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Summary of Specific Instance Complaint to the United States National Contact Point against Marsh regarding its support for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline

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On February 7, 2023, 10 Ugandan and Tanzanian organizations and Inclusive Development International brought a complaint to the United States National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (‘the US NCP’). The complaint outlines failures by the U.S.-based insurance broker firm Marsh, part of the Marsh McLennan Group, to meet the standards of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (‘OECD Guidelines’) in relation to its reported role as insurance broker for the construction phase of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (‘EACOP’).

The full complaint document is not disclosed, per the confidentiality provisions of the US NCP operating  procedures. This document summarizes the key points of the complaint and provides background information on the OECD, US NCP, and the complaint procedure. The Ugandan and Tanzanian complainants are choosing to remain anonymous due to the security risks associated with filing this complaint.

Adverse Impacts associated with the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)
The EACOP is expected to cause—and in many instances, is already causing—extensive and severe adverse human rights and environmental impacts, which the project sponsors have failed to adequately address, prevent and mitigate. These include:1

• Improper land acquisition without adequate safeguards: The project’s land acquisition process is being carried out in a manner inconsistent with human rights and international standards, with adverse impacts being exacerbated rather than mitigated. Communities have reported coercion in the land acquisition and valuation process; have faced hardship due to delayed compensation and restrictions
on the use of their land; and report having received inadequate compensation for their acquired land and assets.

• Security risks and impacts: There are numerous reports of intimidation, harassment, security threats and arbitrary arrests of community members, environmental and human rights defenders, and journalists critical of the project.

• Failure to adequately consult local communities: The complaint points to detailed testimony from local communities that demonstrates a failure by the project sponsors to meaningfully consult affected people, including by failing to provide local communities with information on the project’s risks and providing misleading information about the potential economic benefits.

• Impacts to natural resources: EACOP would put vital freshwater resources at risk from oil spills. The pipeline route traverses numerous lakes, rivers and wetlands, including the Lake Victoria basin,

See  the Assessment of the EACOP and Associated Facilities’ Compliance with the Equator Principles and IFC Performance Standards,  pproduced by Inclusive Development International, BankTrack, and African Institute for Energy Governance (July 2022). See also the community-based reviews of the human rights impact of EACOP by Oxfam and others, Empty Promises Down the Line? A Human Rights Impact Assessment of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (September 2020) and by Les Amis de la Terre and Survie, A Nightmare Named Total (October 2020) and EACOP: A Disaster in the Making (October 2022), and the preliminary environmental and socio-economic
threat analysis for EACOP conducted by WWF Safeguarding people & nature in the East Africa crude oil pipeline project (July 2017).

which supports 40 million people in the region. The pipeline also risks contaminating the high-quality groundwater relied upon by millions for consumption. In addition, the construction and operation of EACOP will threaten agricultural land, forests and wetlands relied on for farming, energy for cooking, construction materials, medicine and cultural goods.

• Impacts to ecosystems and protected areas: The EACOP would cause, and is already causing, immense and irreversible harm to local ecosystems and habitats, including from the clearing of land for construction and the risk of oil spills or leaks. In particular, the pipeline threatens to irreversibly impact a number of legally protected and/or internationally recognized wildlife areas along its route and off the coast of Tanzania.

Climate impacts: The full value chain emissions of EACOP is expected to reach 379 million metrictons of CO2 over the pipeline’s 25-year operational lifetime.2 As such, the project poses unacceptable climate risks, which are fundamentally incompatible with the Paris Agreement and a pathway to limit warming to 1.5°C.

The Complainants submit that many of the most egregious impacts associated the project are inherent to the project and are therefore impossible to adequately mitigate. The EACOP is a fundamentally unsustainable and untenable project that should not proceed.

Marsh’s role in enabling the project to proceed
In May 2022, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Financial Times reported that Marsh had secured the contract to serve as insurance broker for the construction phase of the EACOP.3 In its role as broker, Marsh is tasked with arranging insurance for the pipeline. The company pursued this contract despite internal resistance from the corporate group’s own employees, who called on management to refuse the engagement.

The EACOP cannot be constructed without insurance. It is a legal requirement under Ugandan law that the EACOP must be insured, and large-scale construction projects such as the EACOP are unlikely to be financially viable without insurance. Through its engagement as insurance broker for the EACOP, Marsh is enabling the construction of the pipeline and is therefore contributing to the above adverse impacts.

The Complainants have contacted Marsh numerous times to attempt to engage in a dialogue in relation to the EACOP and to inform Marsh of potential risks that should be reflected in its due diligence process. Marsh did not respond to any of this correspondence. Accordingly, the complainants have turned to the US National Contact Point to resolve this dispute.

Marsh’s breaches of the OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises apply to all companies based in or with operations in OECD countries, including the United States. As a U.S.-based company, Marsh should operate in alignment with the Guidelines. The complaint alleges that Marsh has breached the Guidelines in four main ways:

Contribution to adverse impacts
The Guidelines specify that companies should avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts, including human rights and environmental impacts, and to address such impacts where they occur. Where companies have caused or contributed to impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in the provision of remedy. Where

https://climateaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/CAI-EACOP-Rptlores-Oct22.pdf
https://www.ft.com/content/597a2b01-fb54-4fd3-b326-dadf52dc250a
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2022-05-19/insurance-giant-marsh-signs-on-forenvironmentally-disastrous-pipeline-project

adverse impacts are only directly linked to a company’s operations, products or services by a business relationship (but the company has not itself caused or contributed to the impacts), the company must seek to prevent or mitigate the impacts.

The complaint argues that by providing insurance brokerage services, Marsh is contributing to the adverse environmental and human rights impacts that would be, or have already been, caused by the EACOP. In particular, the complaint argues that Marsh is contributing to the adverse impacts under the Guidelines6 (and is not just directly linked) because: (1) it is enabling the project to go ahead by arranging legally and financially necessary insurance coverage; and (2) in light of the wealth of publicly available information on the damaging effects of EACOP, the human rights and environmental impacts were foreseeable and should have been identified in Marsh’s due diligence process.

Due diligence

Under the Guidelines, companies must conduct risk-based due diligence to identify, prevent and mitigate adverse impacts related to human rights and the environment. The complaint argues that whatever environmental and social due diligence process Marsh may have conducted in relation to EACOP was deficient, as any adequate due diligence process would have concluded that EACOP entails unacceptable unmitigatedenvironmental and human rights risks.

Disclosure
Companies should disclose relevant information on their due diligence policies and processes, including what actions they have taken to prevent or mitigate risks that they identify.8 Marsh has failed to disclose adequate information about its due diligence policy and processes, including failing to disclose any information on the due diligence it conducted in relation to the EACOP.

Sustainable Development
The Guidelines requires companies to operate in a manner that contributes to sustainable development and respects internationally recognized human rights. The complaint alleges that Marsh is undermining sustainable development efforts by supporting EACOP, as it is a fundamentally unsustainable project that poses unmanageable climate, environmental and social risks.

Remedies Sought
To remedy these breaches and bring its operations back into alignment with the OECD Guidelines, the Complainants are calling on Marsh to:
• Publicly confirm whether or not it is currently acting as broker for the EACOP, and disclose whether it has any involvement in the associated Tilenga, Kingfisher, or Kabaale refinery projects.

OECD Guidelines, General Policies, paras 11-12; OECD Guidelines, Human Rights, paras 1-6; OECD Guidelines, Environment, paras 3 and  Guidance on when companies will contribute to adverse impacts is at: OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, page 70; OECD Guidelines, General Policies, commentary para 14; OECD Due Diligence for Responsible Corporate Lending and Securities Underwriting, pages 44-45 OECD Guidelines, General Policies, paras 10-12.; OECD Guidelines, Human Rights, para 5; OECD Guidelines, Environment, para. OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, page 33; OECD Guidelines, Disclosure paras 2-3. OECD Guidelines, General Policies, paras 1-2; OECD Guidelines, Human Rights, paras 1-6.

• Cease its role as broker for the construction of the EACOP and make a public statement to this effect. In addition, Marsh should not be broker for future renewals of insurance cover (such as for the operation phase of the project).
• Fully disclose its current human rights and environmental due diligence policies and procedures.
• Publicly disclose the due diligence process that it undertook in relation to the EACOP specifically, including any areas of risk it identified and the actions it took to prevent or mitigate those risks.
• Adopt and disclose an effective due diligence policy and procedures for future potential engagements. The procedures should set out how Marsh identifies and addresses the environmental and human rights impacts associated with the companies and projects for which it provides insurance brokerage services.
• Stop publicly claiming to be committed to the Sustainable Development Goals unless it ceases its support for the EACOP and improves its environmental and human rights due diligence procedures.

The Complainants request that the US NCP offer its good offices to resolve this complaint. In particular, the Complainants request that the NCP consider these allegations and issue recommendations to bring Marsh back into compliance with the Guidelines.

What happens next?
The US NCP must first determine whether the complaint is admissible, including by assessing whether there is a likely link between Marsh’s activities and the issues raised, and whether the issue is material and substantiated. If the NCP accepts the complaint, it will offer to bring the complainants and Marsh together for a mediated dialogue, subject to both parties’ voluntary participation. Through this mediation, the parties will attempt to negotiate a resolution of the issue.

At the end of the process, the NCP will publicly issue a final statement which outlines the allegations of the complaint, any outcomes reached during the mediation, or reasons why an agreement was not reached. The NCP may also issue recommendations as to how the Guidelines are to be implemented.

Further background on the OECD, OECD Guidelines, and National Contact Points
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization with 38 member countries, created to promote economic growth, prosperity and sustainable development.

Because Marsh is based in the United States, a member country of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it should follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The OECD Guidelines are recommendations from governments to multinational enterprises with operations or headquarters in OECD adhering countries. The Guidelines set out non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct across a range of issues, including human rights and the environment.

All OECD countries are required to establish National Contact Points within their governments. National Contact Points (NCPs) are a unique grievance mechanism responsible for receiving complaints from people or organizations who allege that companies have not complied with the Guidelines.

More information on the US NCP’s procedures can be found here: https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/a-guide-to-the-u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/#FinalStatement
https://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/oecd/about-the-oecd/

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A new wave of land grabs strikes Tanzania

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Tanzania was one of the most heavily targeted countries of a huge scramble for farmland around the world that followed the food and financial crises of 2008 and that was supposed to help solve global food insecurity. The large farm projects, which became a strategy of choice for donors, multinational corporations and some governments, ultimately caused more harm than good by exacerbating land conflicts and destroying people’s livelihoods. In Tanzania, most of these projects soon collapsed and caused miseries for small farmers. But, despite this tragic record, Tanzania’s government is pursuing another round of foreign agribusiness investment by turning hundreds of thousands of hectares of lands into block farms where corporations will produce export crops, not local foods for the people. With China looking to Tanzania as a new supply source for soybeans, the stage could be set for another wave of land grabs, with dire consequences for Tanzania’s small farmers.

It should have been the death knell for large-scale agribusiness in Tanzania. In early 2019, Kilombero Plantation Limited (KPL), the much-hyped, showcase model of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor for Tanzania (SAGCOT), went bankrupt.[1] Despite receiving tens of millions of dollars from foreign development banks and investors, the owner of this large-scale rice farm, a UK-based private equity fund, was unable to pay off its debts and the farm was seized by its creditors. Tanzania’s NMB Bank spent the next two years trying to find a buyer, before the government stepped in to acquire it, and then handed it over to the Army to manage.[2]

The 5,818-hectare rice farm was once highlighted by the G7 and the World Economic Forum as proof that large-scale agribusiness could drive Africa’s agricultural growth. But, with the firm in financial ruin, Kilombero Plantations Limited became instead a stark example of Tanzania’s misguided and failed decade-long drive to increase foreign investment in agriculture.

The collapse of Kilombero Plantations was the latest in a long list of failed agribusiness projects in Tanzania, ushered in by a series of donor-funded programmes under the Presidency of Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015).[3] These programmes– beginning with Kilimo Kwanza in 2006, then SAGCOT in 2010, and finally Big Results Now in 2013– aimed to make large areas of land available to companies, on the assumption that these would make Tanzania an export powerhouse, ensure food security, and most importantly, bring employment, technology, services (training, inputs, machinery, etc) and new markets for the small farmers living near to the farms. SAGCOT alone claimed it would bring in USD 2.1 billion in private sector investment.[4] But after 10 years, very little of this promised investment had materialised, and, of the few projects that got off the ground, most had failed, leaving a legacy of problems for the affected communities to deal with.[5]

By the time of the Kilombero Plantations bankruptcy, Tanzania’s then President, Dr John Pombe Magufuli, had grown frustrated with the approach of his predecessor, and had begun charting a new course. He scrapped the Big Results Now programme and began winding down SAGCOT. His government cancelled funding to a SAGCOT “catalytic fund” that had been created through a World Bank Loan– a clear sign of the changed approach.[6] And he also launched a process to revoke dozens of land titles from companies that had failed to bring lands under production.[7]

But in 2021, Magufuli died, and his successor, his Vice-President, Samia Suluhu Hassan, quickly reversed direction. Under the leadership of her Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, large-scale agribusiness once again became the government’s priority and the doors were swung wide open for domestic or foreign companies wanting large areas of farmland. SAGCOT resumed its central role, with an expanded mandate to establish corridors across the whole country.[8] Hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds have been budgeted for large-scale irrigation and, through a programme that claims to support the involvement of youth in agriculture, hundreds of thousands of hectares of lands across the country are being cleared and consolidated into “block farms” and offered to companies for the production of specified export crops.[9]

Betting on tomorrow

The centrepiece of President Samia’s renewed effort to allocate lands to agribusiness companies is a programme called Building a Better Tomorrow (BBT).[10] Under this programme, the government designates and clears large areas of land for conversion to large-scale, irrigated agriculture, called “block farms”, in which a selection of youth and women, mainly from urban cities and graduates from universities, are allocated small plots of between 1 – 10 acres (0.4-4 ha), while local communities are sidelined. In July 2023, President Samia announced that all 52,000 youth who had applied to join the army that year would be drafted into the BBT programme.[11]

Each BBT block farm is to produce a specific crop for a company that co-invests in the operation. In the model, the company will supply the inputs and machinery and purchase all of the production. It can also get a 99-year lease on a portion of the block farm area to farm the lands itself. The BBT farmers meanwhile get 33 to 66 year titles, and, while they can transfer the titles to someone else, they cannot change the conditions of their contract. They will thus be at the mercy of the company controlling the farm from whom they must buy all of their inputs and to whom they must sell all of their harvests.[12]

President Samia has stated that 690,000 hectares around the country have already been identified for block farms, but there is no publicly available information about the exact locations. In January 2023, the government published a first call for investment proposals for various BBT block farms on 65,000 hectares in the regions of Dodoma, Mbeya, Kagera and Kigoma. Interested companies could apply for lands of between 400 to 8,000 hectares on each block farm.

In March 2023, the first BBT farm was officially opened in the Chamwino district of Dodoma Region. The Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, explained that an initial 162 hectares were allocated for training 812 youth selected to participate in the project.[13] Despite access to land being an issue for the local communities, most of the youth selected for the project are not local and have little of any agricultural experience. The farm in Dodoma is supposed to eventually extend to 11,453 hectares and will produce grapes for a wine processing plant. But there has been no public mention of any private investor as of yet.

Promotional photoshoot of youth farmers at the BBT block farm in Dodoma, Tanzania, 25 March 2023. Source Twitter (X)

Prudence Lugengo, a policy specialist with SAGCOT, says lands for another BBT farm have also been allocated in the regions of Katavi and Tabora. In this case, the BBT farm is said to be a massive, 120,000-hectare block farm that will produce wheat for the Tanzanian agribusiness company MeTL, owned by the Tanzanian billionaire and former politician Mohammed Dewji. According to Lugengo, MeTL will acquire 50,000 hectares for itself and the remaining 70,000 hectares will be allocated under the BBT programme for youth. MeTL did not respond to our requests for confirmation of the deal, and it is not clear how Dewji will be financing this project.[14] It should be noted that just a few years ago, Magufuli’s government revoked several titles for large areas of farmland belonging to Dewji because of his failure to bring them into production.[15]

Together with the aforementioned issues, the odds and prospects of the glorified BBT programme are questionable in its very early days, with allegations surfacing within the corridors of social media, accounting on the government’s failure to live and fulfil its promises. As of late January 2024, a letter alleged to have originated from one BBT youth participant was widely circulated on social media, asserting that the government had failed to allocate to them the promised 5 hectares of land, individually, (let alone the 10 hectares originally promised) and so has the government failed to establish irrigation facilities. Instead, 260 of the youth who had passed through the training programme were sent to a 600 acres farm area in Chinangali, where they are farming without irrigation or decent housing, and are producing sunflower under an off-take arrangement with a company, without any guarantee of a land allocation for themselves.[16]

What are “block farms”?

A “block farm” is a large, contiguous area of land devoted to the production of a few or even a single crop. In Africa, a “block farm” programme can take many forms, but generally the government ensures that the lands are ready and available for large-scale farming, provides infrastructure (such as roads or irrigation) and identifies one or two companies to be the main or “anchor” investors. Normally, a portion of the lands will be farmed and acquired by the company on a 99-year lease and another portion will be farmed by medium to small-scale farmers who must produce crops for the company under contract.

Zambia has pursued a programme since 2006 to establish block farms of 100,000 hectares in each of its 10 provinces. Although the government failed to attract any “credible investors”, in 2023 it hoped to revive the programme through a USD 300 million loan from the World Bank for the construction of infrastructure at the farm sites.[17] The Government of Malawi also launched a block farm programme in 2020, consisting of a number of what it calls “mega farms” of around 5,000 hectares each. It too has struggled to attract significant private sector investment.[18]

A new soybean frontier for China?

Despite the pomp surrounding the roll-out of the BBT programme, there is little evidence of much interest from the private sector. The only significant funds that have so far been committed are from the government, which has pledged USD 1.4 billion over the next 10 years, and from a similar batch of donors to those who supported the SAGCOT era investment drive. These include the World Bank (USD 300 million), the African Development Bank (USD 100 million), AGRA (USD 40 million), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (USD 60 million) and USAID (USD 100 million).[19]

Soybeans could be an exception, and in particular, soybeans destined for China. Due to the growing tensions with the US and the war in the Ukraine, China is increasingly concerned about its dependence on these two countries for soybeans (as well as maize), and it is now looking to Africa as an alternative source of supply. Tanzania is one of three African countries that China has identified for the development of soybean exports. In 2020, it passed a phytosanitary measure to allow the import of soybeans from Tanzania and the first shipment was made the following year by China’s largest grain trader, COFCO.[20] In November 2022, President Samia signed a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership with China during her visit to Beijing in which soybean exports were specified as an initial priority and a task force was created for implementation.

At the moment, Tanzania only produces 200,000 tonnes of soybeans per year– a mere drop in the bucket compared to China’s annual import of 100 million tonnes, most of which goes to produce animal feed and vegetable oil. Production would have to increase dramatically for Tanzania to become a significant supplier.

China’s largest seed company, Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture, has been tasked with pursuing this potential. The company is part of the CITIC Group, China’s largest state-owned conglomerate, and it is already playing a key role in advancing China’s control over soybean and maize production in Brazil, China’s most important supplier. After entering Brazil in 2017, Longping quickly became one of the top seed companies in the country. Now Longping is looking to do the same in Tanzania, as China seeks to export the Brazilian model to Africa.

“We want to take Longping’s expertise in maize and soybean seeds to [Tanzania and Ghana]. There, the climate conditions, temperature and altitude are similar to those in Brazil and very favourable for the development of agriculture. We want to be facilitators of this process, teach them how to plant and produce grains so that in the future they will also be suppliers to China”, says Aldenir Sgarbossa, President of Longping’s Brazilian operations.[21]

In 2022 and early 2023, Longping sent delegations to Tanzania to secure political support and to identify areas for soybean production. Tests of its soybean varieties from Brazil are now underway, as well as for its hybrid maize and sorghum seeds, which will be grown in rotation with the soybeans, as is done in Brazil. While these initial varieties are not GMOs, Longping has several GMO varieties under testing and awaiting approval for commercial sale in China, and it has already had some of its GMO maize varieties approved for human consumption.

Longping says it will invest over USD 213 million (500 billion shillings) in a first phase for developing soybean production in the south of Tanzania and will also invest in the improvement of grain exporting facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam.

The company’s operations in Tanzania are being run through a joint venture with a Tanzanian businessman, the media mogul Joseph Kusaga, owner of Clouds Entertainment Group, along with his wife, Juhayna Kusaga. Longping also has high level support from within the Ministry of Agriculture, from SAGCOT and even from former President Kikwete, who has been using his position as a director of AGRA to encourage Tanzanian farmers to plant soybeans for export to China.[22] As evidence of Longping’s political connections, the government gave it special clearance to reduce the required time for testing of its seeds from five years to five seasons, making it possible for Longping to start large-scale production in 2024.[23]

The Tanzanian government is also making lands available for the company. An initial area of 53,000 ha is said to have been allocated as a BBT farm in the Chunya District of Mbeya Region. Longping Tanzania says it has “acquired” 10,000 ha of these lands for its own farm and claims to have already started farming, while the remaining 43,000 ha will be allocated to participating farmers who the company will supply with seeds, fertilisers, and machinery.[24] The farmers must sell their harvests exclusively to Longping Tanzania, which will then export to China, where the Chinese government has offered a guarantee to purchase all of the soybeans that are produced.[25]

Vice-President of Tanzania Dr. Philip Mpango shakes hands with the CEO of Yuan Longping High-tech Agriculture, Liang Shi, outside the national State House. To the right is Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Anthony Mavunde. February 17, 2023 . Source : Twitter (X)

Longping’s ambitions extend beyond this BBT farm. The company is also setting up block farms with the recently established Soybean Association of Tanzania.[26] According to the association’s chairman, Marcus Albany, these block farms will bring together a group of farmers, with each farmer contributing an area of land (minimum is 2 hectares and maximum is 10% of the entire block farm) to establish one large farm that will be managed as a group. The farm will operate under a contract with Longping, which stipulates the amount the farmers must pay Longping for the supply of inputs and machinery and the price they receive for the sale of their harvests, with the amounts renegotiated each season. As with the BBT farms, a farmer can transfer their share of the lands to another farmer, but that farmer must then take on the same conditions agreed to with Longping.

The Soybean Association of Tanzania and Longping have already formed one block farm in Morogoro Region that is presently at 5,700 hectares and they expect it to eventually reach 10,500 hectares. They are in the process of setting up another one in Lindi Region on 10,500 hectares, one in Katavi starting at 202 hectares and one in Sumbawanga that is still in the process of negotiation with a private landowner. Albany says that, although his association is not made up of youth, the government is also trying to get them to be part of the BBT farm in Mbeya.

Other Tanzanian businessmen are also moving quickly to acquire lands for soybean production. The newly established company Jadeja Farming is developing a 2,800-hectare soybean farm on contested lands at Sumbawanga district in Rukwa Region.[27] The company has ties to Jatu PLC, a company listed on the national stock exchange that claimed to be pursuing block farms but that ended up defrauding its shareholders of over USD 2 million.[28] In the northern region of Kagera, a Tanzanian company called Global Agency is building a massive 21,000 ha maize and soybean farm. Despite its past legal and financial troubles, Global Agency has received substantial funding from the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (via a loan from the African Development Bank), as well as political support from high level members of President Samia’s party.[29]

Moreover, Longping is not the only Chinese company investing in soybean production in Tanzania. In the coastal region of Kilwa, a company called Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments is pursuing a 25,000 ha large-scale cassava and soybean farming project, on lands that were previously part of a much contested biofuels project that went bust. Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments is connected to the Chinese company, Beijing Chaoliang (translated as “Best Agro” or “Super Grain”), as well as Hunan Construction Engineering Group and the Djibouti Silk Road International Bank.[30] In July 2022, nearly 25,000 ha were converted from village lands to “Export Processing Zone” lands, opening the possibility for Pan Tanzania Agriculture Developments to acquire them on a long-term lease.[31]

Land conflicts will get much worse

The combination of China’s new interest in soybean exports from Tanzania and the Tanzanian government’s revitalised interest in foreign agribusiness investment is creating the conditions for a surge in land grabbing. Land conflicts are already present across the country, not only because of agribusiness projects but also because of deals for mining, wildlife and forest reserves, parks and carbon credit projects that the government is also pursuing. One of these, a “sustainable forestry” project with a company owned by a member of the Dubai Royal Family, involves setting aside eight million hectares of lands for the generation of carbon credits.[32]

The new push for block farms and soybean production adds fuel to a fire that is already running hot. For example, in the Kilosa District of Morogoro Region, tensions over land have simmered for decades between villagers who want to maintain access to lands for food production and businessmen who either use the lands for sisal plantations, rent them out for cash or hoard them and render them unproductive. The villagers finally succeeded in getting the government to intervene during the presidency of Magufuli and many land titles held by these businessmen were revoked. But the lands were not redistributed to the villagers. Instead, they were turned over to the District Councils, which are now consolidating the lands and leasing them out as block farms to so-called “farmer groups” to produce cash crops like sisal on the instructions of the state or are handing them over to businessmen and public agencies, such as Tanzania’s Agricultural Seed Agency.

Abdul Tumbo, a small farmer from Mvumi village in Kilosa District struggling to prevent his lands from being grabbed by businessmen and block farm schemes. (Photo: GRAIN)

Abdul Tumbo is a farmer from Mvumi village in Kilosa District. He has been repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for farming on lands that his grandparents farmed but that are also claimed by a powerful businessman. The Magufuli government revoked the businessman’s land titles a few years back but the District Council is now trying to organise these lands into a block farm instead of letting Tumbo and the other villagers continue with their farming. The villagers want nothing to do with the block farm. They say the land is theirs and there is no reason why they should pay rent for it. Moreover, they want to produce food for their families and communities, not commodities for companies.[33]

Tumbo points to one neighbouring community where the District Council has pushed ahead with a 325-hectare block farm on lands the local villagers have been farming since 1984 when a sisal estate was shuttered. In December 2022 the villagers planted local maize for food, and shortly after, on the very same lands, the “farmer group” planted sunflowers. Now the District Council has seized the maize harvest and tensions are boiling over.

Across Tanzania, similar conflicts are erupting as the government and businessmen illegally use backdoor channels to transfer large areas of village lands into block farms to produce soybeans and other crops for export. Thousands of small farmers and pastoralists could be displaced from their lands in the process, and many more could lose access to water, as these projects tend to involve the use of large amounts of water for irrigation. The impacts will be felt not only in rural areas, but also in urban centres, as the lands that small farmers now use to produce food for the country will be converted into large-scale farms to produce agricultural commodities for export.

In another example, in 2023, the government, controversially, gave an eviction order to villagers of at least 23 villages in Mbarali District through a government notice (no. 28 of 2008), whose implementation was delayed because of the controversy and uncertainty on the legality and morality of the notice itself. This eviction order affects one of the most productive districts and national food baskets for rice and will affect over 25,000 smallholder farmers in the area. The order is to expand the Ruaha National Park in a World Bank funded project.[34] At present, 852 villagers have taken the matter to the High Court of Tanzania to challenge the eviction order.[35]

The current situation in Tanzania is reminiscent of the ProSavana project that Japan sought to finance in Northern Mozambique a decade ago. That project involved the take-over of 14 million hectares of land in one of the most fertile and densely populated areas of the country to set up large farms and enlist farmers into contract farming schemes to produce soybeans and other cash crops for export to Japan. ProSavana was developed between the Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican governments behind closed doors, without the knowledge of the affected communities. When these communities became aware of what was going on, they immediately began to organise resistance, with the support of civil society organisations in Mozambique, Brazil and Japan. Despite the powerful forces aligned against them, Mozambican farmers and their allies managed to stop the project, and it was officially terminated in 2020.[36]

This is a critical moment for Tanzania’s small farmers and pastoralists to defend their lands. These food producers are already struggling with a lack of access to sufficient land and water, exacerbated by the climate crisis and the country’s rapidly growing population. They can produce an abundance of nutritious, chemical-free foods to feed the country, and even produce a surplus for export, if the right policies are in place to support their seed systems, provide protection for their lands and water and ensure they have adequate access to markets. Scarce public resources should not be wasted on a failed model of corporate agriculture.

Banner photo: Tanzania’s Minister of Agriculture, Hussein Bashe, visiting a block farm project in Chinangali area, Chamwino, Dodoma District. Source : Twitter (X)

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[1] Oakland Institute, “After Defaulting on Loans, Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL) Goes up for Sale,” March 2019: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/after-defaulting-loans-kilombero-plantation-sale

[2] “State tells off Kilombero plantation lobbyists,” Daily News, March 2023: https://dailynews.co.tz/state-tells-off-kilombero-plantation-lobbyists/

[3] For a selection of examples, see: “Annexe 2. Discarded land deals 2016” in GRAIN, “The global farmland grab in 2016: how big, how bad?”, June 2016: https://grain.org/e/5492

[4] SAGCOT also promised to establish large-scale farms on 350,000 ha, transition 100,000 small farmers into commercial farming, create 420,000 new employment opportunities, lift two million people out of poverty, and generate $1.2bn in annual farming revenue by 2030. See: Emmanuel Sulle, “Bureaucrats, investors and smallholders: contesting land rights and agro-commercialisation in the Southern agricultural growth corridor of Tanzania”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1743093

[5] Gideon Tups and Peter Dannenberg, “Emptying the Future, Claiming Space: The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania as a Spatial Imaginary for Strategic Coupling Processes”, Geoforum 123, 2021: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.04.015

[6] “Tanzania government cancels Sh100bn Sagcot scheme,” The Citizen, May 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-government-cancels-sh100bn-sagcot-scheme-2681476

[7] “Magufuli Revokes Title Deeds for 14 Undeveloped Farms,” Tanzania Daily News, August 2017: https://allafrica.com/stories/201708150094.html

[8] Personal communication with Prudence Lugengo, Policy Specialist with SAGCOT, 24 March 2023.

[9] The government increased the budget allocation for irrigation from 57bn/- 2021-22 to 416bn/- in 2022-23 and has a stated objective to expand the irrigation area from 727,280 hectares to 822,285 hectares in 2022/2023, with a national irrigation target of 1.2 million hectares for 2025 and 8.5 million hectares by 2030.

[10] The idea for the project is said to have come from Geoffrey Kirenga, the CEO of SAGCOT.

[11] “Tanzanian government to draft 52,000 JKT members into BBT scheme,” The Citizen, July 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzanian-government-to-draft-52-000-jkt-members-into-bbt-scheme-4299870

[12] Details about the block farms were gathered from various news reports, government documents and interviews with various people involved in the programme in March and April 2023.

[13] “BBT bring hope for youth employability,” The Guardian, March 2023: https://www.ippmedia.com/en/features/bbt-brings-hope-youth-employability

[14] In July 2022, Dewji told Reuters that he plans to list an agriculture company worth up to $4 billion on the New York or London stock exchanges in 2023, with money raised mainly from development banks. Rachel Savage, “Tanzanian entrepreneur Dewji plans $2-4 billion grains production investment via SPAC,” Reuters, July 2022: https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/tanzanian-entrepreneur-dewji-plans-2-4-bln-grains-production-investment-via-spac-2022-07-08/

[15] “Tanzania revokes titles to six farms owned by Dewji,” East African, January 2019: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-revokes-titles-to-six-farms-owned-by-dewji–1410744

[16] See the post by Maria Sarungi Tsehai (@MariaSTsehai), 27 January 2024 on Twitter (X): https://twitter.com/MariaSTsehai/status/1751133786195087548?t=Rbeb-qm73R83MVzH6UFt-g&s=19

[17] See 2023 Budget address by Honourable Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of Finance: https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/articles/2023%20Budget%20Speech.pdf; and Ministerial Statement by the Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Mtolo Phiri, MP, on the Farm Block Development Programme presented to the House, 16 March, 2023: https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/images/publication_docs/Ministerial%20Statement%20-%20On%20the%20Farm%20Block%20Development%20Programme.pdf

[18] Owen Khamula, “Agriculture ministry moves in to establish mega farms,” Nyasa Times, 30 June 2022: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/31400

[19] “Tanzania Country Presentation for HIH Investment Forum,” October 2023: https://www.fao.org/docs/handinhandlibraries/countries/tanzania/bbt_ps_m-m_presentation-raf-slide-wg-25-sept.pdf?sfvrsn=1dad93cf_1 and “USAID to invest $100M in supporting agribusiness youth in Tanzania,” Further Africa, November 2023: https://furtherafrica.com/2023/11/17/usaid-to-invest-100m-in-supporting-agribusiness-youth-in-tanzania/

[20] “First Shipment of Tanzanian Soybeans Enter China” June 2021: http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2021/06/25/c_7280.htm

[22] “Good news for soybeans farmers to effectively utilise Chinese market,” The Citizen, February 2022: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/business/good-news-for-soybeans-farmers-to-effectively-utilise-chinese-market-3721346

[23] Personal communication with Juhayna Kasuga, Director of Longping Tanzania, 21 March 2023.

[24] Personal communication with Juhayna Kasuga, Director of Longping Tanzania, 21 March 2023 and 27 November 2023.

[25] “Wakulima wa kusini wavutiwa na uwekezaji wa kampuni ya Longping High Tech”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation (Tanzania), May 2022: https://www.foreign.go.tz/resources/view/wakulima-wa-kusini-wavutiwa-na-uwekezaji-wa-kampuni-ya-longping-high-tech

[26] Personal communication with Marcus Albany, 24 March 2023.

[27] See the company website: http://jadeja.co.tz/about/. And the video about the farm: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZJf5eA0X64&ab_channel=JadejaFarming. The farm is known as the Efatha Farm, which was embroiled in a land conflict, see: ‘We were wrong on farm dispute’, The Citizen, October 2017: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/-we-were-wrong-on-farm-dispute–2609534

[28] A director of Jadeja, Hussein Msemwa, was the Assistant Manager of Jatu PLC (https://www.linkedin.com/in/hussein-msemwa-07246211b/?originalSubdomain=tz). For more on Jatu PLC, see: “Struggling Jatu Plc turns to Dutch consultant”, The Citizen, January 2023: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/business/struggling-jatu-plc-turns-to-dutch-consultant–4075174

[29] On the legal and financial troubles, see the court cases against Global Agency for failure to pay Rabobank (https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/judgment/tzhccomd/2021/3517/eng@2021-12-13) and Balton Tanzania (https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/judgment/tzhccomd/2022/378/eng@2022-11-11). On the political support from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Vice Chairman, Colonel Abdulrahman Kinana, see: https://panafricanvisions.com/2022/09/tanzania-ruling-party-vice-chairperson-welcomes-investors-in-kagera-region-which-is-suitable-for-opportunities/; and from the current Minister of Agriculture Hussein Bashe see: https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/bashe-orders-misenyi-dc-support-investors-promote-agro-investments. The TADB does not report publicly on its financing of companies, however the AfDB’s report on its loan to TADB indicates that Global Agency received funds from the TADB for a Kagera farm and that 45% of the entire AfDB loan of $67 million went to companies in Kagera (of which the only other company listed was the Kagera Cooperative Union). See: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/tanzania-tanzania-agricultural-development-bank-project-completion-report

[30] “Chaoliang Group’s Tanzania PTA construction project signed with Hunan Construction Engineering Group for USD 300 million,” China Agricultural Outlook News, October 2021: https://www.farmlandgrab.org//31442. Hunan Construction Engineering Group was sanctioned in 2013 by the World Bank for fraudulent practices in a road construction project in Tanzania: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/office-of-suspension-and-debarment/2018/nov-1/Notice-of-Uncontested-Sanctions-Proceedings-Case-268.pdf

[32] “Blue Carbon and the Government of Tanzania join forces to accelerate transition to low-carbon economy,” Gulf news, February 2023: https://gulfnews.com/business/corporate-news/blue-carbon-and-the-government-of-tanzania-join-forces-to-accelerate-transition-to-low-carbon-economy-1.1675752836855

[33] Interview with Abdul Tumbo, 29 March 2023.

[34] “World Bank investigating alleged crimes at $150 million Ruaha tourism project,” The Citizen, September 2023 https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/world-bank-investigating-alleged-crimes-at-150-million-ruaha-tourism-project-4384506

[35] “Smallholders In Mbarali Protest Govt Plans To Evict Them From Their Land,” The Chanzo, February 2023: https://thechanzo.com/2023/02/09/smallholders-in-mbarali-protest-govt-plans-to-evict-them-from-their-land/

[36] For more information on ProSavana, see: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827

Original Source: Grain

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NGO WORK

The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil explained: a primer for community organisations

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Palm oil is the world’s most common vegetable oil and an essential, cheap raw material for the unhealthy processed foods sold by multinational food companies. Palm oil production has nearly doubled over the past decade, mostly through the expansion of large-scale monoculture plantations, owned by corporations. These oil palm plantations are associated with deforestation, habitat destruction, greenhouse gas emissions and other problems such as water pollution. Oil palm plantation companies have been accused of theft of land from indigenous and other communities, criminalisation of human rights defenders and labour and human rights abuses.

Twenty years ago, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was set up to address these concerns by bringing together ‘stakeholders’ from various parts of the industry, as well as environmental and social organisations. Its founders said this would prevent the destruction of valuable forests and ensure respect for the rights of plantation workers, smallholder farmers and indigenous people. But experience with the RSPO over the past two decades shows that it has failed to live up to its objectives. It has arguably become more of an industry ‘front’ organisation, principally concerned with helping to protect companies, market palm oil and expand the model of industrial monocultures, rather than a means of ensuring higher standards.

Worse, there is much confusion and a lack of awareness about what the RSPO is and what it means for local communities, workers and even the companies occupying their lands. Grassroots organisations and international allies, including GRAIN, recently agreed to develop information and education tools to help workers and communities better understand the RSPO. This primer, “The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil explained”, is one such tool – a collective document, published by GRAIN but produced with inputs from many organisations.

Source: Grain

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NGO WORK

US Luxury Safari Operator Tightens Stranglehold Over Maasai Land in Tanzania

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Oakland, CA – Boston-based Thomson Safaris is exploiting the Tanzanian government’s brutal repression of land defenders to legitimize control over Maasai land in the Loliondo Division of the Ngorongoro District. In June 2022, the government carried out land demarcation to create a Game Reserve in Loliondo, which saw security forces fire live ammunition on the Maasai, severely wounding dozens and displacing thousands. In the immediate aftermath of these events, Thomson Safaris carried out a resurvey of a long-contested land claim they have in the same area. Communities say they were excluded from the resurvey process and alleged in a November 2023 court filing that they have since suffered abuse by the company’s agents enforcing the new boundaries.

“Over the past two years, the Tanzanian government has repeatedly shown it will aid and abet foreign corporations operating luxury safaris at the expense of the Maasai communities who have stewarded these lands for generations. While labeling itself as a sustainable tourism operator, the American firm is getting away with capitalizing on this repression,” said Anuradha Mittal, Executive Director of the Oakland Institute.

Capitalizing on Chaos: Thomson Safaris Tightens Its Stranglehold Over Indigenous Lands in Tanzania exposes how in the aftermath of the resurvey, the strict enforcement of the new boundaries has aggravated daily hardships for the villagers who report incidents of violence – allegedly committed by Thomson Safaris’ guides – against pastoralists and their children. One villager cited in the report alleges, “My boy was taking care of the livestock when he was caught by a Thomson Safaris’ guide and beaten for no reason. He suffered injuries on his body…Our rights have been violated by an intruder in our ancestors’ land.”

As documented in the Oakland Institute’s 2018 report, Losing the Serengeti, since 2006, the Mondorosi, Sukenya, and Soitsambu villages have been ensnared in a prolonged struggle for the return of their lands against the company. Local communities seek to reclaim 10,000 acres of land in what is known to them as the Sukenya farm, originally transferred forty years ago without their Free, Prior, and Informed Consent and vital to their pastoral livelihoods. For over a decade, communities have pursued legal action for the full return of their land in the High Court of Tanzania and Court of Appeal, but to no avail.

On June 8, 2022, the Tanzanian government initiated the illegal demarcation of over 370,000 acres of land in Loliondo Division to create a Game Reserve. The exercise led to widespread violence by state security forces, with dozens of community leaders and villagers arbitrarily arrested while others were forced into hiding. According to local communities, Thomson Safaris took advantage of this increasing state violence against the Maasai and the ensuing chaos to consolidate its claim to the land.

The strict enforcement of the Sukenya farm’s boundaries has reportedly forced villagers to walk hours to access essential medical services and schools. Communities have also lost access to prime grazing land, which has been particularly catastrophic in the context of the drought that ravaged the Horn of Africa between 2020 and 2023. Thomson Safaris is now allegedly lobbying the Tanzanian government to change the land use in the surrounding area exclusively for tourism – a move that would further prohibit Maasai pastoralists’ livestock from accessing vital water and grazing land.

In response to an inquiry by the Oakland Institute, Thomson Safaris’ attorneys in Tanzania denied the allegations about the resurvey and its impact on villagers. While they called the claims “baseless,” the firm failed to provide any evidence that the resurvey took place with full community participation. Despite the ongoing land dispute and allegations of violence made in court by villagers, the company remains the preferred Tanzania operator for high-profile universities, museums, and conservation groups.

Alongside Capitalizing on Chaos, the Institute released Pulling Back the Curtain: How the US Drives Tanzania’s War on the Indigenous. The brief reveals how Tanzania’s largest bilateral donor has been instrumental in designing the country’s aggressive strategy to expand the tourism industry at the expense of Indigenous communities. It details how the US is behind a number of policy changes and measures that have led to the expansion of so-called protected areas and favored private operators, including fiscal measures to their benefit. USAID has for instance prepared development plans for Ruaha National Park – currently being implemented by the World Bank – that will result in the eviction of tens of thousands of people. It has also enabled the creation of new Game Reserves, which will seize over a million hectares of Maasai land and evict thousands of people.

“The fingerprints of the US government are all over the harmful policies and projects to expand protected areas, rendering it complicit in the forced evictions of the Maasai and other local communities across the country. It has turned a blind eye to the egregious human rights abuses of the government so that the rich Americans can keep going on upscale safaris and operators like Thomson Safaris keep raking in massive profits,” concluded Mittal.

Indigenous communities are not enduring hardships solely because of the wrongdoings of the Tanzanian government. The US government and private operators like Thomson Safaris all bear their share of responsibility and must be held accountable for it.

Source: oaklandinstitute.org

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