairman, Colonel Abdulrahman Kinana, see: https://panafricanvisions.com/2022/09/tanzania-ruling-party-vice-chairperson-welcomes-investors-in-kagera-region-which-is-suitable-for-opportunities/; and from the current Minister of Agriculture Hussein Bashe see: https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/bashe-orders-misenyi-dc-support-investors-promote-agro-investments. The TADB does not report publicly on its financing of companies, however the AfDB’s report on its loan to TADB indicates that Global Agency received funds from the TADB for a Kagera farm and that 45% of the entire AfDB loan of $67 million went to companies in Kagera (of which the only other company listed was the Kagera Cooperative Union). See: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/tanzania-tanzania-agricultural-development-bank-project-completion-report

[30] “Chaoliang Group’s Tanzania PTA construction project signed with Hunan Construction Engineering Group for USD 300 million,” China Agricultural Outlook News, October 2021: https://www.farmlandgrab.org//31442. Hunan Construction Engineering Group was sanctioned in 2013 by the World Bank for fraudulent practices in a road construction project in Tanzania: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/office-of-suspension-and-debarment/2018/nov-1/Notice-of-Uncontested-Sanctions-Proceedings-Case-268.pdf

[32] “Blue Carbon and the Government of Tanzania join forces to accelerate transition to low-carbon economy,” Gulf news, February 2023: https://gulfnews.com/business/corporate-news/blue-carbon-and-the-government-of-tanzania-join-forces-to-accelerate-transition-to-low-carbon-economy-1.1675752836855

[33] Interview with Abdul Tumbo, 29 March 2023.

[34] “World Bank investigating alleged crimes at $150 million Ruaha tourism project,” The Citizen, September 2023 https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/world-bank-investigating-alleged-crimes-at-150-million-ruaha-tourism-project-4384506

[35] “Smallholders In Mbarali Protest Govt Plans To Evict Them From Their Land,” The Chanzo, February 2023: https://thechanzo.com/2023/02/09/smallholders-in-mbarali-protest-govt-plans-to-evict-them-from-their-land/

[36] For more information on ProSavana, see: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827

Original Source: Grain

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Press Release | African Women in Action: AfDB, Reparations NOT Debt!

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The Regional Week of Action taking place from 28 to 31 July 2025, is part of a growing movement demanding reparations from the African Development Bank (AfDB) for decades of financing extractive, patriarchal, and profit-driven “development” on the continent. It is an important moment of Pan African mobilisation for women on the frontlines of resistance against AfDB funded maldevelopment in Africa.

“AfDB, Reparations NOT Debt” is the message that hundreds of women in West and Central Africa will voice as they carry out their bold, vibrant actions to challenge the destructive development model financed by the AfDB. Communities and particularly women whose livelihoods and ways of life have been destroyed by the construction and exploitation of mega-projects such as hydroelectric dams, mining, monoculture plantations and other big developments, will rally to call attention to the impacts they face.

The recent AfDB Counter Space held from 21-23 May in Abidjan was aimed at shifting the mainstream neoliberal development narrative and help create space to strengthen solidarity and resistance to AfDB’s continued support for maldevelopment in African communities, concluding in the Abidjan Declaration.

Across five countries – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Guinea – communities will participate in public testimonials, creative actions, community, and online mobilisations, and amplify official demands for reparations. They will make visible the true costs of extractive mega-projects on their land, their livelihoods, and nature.

Women from Batchenga in Cameroon and Bomboré in Burkina Faso will gather during this week to share traditional practices and techniques for crafting organic fertilisers to restore their land and preserve ecosystems. In Côte d’Ivoire, women from Singrobo are joining hands for a day of awareness-raising and intergenerational dialogue around a memory tree.

We are not against development. We are against destruction. If ‘development’ is destruction in disguise, then we say NO,” said Massaouda, a community leader in Niger and member of the steering committee of the AfDB, Reparations NOT Debt campaign.

The campaign: “AfDB, Reparations NOT Debt” calls for:

  • An immediate end to destructive mega-extractive projects.
  • Reparations for women and their communities affected.
  • A transition to ecofeminist alternatives centred on people, not profit.

This Week of Action is a continuation of regional mobilisations in 2023 and 2024 and marks a new stage in the struggle for reparations in Africa.

Source: WoMin

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NGO WORK

Toxic platforms, broken planet: How online abuse of land and environmental defenders harms climate action

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Land and environmental defenders risk their lives advocating for their communities’ rights against destructive industries. Often, they serve as the planet’s last line of defence, sounding the alarm about existential threats to humanity.

Their efforts frequently expose them to dangers to their safety and wellbeing. Every year, Global Witness documents these harms. In our 2024 report, we found that 196 people were murdered for defending their land and homes. Many more were abducted, criminalised and silenced by threats.

Defenders often rely on digital platforms to organise, share information and campaign. In recent years, these online spaces have become many defenders’ main channels for communication with key audiences, and are frequently relied upon for community organising. However, we now know that they suffer significant harms in these online spaces, from trolling, to doxxing, to cyberattacks.

An Indigenous activist photographs another community member after a protest march for Indigenous land rights in Brazil. Land and environmental defenders often rely on digital platforms to spread awareness about their campaigns. Mario Tama / Getty Images

Global Witness conducted a global survey – the first of its kind – to understand defenders’ experiences online. We found that online abuse is very common among defenders who responded to the survey, and frequently translates into offline harm, including harassment, violence and arrests.

This not only hurts defenders’ wellbeing but also has a chilling effect on the climate movement, with many defenders reporting a loss of productivity and, in one case, even ending all their activism due to the abuse.

Our survey shows the challenges defenders face on social media.

The situation is so dire that 91% of the defenders who responded to our survey said that they believe digital platforms should do more to keep them and their communities safe.

It doesn’t need to be this way. Social media companies’ business models prioritise profit over user safety. They can and must do more to help protect these individuals by properly investing in algorithmic transparency, content moderation, and safety and integrity resourcing.

Improving these measures will not only keep defenders safe online but will also benefit all users everywhere.

An Indigenous person documents the Acampamento Terra Livre (Free Land Camp) on a smartphone in Brasilia, Brazil

An Indigenous person documents the Acampamento Terra Livre (Free Land Camp) on a smartphone in Brasília, Brazil. Cícero Pedrosa Neto / Global Witness

A note on sampling: Surveying land and environmental defenders

Land and environmental defenders are a difficult group to reach en masse. Many such individuals have very real and immediate security concerns that require them to be highly careful about how they discuss their activism. No professional survey company has a panel of defenders available for polling.

We therefore had to manually contact defenders’ organisations by a variety of means and do our best to ensure that we had as many people as possible from as many different places respond to our survey.

We acknowledge that our survey sample is therefore not representative of all defenders and, given the nature of the survey, we have not sought to verify the accuracy of their statements.

This report is the first of its kind focusing specifically on the digital threats faced by land and environmental defenders, and the role that social media platforms play in this. We have built on our existing networks to reach hundreds of defenders globally.

This report is a crucial effort to uncover the nature of online harm faced by those on the frontlines of the climate movement and another puzzle piece in understanding what it means to stand in the way of climate breakdown.

These shocking and previously untold stories must prompt real action from social media platforms, who have often failed to act on reports of abuse.

Toxic platforms, broken planet

Widespread online attacks

Many land and environmental defenders experience abuse

92% of the land and environmental defenders who responded to our survey say that they have experienced some form of online abuse or harassment as a result of their work.

The online harms that these defenders report being subjected to range from public attacks on social media, to doxxing, to cyberattacks.

Doxxing

Doxxing (short for dropping docs) is the act of publicly revealing someone’s private or personally identifiable information without their consent, typically with malicious intent. This information can include real names, addresses, phone numbers, workplace details, financial information and even family members’ details.

Doxxing can be used as a form of harassment and intimidation of defenders, and it can lead to serious consequences like stalking, identity theft, swatting (making a false emergency call to send police to someone’s home) or physical harm. It is generally considered unethical and is illegal in many jurisdictions.

Cyberattacks

Cyberattacks are malicious attempts to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorised access to computer systems, networks, or data. These attacks can take many forms, including:

  • Phishing (tricking someone into giving up sensitive information)
  • Malware (malicious software like viruses or spyware)
  • Hacking and data breaches (gaining unauthorised access to steal, alter or destroy information)

The impact of this abuse is significant, with high numbers of defenders reporting feelings of fear and anxiety for themselves and their communities. Almost two-thirds of the defenders who responded to our question on the impact of the abuse they suffered say that they have feared for their safety and almost half report a loss of productivity.

This means that there is a real risk that this online abuse is impacting defenders’ campaigning, which impedes progress on climate action and solutions.

Something clearly needs to change, and the platforms on which a lot of this abuse occurs must bear some of the responsibility.

When we dig a little deeper into the data from the survey responses, some disturbing trends emerge.

Activists from Extinction Rebellion march through Berlin dressed as billionaires, including Big Tech CEOs Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg

Activists from Extinction Rebellion march through Berlin dressed as billionaires, including Big Tech CEOs Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg. Sean Gallup / Getty Images

A Facebook problem

Defenders say they receive abuse on Facebook more than any other platform

Globally, Facebook is the platform that the highest number of defenders say they have suffered abuse on. The next most cited platforms for abuse are X and WhatsApp. Instagram is the fourth most common platform on which abuse has occurred.

Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram are all owned by Meta.

These results may in part reflect the popularity of Facebook overall as a platform (it has over 3 billion monthly active users, making it the largest social networking site globally).

Nevertheless, our survey has revealed that 82% of defenders who say they have suffered abuse online say that they have been abused on at least one of Meta’s three platforms.

Based on this data, Meta therefore holds a huge amount of responsibility when it comes to finding ways to address online harms to defenders.

The results shift slightly when comparing responses from different regions. For example, among defenders in Europe almost the same number reported experiencing abuse on X as on Facebook.

According to this survey, X therefore also holds a level of responsibility when it comes to addressing online harms to defenders.

We set out below a selection of first-hand accounts of defenders who agreed to speak with us after completing our survey. These accounts reflect the defenders’ personal experience and are given in the defenders’ own words.

Read the full report at: Global Witness

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NGO WORK

Solidarity statement in support of communities and ILC Africa members in special circumstances.

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Solidarity statement in support of communities and ILC Africa members in special circumstances. ILC Africa stands in unwavering solidarity with our members and communities who continue to face land injustices and other human rights violations due to forced evictions and land/natural resource-related conflicts in Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kenya. Across Africa, large-scale land acquisitions continue to pose significant challenges, particularly for millions of rural communities who live on and depend on land for their livelihood.

While these land deals are promoted as opportunities for agricultural investment, biodiversity conservation through fortress conservation, and economic growth, they frequently lead to displacement, loss of livelihoods, and social conflicts. This is particularly concerning because many affected communities lack formal land titles, making them vulnerable to dispossession without adequate, fair, and just compensation.

Additionally, weak governance and unclear land tenure systems exacerbate tensions, as foreign investors and governments prioritize commercial interests over the rights of communities. In some cases, these acquisitions have fueled protests and unrest, highlighting the urgent need for transparent policies that protect land rights and ensure equitable development.

Since June 2022, the Maasai communities in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area have faced ongoing uncertainty and fear of displacement from their ancestral lands, as commercial tourism investments threaten their ancestral homes. Repeated instances of violent forced evictions have intensified their plight. Although we acknowledge the steps taken by the Government of Tanzania to facilitate dialogue through the establishment of two presidential commissions tasked with examining the underlying causes of the land crisis in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Loliondo, we underscore the importance and need for genuine and inclusive engagements with stakeholders that will result in human rights centred solutions in the interest of the thousands of affected communities.

Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Rwandan Army’s military occupation of Eastern DRC in early 2025, through the proxy of M23, has thrust local communities, including ILC’s member Union Pour L’emancipation De La Femme Autochtone (UEFA) and the communities they work with, into a state of turmoil and instability. Despite mounting international pressure and emerging diplomatic efforts, Rwanda’s persistent actions appear to be driven by a longstanding interest in exploiting the region’s rare minerals, vast agricultural lands, and securing strategic transport corridors to establish a dominant logistics position in East Africa.

The ongoing conflict in the DRC has inflicted widespread devastation on communities across several regions particularly in South and North Kivu provinces, Mwenga and Shabunda regions, Bitale and Kalonge, Idjwi, Bunyakiri, Bukanga-Lonzo and Maï-Ndombe province among others. This conflict has unleashed a deepening humanitarian crisis marked by widespread displacement, violence, and economic collapse. Communities are grappling with mass exodus, destruction of homes and farmland, and pervasive human rights abuses—including rape, extortion, kidnappings, and murders. Civilian infrastructure has been repurposed or blocked, access to basic services has crumbled, and families are enduring hunger, illness, and extreme overcrowding. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, facing targeted violence and loss of livelihoods. The war, driven by foreign interest in minerals, land, and strategic routes, is tearing apart the social fabric and plunging already fragile populations into greater instability.

In Kenya, the Ogiek people’s fight for justice took a critical turn during a compliance hearing at the AfricanCourt on Human and Peoples’ Rights, reaffirming their rightful ownership of ancestral lands in the Mau Forest and ordering reparations. However, despite past rulings in 2017 and 2022, the Kenyan
government’s continued delays led to renewed suffering. Most devastatingly, in November 2023, over 700
Ogiek were forcibly evicted from Narok County, with homes, schools, and property burned—despite clear court orders forbidding such actions. The community faced severe losses and emotional turmoil, underscoring persistent violations of their rights.Delays in implementation continue to harm lives and disrupt livelihoods, while the ongoing disregard for collective land rights weakens the broader framework
of Indigenous Peoples protections across Africa.

In the face of these multiple adversities, the struggle of these communities is not just for their own survival but also for the preservation of ecosystems and the rights of future generations.

We call on the respective governments, relevant authorities and private actors responsible for the persistent land and natural resource related conflicts and forced evictions to:

  • Immediately and unconditionally ceasefire by all armed actors to halt the violence and protect civilians including land and environmental defenders.
  • Facilitate and create an enabling environment for an inclusive and genuine dialogue with the affected stakeholders that will result in human rights centered solutions to the long standing land and natural resource related forced evictions and conflicts.
  • End all forms of forced evictions including those justified by conservation goals or carbon-credit projects, and respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, including women and youth.
  • Respect and enforce court orders from both national and international judicial bodies.Secure the legal recognition of the communal land rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local
    Communities and deliver just through reparations for historical land injustices.
  • Protect land and environmental defenders from violence and persecution and hold perpetrators accountable for human rights violations.
  • Support sustainable and people centered conservation models that prioritize the well-being of local communities.

We call on International and Development Partners to:

  • Support the international advocacy and lobbying efforts of the communities: by amplifying calls for justice and accountability. Coordinated lobbying can help maintain pressure on the Government to uphold commitments to fair land policies and prevent forced displacements.

We call on the civil society to take urgent action:

  • Strengthen the social movement by fostering unity and resilience across all affected areas. This includes mobilizing communities to stand together in opposition to any government directives that threaten land security. A unified stance will enhance the community’s capacity to resist external pressure.
  • In the case of the Maasai of Ngorongoro Conservation Area, we invite the CSOs and other relevant non-state actors to support the on-going Ministerial and Presidential (Through the two Commissions of Inquiry into the land question and the relocation process). Engagement with key government ministries, such as the Ministry of Land, Livestock, Natural Resources, and Tourism, and the Ministry of Local Government. The objective is to ensure these institutions fully understand the root causes of the ongoing crises and are influenced to support just and sustainable solutions.

ILC Africa remains steadfast in its commitment to advocating for justice and fair land governance across the continent, standing with communities in their fight for dignity, land security, and human rights.

Source: International Land Coalition-ILC

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